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La scientologie et le fisc aux USA et au Royaume-Uni

L'exemption d'impôts accordée par le fisc américain à la scientologie est illégale et anti-constitutionnelle (United States Court of Appeals for the ninth circuit - December 12, 2008)

Un procès aux USA s'attaque à l'exemption d'impôts de la scientologie / Court Case Poses Challenge to Scientology Tax Break (nytimes.com - 21 mars 2004)

U.S. Court rules Orthodox Jews cannot use the same tax deductions as Scientologists (Counterknowledge.com - December 16, 2008)

Ninth Circuit Court Rejects Arguments That Children's Religious School Tuition Should Be Tax Deductible (marketwatch.com - Dec 12, 2008)

Scientology is tax-exempt in the United States ? (Anoymous - 2010)

Does Scientology enjoy this tax-exemption in other countries, or just the United States? (Anonymous - 2010)

The Shadowy Story Behind Scientology's Tax-Exempt Status (New York Times, 9 March 1997)

An Ultra-Aggressive Use of Investigators and the Courts (New York Times, 9 mars 1997)

L'histoire louche qui se cache derrière le statut d'exonération fiscale de la Scientologie (New York Times, 9 March 1997)

Un scientologue américain, Hernandez, voulait déduire les sommes qu'il versait à la scientologie des sommes déclarées au fisc (caselaw.lp.findlaw.com - June 5, 1989)

UK: Décision de la "Charity Commission" du Royaume Uni concernant la scientologie (UK - 1993)

IRS: Closing Agreement On Final Determination Covering Specific Matters (october 1993)

 
L'exemption d'impôts accordée par le fisc USA à
la scientologie est illégale et anti-constitutionnelle
 

Comme la France, les Etats-Unis ne reconnaissent aucune religion. Par contre la scientologie n'y est pas consi- dérée comme une secte. Cette idée comme quoi la scientologie serait reconnue comme religion aux USA découle d'une décision des impôts américains (IRS) d'exempter d'impôts les nombreuses entités de la nébuleuse sciento- logue et de donner aux membres des droits refusés aux membres d'autres organisations exemptées (voir à ce propos l'affaire Sklar ci-dessous).

Cette exemption a été obtenue sous la pression, d'une part de milliers de demandes de membres et d'autre part sans doute par des moyens moins avouables (on a parlé de chantage sur des dirigeants de l'IRS).

Le couple Sklar contre l'IRS

Les Sklar sont un couple juif qui met ses enfants dans des écoles religieuses et voulait donc, conformément aux avantages exorbitants accordés aux scientologues, déduire la formation religieuse de ses enfants des impôts qu'ils paient. Le fisc américain n'a cessé de refuser de leur appliquer les mêmes avantages que ceux accordés aux scientologues, lesquels déduisent au moins 80% de leurs versements à la secte de leurs propres impôts.

Dans le procès en appel de Michael Sklar et Marla Sklar, appelants, contre le Commissaire de l'IRS (fisc américain), voici ce qu'on peut lire. Rappelons brièvement les faits: les scientologues américains ayant obtenu une exemption illicté d'impôts pour ce qu'ils versent comme fonds à leur secte, une famille de religion juive de Los Angelès a demandé à bénéficier du même avantage pour les études religieuses de ses enfants. Elle n'a pas obtenu gain de cause, mais ici, on lit que la Cour d'Appel estime que l'avantage accordé aux scientologues par le fisc devrait leur être retiré (ou, en tout cas, l'affaire devrait faire l'objet d'un procès contre l'IRS et la secte)

"Nous [c'est le président de la Cour d'appel qui écrit] rejetons par conséquent l'argument selon lequel le compromis final entre l'église de scientologie et l'IRS [fisc américain], ou au moins, la partie du compro- mis qui établit les règles applicables aux membres de la scientologie en général, ne soit pas assujetti à l'obligation de publication auprès du public. L'IRS n'a simplement pas le droit d'établir des compromis finaux avec des organisations religieuses ou sans but lucratif, accords qui gouverneraient des déduc- tions, puis de taire ces compromis auprès des tribunaux, du Congrès et du public.

.../...

Un compromis final de l'IRS ne peut supplanter le Congrès ni la Cour Suprême.

Si l'IRS donne en fait un traîtement préférentiel aux membres de l'église de scientologie, en leur donnant un droit spécial de prétendre à des déductions qui sont contraires à la loi, et que l'IRS refuse avec raison ce droit à tous les autres, l'action correcte à entreprendre alors est de porter plainte afin de mettre fin à cette politique. Le remède ne consiste pas à exiger que les autres obtiennent aussi cette déduction imméritée.


Une 3e cour américaine juge inconstitutionnelle
l'exemption d'impôts de la scientologie

Le Tribunal auquel les Sklar se sont adressés pour la 3e fois dit ceci; en substance, le fisc américain prétend avoir voulu éviter un litige trop ennuyeux pour lui en signant un deal avec la secte criminelle. Mais le juge estime pour sa part que si on analyse cet argument, il suffirait à tous les groupes "religieux" de s'attaquer au fisc pour finir par obtenir une exemption imméritée. (Cf. Décision de la cour d'appel de février 2008 publiée le 12 décembre 2008)

Voici la partie du texte d'un tribunal, l'United States Court of Appeals for the ninth circuit, qui en explique qu'en réalité, l'exemption d'impôts accordée par le fisc USA à la scientologie est bel et bien illégale et anti- constitutionnelle, et que par conséquent, on ne peut pas accorder à d'autres religions les mêmes avantages sans violer de nouveau la Constitution et le Code des Impôts. Une décision de la cour d'appel datée de février 2008 et publiée le 12 décembre 2008

Décision de la 3ème Cour (United States Court of Appeals for the ninth circuit - December 12, 2008) .pdf
 
Traduction partielle:

.../...

16366 SKLAR v. CIR

La seconde enquête Larson cherche à déterminer si la règle discriminatoire établie par l'IRS serait justifiée par l'existence d'un intérêt gouvernemental irrésistible 456 U.S. At 246-47, 102 S. Ct. 1673.

Bien que l'IRS ne concède pas avoir dans une politique discriminatoire [au profit de la scientologie], elle affirme dans sa réponse que les termes de l'accord discuté ne peuvent servir à établir une violation de la Clause d'Establishement, car, dit l'IRS, « pour pouvoir trancher un litige, les deux parties doivent établir des compromis en accord avec des points qu'elles croient légalement valides».

C'est le seul intérêt que l'IRS ait avancé pour justifier la politique préférentielle à l'égard de la sciento- logie, c'est à dire de mettre fin à un long et coûteux litige d'imposition avec l'église de scientologie; mais aussi important que puisse être cet intérêt pour l'IRS, il n'atteint pas le degré pouvant passer lors d'une analyse plus approfondie.

Les avantages d'en finir avec une controverse vis-à-vis d'une organisation religieuse peuvent difficile- ment se comparer au prix à payer lorsqu'on s'engage à établir une préférence religieuse. Même en laissant de côté les considérations constitutionnelles, une règle contraire créerait une procédure par laquelle n'importe quelle dénomination religieuse désirant obtenir une préférence pourrait passer outre les législateurs du Congrès et les règles fiscales en s'engageant dans un très vaste litige fiscal.

Une telle procédure aurait donc probablement pour conséquence d'encourager la prolifération de tels litiges, et non de les réduire. Larson, 456 U.S. at 248, 102 S. Ct. 1673 (qui tient que même en arguant que le gouvernement ait un intérêt capital pour une préférence dénominationnelle, il doit quand-même prouver que la règle «concorde au mieux à l'intérêt qu'elle prétend servir dans les faits»).

Du fait que la préférence accordée à la scientologie, de facto inscrite dans la politique de l'IRS avecs ses membres, ne peut être justifiée par un intérêt gouvernemental capital, nous établirions d'emblée, si nous avions à décider à son sujet à partir du cas présenté par les Sklar, que la politique déterminée par l'IRS [vis-à-vis de la scientologie] constitue une préférence dénominationnelle anti-constitutionnelle selon Larson, 456 U.S. at 230, 102

S. Ct. 1673.

[plus loin, on lit encore:]

[12] T

.../... nous adoptons complètement les conclusions dictées [par les procès Sklar précédents]. Conclure différem- ment reviendrait directement à réécrirre le Code des Impôts, en négligeant la jurisprudence de la Cour Suprême Fédérale, pour atteindre une conclusion tout à fait opposée à la Clause d'Etablissement - le tout, au nom de cette même Clause.

Les principes avancés par les Sklar ne s'interrompent pas à leur seul problème de taxation de l'année 1995; leur logique s'étendrait alors à tous les membres de toutes les organisations religieuses qui béné- ficient de services éducatifs en tout ou partie de nature religieuse.

Le tribunal des Impôts a donc correctement maintenu que la Clause d'Etablissement et les principes de consistance administrative ne permettent pas la déduction que les Sklar demandent, et le refus par le tribunal des Impôts de tenir compte du Closing Agreement [l'accord secret signé par l'IRS avec la scientologie en 1993] n'était donc pas un abus discrétionnaire.»
 

Citation:

"The second Larson inquiry is whether or not the facially discriminatory policy is justified by a compelling governmental interest. 456 U.S. at 246-47, 102 S. Ct. 1673. Although the IRS does not concede that it is engaging in a denominational preference, it asserts in its brief that the terms of the settlement agreement cannot be used as a basisto find an Establishment Clause violation because "in order to settle a case, both parties are required to makecompromises with respect to points on which they believe they are legally correct." This is the only interest that the IRS proffers for the alleged policy. Although it appears to be true that the IRS has engaged in this particular preference in the interest of settling a long and litigious tax dispute with the Church of Scientology, and as compelling as this interest might otherwise be, it does not rise to the level that would pass strict scrutiny.

The benefits of settling a controversy with one religious organization can hardly outweigh the costs of engaging in a religious preference. Even aside from the constitutional considerations, a contrary rule would create a procedure by which any denomination seeking a denominational preference could bypass Congressional law-making and IRS rulemaking by engaging in voluminous tax litigation.

Such a procedure would likely encourage the proliferation of such litigation, not reduce it. Larson, 456 U.S. at 248, 102 S. Ct. 1673 (holding that even assuming arguendo that the government has a compelling governmental interest for a denominational preference, it must show that the rule is "closely fitted to further the interest that it assertedly serves").

Because the facial preference for the Church of Scientology embodied in the IRS's policy regarding its members cannot be justified by a compelling governmental interest, we would, if required to decide the case on the ground urged by the Sklars, first determine that the IRS policy constitutes an uncon- stitutional denominational preference under Larson, 456 U.S. at 230, 102 S. Ct. 1673. 282 F.3d at 618-19 (footnote omitted). However, the Sklar I panel declined to follow the Sklars' suggestion that they, too, are entitled to an unconstitutional denominational preference for three reasons:

First, we would be reluctant ever to presume that Congress or any agency of the government would intend that a general religious preference be adopted, by extension or otherwise, as such preferences raise the highly sensitive issue of state sponsorship of religion.

In the absence of a clear expression of such intent, we would be unlikely to consider extending a policy favoring one religion where the effect of our action would be to create a policy favoring all. Second, the Supreme Court has previously stated that a policy such as the Sklars wish us to create would be of questionable constitutional validity under Lemon, because the administration of the policy could require excessive government entanglement with religion. Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 694, 109 S. Ct. 2136; see Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13, 91 S. Ct. 2105. Third, the policy the Sklars seek would appear to violate section § 170. See Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 692-93, 109 S. Ct. 2136."

 

"Un procès s'attaque à l'exemption d'impôts de la scientologie"

Par David Cay Johnston - 24 mars, 2004

Original anglais: New York Times
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/24/business/24irs.html

[Titre original anglais: Court Case Poses Challenge to Scientology Tax Break]

LOS ANGELES, 21 mars 2004

C'est mercredi matin qu'a commencé un procès afin de déterminer si un couple juif pourrait déduire le montant de l'éducation religieuse de ses cinq enfants. Le couple signale que le gouvernement a accordé cet avantage aux  membres d'une seule  religion, la scientologie.

Les ramifications potentielles sont énormes, car une décision en faveur de ce couple pourrait affecter des millions d'américains faisant poursuivre des études dans écoles privées religieuses à leurs enfants. Cela pourrait avoir comme effet d'autoriser la déduction des frais d'éducation religieux comme s'il s'agissait de dons en faveur d'oeuvres de charité, de la même façon que les scientologues ont été autorisés à le faire lors d'un deal officiellement secret de 1993 entre leur organisation et l'IRS.

Cet accord a été conclu en dépit d'une décision de la Cour Suprème Fédérale de 1989, refusant l'exemption d'impôts pour les sommes prédéterminées, versées à titre d'honoraires à l'église de scientologie, pour ses services "audition" et "entrainement". La Cour Suprême décida que ces versements n'avaient pas qualité pour déduction charitable, s'agissant de prix préétablis équivalents à des honoraires payables en échange d'un service.

Michael et Marla Sklar, le couple de Los Angelès, ont en premier lieu porté l'affaire devant les tribunaux après que l'IRS ait refusé qu'ils déduisent 2080 dollars de frais d'éducation religieuse pour leurs enfants en 1993. Ils ont perdu ce procès, M. Sklar, comptable fiscal, s'étant défendu lui-même. Le couple a fait appel, et trois juges de la Cour d'Appel du Neuvième Circuit leur ont donné tort voici deux ans. Mais l'un des juges a fait une inhabituelle requête, en suggérant qu'un procès supplémentaire pourrait décider au mieux du problème soulevé.

Les juges du procès Sklar original ont dit "qu'il semblait vrai que la scientologie, - fondée par l'auteur de science-fiction Hubbard dans les années 50 -, avait obtenu un traitement fiscal préférentiel en violation du Premier Amendement.

"Pourquoi les cours scientologues différeraient-ils des cours de toutes les autres religions ?", écrivit le Juge Barry D. Silvermann dans son Opinion, ajoutant qu'une réponse à cette question n'aurait pas de réponse immédiate puisque la Cour n'avait pas à déterminer "si les membres de l'église de scientologie étaient les Elus de l'IRS". Le Juge Silverman  recommanda que le litige décide si le gouvernement avait malencontreusement favorisé une religion.

"Si l'IRS donne un traitement préférentiel aux membres de l'église de scientologie - en les autorisant à obtenir des exemptions contraires à la loi et interdites à tous les autres - alors, l'action convenable à entreprendre consiste à porter plainte pour mettre fin à cette politique", expliqua le Juge Silverman.

Dans ce second procès, également intenté à l'IRS à propos cette fois de 2309 dollars d'impôts, les Sklar sont représentés par Jeffrey I. Zuckerman du cabinet Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle à Washington, qui les défend grâcieusement.

L'avocate des impôts de la scientologie, Moique E. Yingling, explique que le procès des Sklar est dénué de fondement. Elle explique que jusqu'à l'accord de 1993, il y avait discrimination contre les scientologues car on ne leur permettant pas d'effectuer des déductions au titre de charité.

"Désormais, les scientologues sont traités comme les autres, les catholiques, les mormons, et autres," - continuant sa liste de religions.

L'audition et l'entrainement sont des services religieux scientologues", explique Madame Yingling, pour lesquels les membres paient d'avance des participations à la scientologie."

Cependant, Monsieur Sklar dit ne pas voir de différence entre les services que les scientologues citent pour leurs déductions et l'éducation religieuse que reçoivent ses enfants au sein de deux écoles hébraïques de Los Angelès.

Sur leurs déclarations d'impôt, les Sklar ont demandé un pourcentage de déductibilité proportionnel à la part religieuse de l'éducation que reçoivent leurs enfants. M. Sklar explique que s'il était scientologue, il pourrait bel et bien déduire ces sommes.

Lorsque les Sklar ont essayé d'avoir la déduction, l'IRS leur a envoyé des courriers soulignant les termes des déductions scientologues. L'IRS a alors refusé les déductions des Sklar, puisqu'ils ne présentaient pas de reçus de l'église de scientologie.

En dehors du couple Sklar, les seuls (2 ndt) à avoir tenté de venir à bout de l'accord de l'IRS avec les scientologues provient du magazine associatif à but non-lucratif "Tax Notes". Il tenta sans succès d'obtenir que l'accord scientologie-IRS soit rendu public. (Des copies de ce qui semble être le deal scientologie - IRS sont publiquement apparues il y a quelques années).

IRS: Closing Agreement On Final Determination Covering Specific Matters (october 1993)

[voir aussi l'affaire Henson]

"Si j'ai commencé cette action, c'est que je ressentais qu'un très dangereux précédent venait d'être élaboré, explique M. Sklar. Si on ne lutte pas contre le gouvernement qui l'a décidé, cela signifie qu'il y existe désormais une religion favorisée par l'état, et ce genre de chose n'a jamais été fameux pour les juifs."

M. Sklar a dit qu'après avoir demandé cette déduction, l'IRS lui a passé un audit, ainsi que huit de ses clients. "Je crois que l'IRS m'a harcelé, car j'avais jusque-là à peine un audit tous les deux ans."

Une demande judiciaire destinée à obtenir l'accord secret entre scientologie et IRS a été repoussée à la demande de l'église de scientologie et de l'IRS. La lutte pour parvenir à obtenir ["officiellement"] ce document risque d'être cruciale lors de l'appel, appel qui semble plus que probable quelle que soit la manière dont les juges d'instance décideront.

M. Sklar explique qu'après plus d'une décennie d'exemptions en faveur des scientologues, il croit que la seule voie laissée aux tribunaux sera d'autoriser l'exemption des frais éducatifs aux gens de toutes les religions.

Mais le Juge Silverman, qui avait incité à un procès complémentaire pour règler cette affaire, avait envisagé une approche différente voici deux ans.

"Le remède, écrivit-il, ce n'est pas d'exiger de l'IRS qu'il autorise d'autres gens à demander des déductions illicites."


Il s'agit de la décision de la Cour Suprème Commissionner vs Hernandez

#Premier Amendement de la Constitution américaine: en résumé, cet amendement de la Constitution fédérale US garantit la non-ingérence de l'état et sa neutralité en faveur de "religions".

Un activiste antisectaire américain, Keith Henson, a également soulevé le problème de ce deal illicite devant les tribunaux, mais l'IRS l'a fait éconduire sous un prétexte que je qualifierais de formel. [La direction de la secte a alors tout fait pour se débarrasser de M. Henson, qui a été contraint de s'expatrier au Canada pour éviter d'être emprisonné un an à la suite de faux témoignages des scientologues de Hemet, Californie (la base où réside leur chef Miscavige). Il semble que le New York Times n'ait pas été conscient de cette action.]

 
U.S. Court rules Orthodox Jews cannot use
the same tax deductions as Scientologists
 
Counterknowledge.com - 16. décembre 2008
[Texte intégral]
 

An American court ruled this week that an Orthodox Jewish couple could not use tax deductions that Scientologists can use (deductions they obtained by way of a secret 1993 agreement with the Internal Revenue Service). In the case Sklar v. Commissioner of the IRS, Michael and Marla Sklar tried to claim their childrens’ tuition for their Jewish day school as a tax deduction but their argument was rejected by the US Ninth Circuit Court because it violates the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, which states in the first sentence that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion”.

The Sklars’ main argument was that section 170(f)(8) and 6115 of the IRS code authorized deductions for donations made to religious institutions if they provided “intangible religious benefits”. Scientologists can claim deductions for “religious” services provided by the “Church”, and the Sklars argued that they too should be allowed to utilize this benefit. If the “Church” of Scientology is allowed to violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, then they should be able to do the same thing in the name of consistency. The Ninth Circuit Court rejected this argument because “[t]o conclude otherwise would be tantamount to rewriting the Tax Code, disregarding Supreme Court precedent, only to reach a conclusion directly at odds with the Establishment Clause — all in the name of the Establishment Clause.”.

The court ruled wisely in favor of not violating the First Amendment, which unequivocally states that no religion should have an advantage over the other. But what to say about the “Church” of Scientology’s special privilege, which they allegedly obtained by shady means. Three years after the “Church” was established by L. Ron Hubbard in 1953, the IRS gave it tax-exempt status. However, in 1967, their tax-exempt status was stripped away because it was determined that the activities of the “Church” were commercial, and several US courts agreed. This meant war between the IRS and the “Church”, which continued for 25 years.

In 1973, L. Ron Hubbard initiated Operation Snow White against the governments of several countries, including the United States. The main target of “Project Hunter”, the American branch of Snow White was the IRS. Operation Snow White called for the infiltration of the IRS and other US government agencies in order to steal documents related to L. Ron Hubbard and the “Church” of Scientology. Eventually, several Scientologists, including L. Ron Hubbard’s wife Mary Sue, were caught, and the FBI invaded Scientology offices in Los Angeles and Washington DC. In 1979, eleven Scientologists, including Mary Sue Hubbard, were sentenced to five years in prison. That did not stop the war against the IRS. Private investigators were hired by the cult to dig up dirt on various IRS officials, and in many cases, they found enough damning evidence to blackmail these officials.

Finally, in 1993, then IRS Comissioner Fred Goldberg met with current “Church” leader David Miscavige and reached an agreement that would end all lawsuits against the IRS by the “Church” of Scientology: the war was finally over. Attempts by various IRS watchdogs to get the IRS to disclose this agreement were unsuccessful, even though by law the IRS has to release it.

The question to ask is: why is a pseudo-religion started by a charlatan solely to make money allowed these special privileges, while legitimate religions are not? This IRS agreement violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by making it a de facto “established” religion. It was wise on the part of the Ninth Circuit Court to reject Michael and Marla Sklar’s argument, but the “Church” of Scientology must be called out for this circumvention of the US Constitution.

Let me leave you with a quote from L. Ron Hubbard:

“Somebody some day will say ‘this is illegal’. By then be sure the orgs say what is legal or not.”

 
Ninth Circuit Court Rejects Arguments That Children's
Religious School Tuition Should Be Tax Deductible
marketwatch.com - Dec 12, 2008
[Texte intégral]

WASHINGTON /PRNewswire-USNewswire via COMTEX

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit today rejected taxpayers Michael and Marla Sklars' argument that they were entitled to claim deductions for tuition and fees paid to their children's Orthodox Jewish day schools, the Justice Department announced.

The Sklars sought charitable deductions under section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code for portions of their tuition payments made to the religious day schools their children attended, asserting that those portions of the tuition payments were for "intangible religious benefits." The Sklars made three arguments in support of their position, each of which was rejected by the Ninth Circuit.

First, the Sklars argued that their tuition and fee payments to exclusively religious schools were deductible under a "dual payment analysis" to the extent the payments exceeded the value of the secular education their children received. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, finding that the Sklars had not shown that the payment exceeded the fair market value of the benefit received for their payments (i.e., an education for their children), and they had not shown that any excess payment was made with the intent of making a gift.

Second, the Sklars argued that sections 170(f)(8) and 6115 of the Internal Revenue Code, as enacted in 1993, authorized the deduction of tuition payments for religious education made to exclusively religious schools. In dismissing this argument, the Ninth Circuit explained that the amendments to these tax sections referring to "intangible religious benefits" did not expand the types of payments for which charitable deductions were available, but rather merely created exceptions to the substantiation requirements added in those sections.

Third, the Sklars argued that denial of their claimed deductions violated the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution, as well as principles of administrative consistency, because allegedly similar deductions were allowed for members of the Church of Scientology under a closing agreement with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The Ninth Circuit rejected these arguments as well, because "[t]o conclude otherwise would be tantamount to rewriting the Tax Code, disregarding Supreme Court precedent, only to reach a conclusion directly at odds with the Establishment Clause -- all in the name of the Establishment Clause."

"We are pleased that the IRS's denial of the Sklars' claimed deductions was upheld by the Tax Court and the Ninth Circuit," said Nathan J. Hochman, Assistant Attorney General of the Justice Department's Tax Division. "While taxpayers may choose to enroll their children in religious schools, the Tax Code should not subsidize this choice."

Assistant Attorney General Hochman thanked Tax Division attorneys Ellen DelSole and Kenneth Greene, who handled the case on appeal, as well as IRS Chief Counsel attorneys Henry Scheiderman and Keith Aqui who assisted them. He also thanked IRS Chief Counsel attorneys Louis Jack, Sherri Wilder and Julie Vandersluis, who handled the case in the U.S. Tax Court. More information about the Justice Department's Tax Division is available at www.usdoj.gov/tax/

SOURCE U.S. Department of Justice

 http://www.USDOJ.gov
 

Scientology is tax-exempt in the United States ?

“The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the federal government can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.”- Justice Hugo Black, United States Supreme Court

The cult's founder, L. Ron Hubbard, using a crude lie detector on a tomato plant Currently yes, although it has been revoked in the past as it has fallen into the category of a commercial enterprise. One of the most important aspects of the global protests against the Church of Scientology has to do with its tax-exempt status, including the methods by which it was obtained, the details of the agreement that led to their exemption, and several instances where the tax-exempt status they received is in violation of the United States Constitution.

Does Scientology deserve its tax-exempt status?

By all accounts, no. Scientology is structured more like a business than a church, and is recognized purely as a commercial enterprise outside of the United States. Unlike other religions Scientology charges for information on everything pertaining to its teachings.

Walk into a mosque, church or synagogue and ask about Islam, Christianity or Judaism and you will receive answers, free of charge or strings. Walk into a Scientology Org and ask about their religion and you will be asked to take a 'Free Personality Test' where they will likely find many things 'wrong' with you, all of which can only be 'cured' by Scientology's teachings, which are described in books and classes you have to buy. And it's not cheap by any means.

Scientology charges its members tens to hundreds of thousands of dollars for classes, books, auditing sessions, and everything else they need to advance through the ranks of Scientology. Anyone with eyes can see their organization is structured like a pyramid scheme, not a non-profit entity like a religion.

What is Scientology's Tax History?

First, we need go back to the early 1950s. At that time Scientology was administered by the Hubbard Association of Scientologists (HAS), which was established in Arizona on September 10, 1952. The first organization to take on the name of "The Church of Scientology" was incorporated later, on December 18, 1953 in Camden, New Jersey. At this same time, Hubbard also incorporated two other "churches" under the names of The Church of Spiritual Engineering and The Church of American Science. However, all three of these organizations were soon abandoned.

They were replaced by "The Church of Scientology" on February 18, 1954. But only a few short years later, in 1956, this organization changed its name to "The Church of Scientology of California" (CSC). It's a long and very confusing progression, leaping from one business name to another, pulling together a vast network of seemingly unrelated tax-exempt organizations spread throughout the United States.

In 1966, Hubbard transferred all of his assets to the CSC, at long last gathering Scientology under one tax-exempt roof. However, the IRS soon caught up with this helter-skelter conglomeration of organizations. In 1967, the IRS stripped all US-based Scientology entities of their tax exemption, declaring that Scientology's activities were commercial and operated purely for the financial benefit of Hubbard.

How did the Church of Scientology gain their tax-exempt status?

Hubbard and his many organizations sued the IRS and lost repeatedly for twenty-six years trying to regain their former tax-exempt status.

Many internal documents and personal testimonies from former upper-level Scientologists have stated that the continuous volley of lawsuits was a calculated effort to exhaust the IRS into submission. By 1991, the IRS was facing a mountain of litigation. Scientology has claimed to have had as many as 2500 active suits against IRS and its individual employees.

Aside from lawsuits, they placed their members within the IRS as agents of infiltration to obtain exploitable information they could use against the IRS and other federal agencies. They also hired private investigators to dig up dirt on high-ranking IRS employees.

After decades of this, in 1991, Scientology's spiritual leader, David Miscavige, arranged a meeting between himself and Fred Goldberg, then Commissioner of the IRS. In that meeting, secret agreements were made that ultimately fell in Scientology's favor.

This was followed by a two year review process by the IRS of Scientology, where IRS agents were ordered to ignore Scientology's multiple questionable policies and history of legal violations. In 1993, a payment was made by the Church of Scientology to the IRS, totaling $12.5 million dollars, substantially less than the IRS had initially demanded. In addition to that one-off payment, Scientology dropped all major lawsuits they had filed against the IRS. In exchange for this, the church's tax exemption status was reinstated.

Does Scientology enjoy this tax-exemption in other countries,
or just the United States ?
 

Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Israel, Russia, the United Kingdom have rejected Scientology's applications for tax-exempt, charitable status or recognition as a religious organization.

Only the United States and Australia allow the cult this special status

Do other churches enjoy tax-exempt status in the United States ?

Not in the same way that the Church of Scientology does. One of the special parts of the tax-exempt status that Scientology enjoys has to do with their exemption for "religious education". This means that any Scientologist can deduct their expenses for Scientology courses, auditing, and even all of the Hubbard books they buy. They are the only church that has been granted this status.

In 2004, a suit was filed on behalf of Michael and Marla Sklar, a Jewish couple who attempted to claim $15,000, which was the cost associated with the religious component of their childrens' education. The foundation of the case was the Church of Scientology's religious education tax exemption, which served as precedent for the Sklar's deduction. Inevitably, the court's decision hinged on an investigation into the religious education exemption that allows each individual Scientologist to deduct very large sums of money spent on auditing and religious education. At the heart of this case was a discussion regarding Scientology's tax exemption in relation to the Constitution's Establishment Clause.

What is the 'Establishment Clause' ?

It is a clause in the First Amendment to the US Constitution, stating: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." One of the vital aspects to this clause's interpretation includes an explicit prohibition against the establishment of any law giving preference to one religion over another. In other words, if one specific church is going to receive a specific benefit (in this case, the religious education tax exemption Scientology enjoys) then that same benefit must be freely given to all other faiths as well. If that can't be achieved, then no individual church should receive such preferential treatment, lest the law or governmental agency find themselves in violation of the Constitution.

This means the tax-exempt status the IRS was coerced into granting Scientology is in direct violation of the US Constitution.

In response to the Sklar's claims in their lawsuit, the IRS stated that the agreement between the IRS and the Church of Scientology is private and cannot be reviewed by any outside agency. Furthermore, in their opinion, the Sklars were not entitled to receive the same benefits that members of the Church of Scientology enjoy.

The reactions of one of the judges in the case is as follows, "The view of the IRS is that it can violate the constitution by establishing religion by treating one religion more favorably than other religions, in terms of what it allows as deductions and there can never be any judicial review of that."

Why does any of this matter ?

There are two primary reasons that this is an important issue:

  • This is a critical Constitutional issue. The IRS has set a dangerous precedent by showing Scientology favor above other religions, which is a gross violation of the First Amendment. Because of this, the path has been tread to allow other government agencies to give preferential treatment to any other group claiming religious status, regardless of whether they deserve it. This is not what the framers of the Constitution intended.
  • Their extremely generous tax-exemption allows Scientology to rake in massive profits from its members, allowing an organization that's guilty of some of the most terrible human rights violations and federal crimes in history to thrive and prosper on the backs of its followers without paying a cent to the government. This is a travesty of justice and common sense.

Why does any of this matter?

There are two primary reasons that this is an important issue:

  • This is a critical Constitutional issue. The IRS has set a dangerous precedent by showing Scientology favor above other religions, which is a gross violation of the First Amendment. Because of this, the path has been tread to allow other government agencies to give preferential treatment to any other group claiming religious status, regardless of whether they deserve it. This is not what the framers of the Constitution intended.
  • Their extremely generous tax-exemption allows Scientology to rake in massive profits from its members, allowing an organization that's guilty of some of the most terrible human rights violations and federal crimes in history to thrive and prosper on the backs of its followers without paying a cent to the government. This is a travesty of justice and common sense.

How Can This Be Changed ?

What can average, every day concerned citizens do to make our elected officials aware of this Constitutional breach by the IRS and the unjust tax-exemption Scientology enjoys? There are several things you can do to raise awareness and bring this onto the national stage.

Write our elected leaders

Send letters to your representatives, congressmen and the president. Use the information and sources cited here to let them know that as an American citizen and tax-payer, you will not stand for this breach of the Constitution and what is virtually government support of a corrupt, abusive organization.

Write your Representative
Write your Senators
Write the President

Use social websites to inform friends

Social networks such as facebook or twitter are great methods to spread awareness amongst those that might be interested. If you didn't know about this issue then there's a great chance that they don't either!

Petition Drives

There are several online petitions specifically focused on making the IRS review Scientology's tax-exempt status, and make Congress investigate the conditions and history of why it was granted in the first place. If this happens, it will unleash a storm as Congress reopens the cabinets of files they have on the Church of Scientology.

Stop Scientology: Online Petition at Petition Spot
View the Change.gov Petition
Printable Tax Petition

Postcards

A simple way for people to get involved is to create a variety of postcards focused on investigating the tax exempt status of Scientology. These would be pre-written with space for people to write their own message, sign it, and scribble down their return address. Have some addressed to the appropriate congressmen and some addressed to the President. People can either send these in themselves, or they can be all collected and sent at the same time.

Information Packets

Print out and distribute informational flyers regarding the Church of Scientology tax issue and the Constitutional issues involved. The more people are made aware of this disturbing breach of the Establishment Clause, the higher the level of public consciousness will be.

Printable Tax Flyer

Alert Taxation Watchdog Groups

Any petitions can also be sent to any and all tax watchdog groups, both liberal and conservative, to alert them to this longstanding problem to see if they can be mobilized to act as well. These groups often seem to focus on the least amount of taxation possible, but really what the majority of them are for is FAIR TAXATION, which isn't anywhere to be seen in this situation.

Join the Global Protest against Scientology

Visit Why We Protest for more information.

Relevant Articles and Source Material

Source: http://www.taxthecult.com/#matter

 

The Shadowy Story Behind Scientology's Tax-Exempt Status

New York Times, 9 March 1997

Source: http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~dst/Cowen//essays/nytimes.html

By Douglas Frantz

On Oct. 8, 1993, 10,000 cheering Scientologists thronged the Los Angeles Sports Arena to celebrate the most important milestone in the church's recent history: victory in its all-out war against the Internal Revenue Service.

For 25 years, IRS agents had branded Scientology a commercial enterprise and refused to give it the tax exemption granted to churches. The refusals had been upheld in every court. But that night the crowd learned of an astonishing turnaround. The IRS had granted tax exemptions to every Scientology entity in the United States.

"The war is over," David Miscavige, the church's leader, declared to tumultuous applause.

The landmark reversal shocked tax experts and saved the church tens of millions of dollars in taxes. More significantly, the decision was an invaluable public relations tool in Scientology's worldwide campaign for acceptance as a mainstream religion.

On the basis of the IRS ruling, the State Department formally criticized Germany for discriminating against Scientologists. The German government regards the organization as a business, not a tax-exempt religion, the very position maintained for 25 years by the U.S. government.

The full story of the turnabout by the IRS has remained hidden behind taxpayer privacy laws for nearly four years. But an examination by The New York Times found that the exemption followed a series of unusual internal IRS actions that came after an extraordinary campaign orchestrated by Scientology against the agency and people who work there. Among the findings of the review by The New York Times, based on more than 30 interviews and thousands of pages of public and internal church records, were these:

  • Scientology's lawyers hired private investigators to dig into the private lives of IRS officials and to conduct surveillance operations to uncover potential vulnerabilities, according to interviews and documents. One investigator said he had interviewed tenants in buildings owned by three IRS officials, looking for housing code violations. He also said he had taken documents from an IRS conference and sent them to church officials and created a phony news bureau in Washington to gather information on church critics. The church also financed an organization of IRS whistle-blowers that attacked the agency publicly.
  • The decision to negotiate with the church came after Fred T. Goldberg Jr., the commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service at the time, had an unusual meeting with Miscavige in 1991. Scientology's own version of what occurred offers a remarkable account of how the church leader walked into IRS headquarters without an appointment and got in to see Goldberg, the nation's top tax official. Miscavige offered to call a halt to Scientology's suits against the IRS in exchange for tax exemptions.
  • After that meeting, Goldberg created a special committee to negotiate a settlement with Scientology outside normal agency procedures. When the committee determined that all Scientology entities should be exempt from taxes, IRS tax analysts were ordered to ignore the substantive issues in reviewing the decision, according to IRS memorandums and court files.
  • The IRS refused to disclose any terms of the agreement, including whether the church was required to pay back taxes, contending that it was confidential taxpayer information. The agency has maintained that position in a lengthy court fight, and in rejecting a request for access by The New York Times under the Freedom of Information Act. But the position is in stark contrast to the agency's handling of some other church organizations. Both the Jimmy Swaggart Ministries and an affiliate of the Rev. Jerry Falwell were required by the IRS to disclose that they had paid back taxes in settling disputes in recent years.

In interviews, senior Scientology officials and the IRS denied that the church's aggressive tactics had any effect on the agency's decision.

They said the ruling was based on a two-year inquiry and voluminous documents that showed the church was qualified for the exemptions.

Goldberg, who left as IRS commissioner in January 1992 to become an assistant secretary at the Treasury Department, said privacy laws prohibited him from discussing Scientology or his impromptu meeting with Miscavige.

The meeting was not listed on Goldberg's appointment calendar, which was obtained by The New York Times through the Freedom of Information Act.

The IRS reversal on Scientology was nearly as unprecedented as the long and bitter war between the organizations. Over the years, the IRS had steadfastly refused exemptions to most Scientology entities, and its agents had targeted the church for numerous investigations and audits.

Throughout the battle, the agency's view was supported by the courts. Indeed, just a year before the agency reversal, the U.S. Claims Court had upheld the IRS denial of an exemption to Scientology's Church of Spiritual Technology, which had been created to safeguard the writings and lectures of L. Ron Hubbard, the late science fiction writer whose preachings form the church's scripture.

Among the reasons listed by the court for denying the exemption were "the commercial character of much of Scientology," its "virtually incomprehensible financial procedures" and its "scripturally based hostility to taxation."

Small wonder that the world of tax lawyers and experts was surprised in October 1993 when the IRS announced that it was issuing 30 exemption letters covering about 150 Scientology churches, missions and corporations. Among them was the Church of Spiritual Technology.

"It was a very surprising decision," said Lawrence B. Gibbs, the IRS commissioner from 1986 to 1989 and Goldberg's predecessor. "When you have as much litigation over as much time, with the general uniformity of results that the service had with Scientology, it is surprising to have the ultimate decision be favorable. It was even more surprising that the service made the decision without full disclosure, in light of the prior background."

While IRS officials insisted that Scientology's tactics did not affect the decision, some officials acknowledged that ruling against the church would have prolonged a fight that had consumed extensive government resources and exposed individual officials to personal lawsuits. At one time, the church and its members had more than 50 suits pending against the IRS and its officials.

"Ultimately the decision was made on a legal basis," said a senior IRS official who was involved in the case and spoke on the condition that he not be identified. "I'm not saying Scientology wasn't taking up a lot of resources, but the decision was made on a legal basis."

The church's tactics appeared to violate no laws, and its officials and lawyers argued strenuously in a three-hour interview at church offices in Los Angeles last month that the exemptions were decided solely on the merits. They said the church had been the victim of a campaign of harassment and discrimination by "rogue agents" within the IRS. Once the agency agreed to review the record fairly, they said, it was inevitable that the church would be granted its exemptions.

"The facts speak for themselves," said Monique E. Yingling, a Washington lawyer who represented the church in the tax case. "The decision was made based on the information that the church provided in response to the inquiry by the Internal Revenue Service."

Church officials and lawyers acknowledged that Scientology had used private investigators to look into their opponents, including IRS officials, but they said the practice had nothing to do with the IRS decision.

"This is a church organization that has been subjected to more harassment and more attacks certainly than any religion in this century and probably any religion ever, and they have had to perhaps take unusual steps in order to survive," Ms. Yingling said.

THE ORIGINS: AN EXPANDING CHURCH ON A COLLISION COURSE

Since its founding in 1950, Scientology has grown into a worldwide movement that boasts 8 million members, although defectors say the actual number is much smaller. The church, which has vast real estate holdings around the world and operates a yacht based in the Caribbean, describes itself as the only major new religion to have emerged in the 20th century.

Its founder, Hubbard, asserted that people are immortal spirits who have lived through many lifetimes. In Scientology teachings, Hubbard described humans as clusters of spirits that were trapped in ice and banished to Earth 75 million years ago by Xenu, the ruler of the 26-planet Galactic Confederation.

Scientology describes its goal as "a civilization without insanity, without criminals and without war, where the able can prosper and honest beings can have rights, and where Man is free to rise to greater heights." To reach those heights, Scientologists believe, each individual must be "cleared" of problems and afflictions through a series of counseling sessions known as "auditing." The sessions are performed by a trained auditor assisted by a device similar to a lie detector, known as an E-meter.

Although Scientology's complicated finances make a total estimate difficult, records on file at the IRS indicate that in the early 1990s the church was earning about $300 million a year from auditing fees, the sale of Scientology literature and recordings, management services and the franchising of its philosophy. Church officials said those figures were higher than actual earnings.

The original mother church, the Church of Scientology of California, was established by Hubbard in Los Angeles in 1954. Three years later, it was recognized as tax exempt by the IRS. But in 1967, the agency stripped the church of its exemption, and a fierce struggle broke out between the agency and the church.

In its revocation letter, the agency said that Scientology's activities were commercial and that it was being operated for the benefit of Hubbard, a view supported by the courts several times in the ensuing 25 years. The church ignored the action, which it deemed unlawful, and withheld taxes.

The IRS put Scientology on its hit list. Minutes of IRS meetings indicate that some agents engaged in a campaign to shut down Scientology, an effort that church officials cite as evidence of bias. Some of the tactics led to rebukes by judges, including a 1990 ruling in Boston that criticized the IRS for abusive practices in seeking access to church records.

Scientology retaliated. In 1973 the church embarked on a program code named Snow White. In a document labeled "secret," Hubbard outlined a strategy to root out all "false and secret files" held by governments around the world regarding Scientology.

"Attack is necessary to an effective defense," Hubbard wrote.

Snow White soon turned sinister. Under the supervision of Hubbard's third wife, Mary Sue, Scientologists infiltrated the Department of Justice and the IRS to uncover information on Hubbard. They broke into offices at night and copied mountains of documents. At one point, an electronic bugging device was hidden inside an IRS conference room the day before a meeting about Scientology.

Critics say those actions fell under a church doctrine that Hubbard had called the Fair Game policy. Hubbard wrote that church enemies may "be deprived of property or injured by any means by any Scientologist without any discipline of the Scientologist. May be tricked, sued or lied to or destroyed."

The conspiracy was uncovered in 1977, and Mrs. Hubbard and 10 others were eventually sentenced to prison. Hubbard was named an unindicted co-conspirator because investigators could not link him to the crimes.

The church promised to change its ways. Scientologists said members who broke the law were purged, including Mrs. Hubbard, and the church was restructured to protect against a recurrence. The Fair Game policy, they said, has been misinterpreted by courts and critics.

"There is nothing like that," said Elliot J. Abelson, the church's general counsel. "It doesn't happen."

THE COVERT WAR: WHISTLE-BLOWERS AND 'VULNERABILITIES'

But interviews and an examination of court files across the country show that after the criminal conspiracy was broken up, the church's battle against the IRS continued on other fronts. When Hubbard died in January 1986, his opposition to taxes lived on among the new generation of leaders, including Miscavige, a second-generation Scientologist.

Part of the battle was public. A leading role was played by the National Coalition of IRS Whistle-Blowers, which Scientology created and financed for nearly a decade.

On the surface, the coalition was like many independent groups that provide support for insiders who want to go public with stories of corruption. But Stacy B. Young, a senior Scientology staff member until she defected in 1989, said she helped plan the coalition as part of Scientology's battle against the IRS in late 1984 while she was managing editor of the church's Freedom Magazine.

"The IRS was not giving Scientology its tax exemption, so they were considered to be a pretty major enemy," Ms. Young said. "What you do with an enemy is you go after them and harass them and intimidate them and try to expose their crimes until they decide to play ball with you. The whole idea was to create a coalition that was at arm's length from Scientology so that it had more credibility."

Ms. Young said she recruited Paul J. DesFosses, a former IRS agent who had spoken out against the agency, to serve as the group's president. DesFosses acknowledged that Scientology provided substantial financing, but he denied that the church created or ran the coalition.

"We got support from lots of church groups, including the Church of Scientology," DesFosses said in a recent interview.

The coalition's biggest success came in 1989 when it helped spark congressional hearings into accusations of wrongdoing by IRS officials. Using public records and leaked IRS documents, the coalition showed that a supervisor in Los Angeles and some colleagues had bought property from a firm being audited by the agency. Soon after the purchase, the audit was dropped and the firm paid no money.

Kendrick L. Moxon, a longtime church lawyer, acknowledged that the coalition was founded by Freedom Magazine. He said its work was well known and part of a campaign by Scientology and others to reform the IRS.

The church's war had a covert side, too, and its soldiers were private investigators. While there have been previous articles about the church's use of private investigators, the full extent of its effort against the IRS is only now coming to light through interviews and records provided to The New York Times.

Octavio Pena, a private investigator in Fort Lee, N.J., achieved a measure of reknown in the late 1980s when he helped expose problems within the Internal Revenue Service while working on a case for Jordache Enterprises, the jeans manufacturer.

In the summer of 1989, Pena disclosed in an interview, a man who identified himself as Ben Shaw came to his office. Shaw, who said he was a Scientologist, explained that the church was concerned about IRS corruption and would pay $1 million for Pena to investigate IRS officials, Pena said.

"I had had an early experience with the Scientologists, and I told him that I didn't feel comfortable with him, even though he was willing to pay me $1 million," Pena said.

Scientology officials acknowledged that Shaw worked for the church at the time, but they scoffed at the notion that he had tried to hire Pena. "The Martians were offered $2 million; that's our answer," said Moxon, whose firm often hired private investigators for the church.

Michael L. Shomers, another private investigator, said he shared none of Pena's qualms, at least initially.

Describing his work on behalf of Scientology in a series of interviews, Shomers said that he and his boss, Thomas J. Krywucki, worked for the church for at least 18 months in 1990 and 1991.

Working from his Maryland office, he said, he set up a phony operation, the Washington News Bureau, to pose as a reporter and gather information about church critics. He also said he had infiltrated IRS conferences to gather information about officials who might be skipping meetings, drinking too much or having affairs.

"I was looking for vulnerabilities," Shomers said.

Shomers said he had turned over information to his Scientology contact about officials who seemed to drink too much. He also said he once spent several hours wooing a female IRS official in a bar at a conference, then provided her name and personal information about her to Scientology.

In one instance, information that Shomers said he had gathered at an IRS conference in the Pocono Mountains was turned over to an associate of Jack Anderson, the columnist, and appeared in one of Anderson's columns criticizing top IRS managers for high living at taxpayer expense.

Shomers said he had received his instructions in meetings with a man who identified himself as Jake Thorn and said he was connected with the church. Shomers said he believed the name was a pseudonym.

Shomers said he had looked into several apartment buildings in Pennsylvania owned by three IRS officials. He obtained public files to determine whether the buildings had violated housing codes, he said, and interviewed residents looking for complaints, but found none.

In July 1991, Shomers said, he posed as a member of the IRS whistle-blowers coalition and worked with a producer and cameraman from NBC-TV to get information about a conference for senior IRS officials in Walnut Creek, Calif. The producer said that she recalled Shomers as a representative of the whistle-blowers, but knew nothing of his connection to Scientology. The segment never ran.

At one point, Shomers said, he slipped into a meeting room at the Embassy Suites, where the conference was held, and took a stack of internal IRS documents. He said he mailed the material to an address provided by his church contact.

Krywucki acknowledged that he had worked for Scientology's lawyers in 1990 and 1991, though he declined to discuss what he did. He said he would ask the lawyers for permission to speak about the inquiry, but he failed to return telephone calls after that conversation.

It is impossible to verify all of Shomers' statements or determine whether his actions were based on specific instructions from church representatives. He said he had often been paid in cash and sometimes by checks from Bowles & Moxon, a Los Angeles law firm that served as the church's lead counsel. He said he had not retained any of the paychecks.

Shomers provided The New York Times with copies of records that he said he had obtained for the church as well as copies of hotel receipts showing that he had stayed at hotels where the IRS held three conferences, in Pennsylvania, West Virginia and California. He also provided copies of business cards, with fake names, that he said had been created for the phony news bureau in Washington and copies of photographs taken as part of his surveillance work.

One of the IRS officials investigated by Shomers recalled that a private investigator had been snooping around properties he managed on behalf of himself and two other mid-level agency officials.

The official, Arthur C. Scholz, who has since left the IRS, said he was alerted by tenants that a man who identified himself as a private investigator had questioned tenants about him and the other landlords. He said the tenants had not recalled the man's name but had noted that he was driving a car with Maryland license plates.

"He went to the courthouse and found the properties, and then went out banging on doors of these tenants and made a number of allegations dealing with things that were totally bull," said Scholz, who had no involvement with the IRS review of Scientology and was at a loss to explain why the church would have been interested in him. "I notified the local police about it."

Shomers, who has since left the private-investigation business, said he was willing to describe his work for the church because he had come to distrust Scientology and because of a financial dispute with Krywucki.

Moxon, the Scientology lawyer, said the IRS was well aware of the church's use of private investigators to expose agency abuses when it granted the exemptions. Moxon did not deny hiring Shomers, but he said the activities described by Shomers to The New York Times were legal and proper.

Moxon and other church lawyers said the church needed to use private investigators to counter lies spread by rogue government agents.

"The IRS uses investigators, too," said a church lawyer, Gerald A. Feffer, a former deputy assistant attorney general now with Williams & Connolly, one of Washington's most influential law firms. "They're called CID agents" -- for Criminal Investigation Division -- "and the CID agents put this church under intense scrutiny for years with a mission to destroy the church."

A blunt assessment of Scientology's victorious strategy against the IRS was contained in a lengthy 1994 article in International Scientology News, an internally distributed magazine. The article said:

"This public exposure of criminals within the IRS had the desired effect. The Church of Scientology became known across the country as the only group willing to take on the IRS."

"And the IRS knew it," the article continued. "It became obvious to them that we weren't about to fold up or fade away. Our attack was impinging on their resources in a major way, and our exposes of their crimes were beginning to have serious political reverberations. It was becoming a costly war of attrition, with no clear-cut winner in sight."

THE UNUSUAL PEACE: AFTER A MEETING, A 180-DEGREE TURN

Scientology made the initial gesture toward a cease-fire when Miscavige, the church leader, paid an unscheduled visit to the IRS commissioner, Goldberg.

The first full account of that meeting and the events that followed inside the IRS was assembled from interviews, Scientology's own internal account, IRS documents and records in a pending suit brought by Tax Analysts, a nonprofit trade publisher, seeking the release of IRS agreements with Scientology and other tax-exempt organizations.

Feffer, a church lawyer since 1984, said he approached officials at the Justice Department and the IRS in 1991 with an offer to sit down and negotiate an end to the dispute.

The church's version of what followed is quite remarkable. Miscavige and Marty Rathbun, another church official, were walking past the IRS building in Washington with a few hours to spare one afternoon in late October 1991 when they decided to talk to Goldberg.

After signing the visitors' log at the imposing building on Constitution Avenue, the two men asked to see the commissioner. They told the security guard that they did not have an appointment but were certain Goldberg would want to see them. And, according to the church account, he did.

Goldberg said he could not discuss the meeting, although a former senior official confirmed that it occurred. An IRS spokesman said it would be unusual for someone to meet with the commissioner without an appointment.

Miscavige does not grant interviews, church officials said, but Rathbun said the Goldberg meeting was an opportunity for the church to offer to end its long dispute with the agency, including the dozens of suits brought against the IRS, in exchange for the exemptions that Scientology believed it deserved.

"Let's resolve everything," Rathbun recalled saying. "This is insane. It's reached insane levels."

Goldberg's response was also out of the ordinary. He created a special five-member working group to resolve the dispute, bypassing the agency's exempt organizations division, which normally handles those matters. Howard M. Schoenfeld, the IRS official picked as the committee's chairman in 1991, said later in a deposition in the Tax Analysts case that he recalled only one similar committee in 30 years at the agency.

The IRS negotiators and Scientology's tax lawyers held numerous meetings over nearly two years. An IRS official who participated, and who spoke about the meetings on condition that his name not be used, described the sessions as occasionally rancorous, but he said the general tone was far friendlier than over the preceding years.

There are indications that the early momentum was toward resolution. In a letter to Ms. Yingling on Jan. 19, 1992, John E. Burke, the assistant commissioner for exempt organizations, brushed aside what could have been a stumbling block. Ms. Yingling had apparently objected to the potential public disclosure of information that the church was providing to the IRS.

Burke said he did not want the dispute to delay the talks, and he committed the IRS to allowing only a portion of the information to become public. He said the only hitch would come "in the event that our discussions break down, an eventuality that I have no reason to believe will occur."

An IRS official involved in the talks said it was not unusual for the agency to negotiate with a taxpayer over what is made public in an agreement. By agreeing at the outset that information could be withheld, however, the IRS seemed to relinquish a big bargaining chip.

Paul Streckfus, a former official in the IRS exempt organization division, first disclosed the existence of the negotiating committee in a trade journal after the agreement was announced. He said in an interview that creating the group meant a settlement was almost preordained.

"Once the IRS decided to set up this rather extraordinary group, the wheels were in motion for a deal," Streckfus said.

Not even a stinging court decision in favor of the IRS could derail the talks. Midway through the negotiations, in June 1992, the U.S. Claims Court handed down its decision upholding the IRS denial of a tax exemption for Scientology's Church of Spiritual Technology. The ruling underscored the agency's longstanding concerns over the commercial nature of Scientology and other matters.

Ms. Yingling, the church's tax lawyer, said the Claims Court ruling ignored the facts and was filled with gratuitous comments. She said the IRS negotiators were fairer in considering the evidence.

A portion of the correspondence between the agency and church from the two years of negotiations was released when the exemptions were granted three and a half years ago. It fills part of a large bookcase in the IRS reading room in Washington.

The central issues are discussed in a series of lengthy answers by Scientology's lawyers to questions from the IRS. The church provided extensive information on its finances and operational structure.

The senior IRS official involved in the negotiations, who asked not to be identified, said the church satisfied the agency in the three critical areas. He said the committee was persuaded that those involved in the Snow White crimes had been purged, that church money was devoted to tax-exempt purposes and that, with Hubbard's death, no one was getting rich from Scientology.

Ms. Yingling argued that nothing substantive had changed. She said the church had been qualified for tax exemption for years, but biased elements within the IRS had stood in its way.

"There were no changes in the operations or activities of the church," she said. "What came about was finally that they looked at all the information and saw that the church qualified for exemption, and they were satisfied."

In August 1993, the two sides reached an agreement. The church would receive its coveted exemptions for every Scientology entity in the country and end its legal assault on the IRS and its personnel.

There was just one more step. Scientology entities were required to submit new applications for exemption, which were to be evaluated by the agency's exempt organizations division. But something unusual occurred there, too.

Schoenfeld, the negotiations chairman, ordered the two tax analysts assigned to the review not to consider any substantive matters, according to IRS memorandums and records in the Tax Analysts case. Those issues, Schoenfeld informed them, had been resolved.

Both analysts, Donna Moore and Terrell M. Berkovsky, wrote memorandums specifying that they had been instructed not to address issues like whether the church was engaged in too much commercial activity or whether its activities provided undue private benefit to its leaders.

Schoenfeld, who has since left the IRS, said he could not discuss the case. But the senior IRS official involved in the talks said there was nothing sinister about the instructions because those matters had been decided by the negotiating committee. He acknowledged, however, that this was not the typical procedure.

The agreement was announced on Oct. 13, 1993. The IRS refused to make public any of its terms, including whether the church paid any back taxes. The IRS also refused to discuss the legal reasoning behind one of the biggest turnarounds in tax history.

Tax lawyers said the IRS could have required the church to disclose terms of the agreement, which it has done in the past. In 1991, the IRS required the Jimmy Swaggart Ministries to disclose that the group had paid $171,000 in back taxes for violations. In 1993, just a few months before the Scientology agreement, the IRS required the Old Time Gospel Hour, a group affiliated with the Rev. Jerry Falwell, to publicize its payment of $50,000 in back taxes.

"The IRS actually specified which media outlets we were to notify and approved the release," said Mark DeMoss, a spokesman for Falwell. "When nobody picked it up, they put out their own press release."

William J. Lehrfeld, who represents Tax Analysts in its suit to make the Scientology agreement public, said, "You and I, as taxpayers, are subsidizing these people, and we should see this information."

THE AFTERMATH: A FORMER ENEMY BECOMES AN ALLY

Five days before the official announcement, Miscavige went before the Scientology gathering in Los Angeles and declared victory. In a two-hour speech, according to the account in International Scientology News, Miscavige described years of attacks against Hubbard and Scientology by the government.

"No other group in the history of this country has ever been subject to the assault I have briefed you on tonight," he said, calling it "the war to end all wars."

As part of the settlement, Miscavige said, the IRS had agreed to distribute a fact sheet describing Scientology and Hubbard. "It is very complete and very accurate," Miscavige said. "Now, how do I know? We wrote it! And the IRS will be sending it out to every government in the world."

Feffer, Ms. Yingling and Thomas C. Spring, another of the church's tax lawyers, appeared in formal attire on stage that night and received Waterford crystal trophies in recognition of their efforts.

Miscavige called the agreement a peace treaty that would mark the biggest expansion in Scientology history.

The church immediately began citing the IRS decision in its efforts to win acceptance from other governments and to silence critics. But the biggest public relations benefit may have come from the U.S. government itself.

Four months after the exemptions were granted, the State Department released its influential human rights report for 1993, a litany of the countries that abuse their citizens. For the first time, the report contained a paragraph noting that Scientologists had complained of harassment and discrimination in Germany. The matter was mentioned briefly in the 1994 and 1995 reports, too.

Throughout those years, the dispute between Scientologists and the German government escalated. In an intense publicity campaign that included advertisements in this newspaper, the church said that businesses owned by Scientologists were boycotted and that its members were excluded from political parties and denied access to public schools. The church asserted that the German actions paralleled early Nazi persecution of Jews.

The German government responded that Scientology was not a church worthy of tax exemption, but a commercial enterprise -- the very position the IRS had maintained in its 25-year war against the church. German officials said equating the treatment of Scientologists with that of Jews under the Nazi regime was a distortion and an insult to victims of the Holocaust, a view supported by some Jewish leaders in Germany.

The dispute turned into a diplomatic ruckus in January when the State Department released its 1996 human rights report, with an expanded section on Scientology that said German scrutiny of the religion had increased. Artists had been prevented from performing because of their membership in the church and the youth wing of the governing Christian Democratic Union had urged a boycott of the film "Mission: Impossible" because its star, Tom Cruise, is a prominent Scientologist, the State Department said.

German officials were angered by the criticism, and Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel raised the matter with Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright when she was in Bonn on Feb. 18. Ms. Albright told him that the issue was a subject for bilateral discussions, but she said she found claims by Scientologists that they are the victims of Nazi-style persecution "distasteful."

Nicholas Burns, the State Department spokesman, said that, despite the belief that Scientologists had gone too far in drawing comparisons to persecution of Jews, the department had felt compelled to expand on the church's troubles with the Germans in its latest human rights report.

"The Germans are quite adamant, based on their own history, that these are the kinds of groups that ought to be outlawed," Burns said. "However, for our purposes, we classify Scientology as a religion because they were granted tax-exempt status by the American government."

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by Chris Owen (1997-1998)


An Ultra-Aggressive Use of Investigators and the Courts

By DOUGLAS FRANTZ

New York Times, 9 March 1997

For years, Scientology has gone to great lengths to defend itself from critics. Often its defense has involved private investigators working for its lawyers. While the use of private investigators is common in the legal profession, some instances involving the church have been unusual.

Scientology officials said that the investigators operated within the law and that the tactics were necessary to counter attacks made over the years by Internal Revenue Service agents and the press.

"When people stop spreading lies about them and stop printing false allegations about them in newspapers, the church will stop using private investigators," said Monique E. Yingling, a church lawyer.

In 1986 the Federal Court of Appeals in Boston said evidence in an extortion case indicated that Scientology investigators had induced witnesses to lie. It identified one investigator as Eugene M. Ingram.

Eight years later, Ingram was charged with impersonating a police officer in seeking information about a sheriff in Tampa, Fla., while working as a church investigator. He and a Scientology employee flashed badges and told a woman that they were police detectives before questioning her about possible links between a county sheriff and what was said to be a prostitution ring, police records say.

Court officials said a warrant for Ingram's arrest was still outstanding.

Ingram had been dismissed from the Los Angeles Police Department in 1981 after accusations that he was involved in running a prostitution ring and had provided information to a drug dealer. He was acquitted of criminal charges in that case.

Elliot J. Abelson, the church's general counsel, said he had used Ingram often as an investigator and had the highest regard for him. He said the Tampa case was phony.

Richard Behar, an investigative reporter, incurred Scientology's wrath when he wrote a cover article about the church in Time magazine in 1991. The article called the church "a hugely profitable global racket that survives by intimidating members and critics in a Mafia-like manner."

The church and a member sued Time and Behar for libel, and the company spent more than $7 million defending the cases. The church's suit was dismissed last year by a Federal District Court judge, an action being appealed by Scientology. The individual's suit was settled with a corrective paragraph but no money.

Behar contends in a countersuit that even before the article ran, church investigators questioned his acquaintances about his health and whether he had had tax or drug problems. Behar said that after the article ran, he had been followed by Scientology agents and had been so concerned he had hired bodyguards.

In 1992, Judge Ronald Swearinger of Los Angeles County Superior Court told The American Lawyer magazine that he believed Scientologists had slashed his car tires and drowned his collie while he was presiding over a suit against the church. The church denied the accusations.

In 1993, Judge James M. Ideman was presiding over a suit involving Scientology in Federal District Court in Los Angeles when he took the unusual step of withdrawing from the case. In a court statement, he said he could no longer preside fairly because the church "has recently begun to harass my former law clerk who assisted me on this case."

Kendrick L. Moxon, the church's lawyer in the case, said he had tried to question the former clerk about accusations that there was a framed Time magazine cover about Scientology in the judge's chambers. He said that the former clerk had refused to talk to him and that his subpoena for her testimony had been quashed.

Scientology's tactics in court have also drawn judicial rebukes. Last year, the California Court of Appeal accused Scientology of using "the litigation process to bludgeon the opponent into submission." The Federal Court of Appeals in San Francisco said last year that Scientology had played "fast and loose with the judicial system" and levied $2.9 million in sanctions against the church.

By aggressively pursuing its opponents in court, the church seems to heed the preaching of L. Ron Hubbard, its founder, who once wrote: "The purpose of the suit is to harass and discourage rather than win. The law can be used very easily to harass, and enough harassment on somebody who is simply on the thin edge anyway ... will generally be sufficient to cause his professional decrease. If possible, of course, ruin him utterly."

One focus of suits by Scientologists was the Cult Awareness Network, a nonprofit organization dedicated to countering religious groups it perceived as dangerous.

Scientology has long regarded the network, known as CAN, as an opponent of religious freedom and a hate group. Church officials said the network used "deprogrammers" to kidnap people in an effort to persuade them to leave small religious groups. Deprogrammers affiliated with the network have been convicted of crimes in connection with efforts to force people to leave religious organizations.

Beginning in 1992, Scientologists filed 40 to 50 suits against the network and its officers, contending that they discriminated by refusing to allow Scientologists to attend conventions or join chapters. Some Scientologists prevailed in court.

Moxon, who represented many Scientologists, said the suits had been intended to address network discrimination against people who wanted to reform it.

But Daniel A. Leipold, who represented the network, said during depositions in some of the suits that the actions had been part of a campaign by Scientology to destroy the network.

Last year, the network declared bankruptcy after a $1.8 million judgment against it in a suit brought by a young man who had been a member of a Pentecostal group. The jury found that the man had been forcibly detained by a deprogrammer. Moxon, who represented the man, said that he had taken the case as a religious freedom matter and that his expenses had been paid by the Pentecostal group.

After the network filed for bankruptcy, its name, logo and telephone were bought by a group represented by a lawyer who is a Scientologist. While the church said it had no connection with the purchasers, a brochure mailed by the new Cult Awareness Network in January was a glowing description of Scientology as a means to "increase happiness and improve conditions for oneself and for others."

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by Chris Owen (1997-1998)

 
L'histoire louche qui se cache derrière le statut
d'exonération fiscale de la Scientologie

New York Times - 9 Mars 1997

Par Frantz DOUGLAS

Traduction par google

Le 8 octobre 1993, 10.000 scientologues se pressait dans les Los Angeles Sports Arena pour célébrer l'événement le plus important dans l'histoire récente de l'Eglise: la victoire dans sa guerre totale contre l'Internal Revenue Service .

Depuis 25 ans, les agents de l'IRS qualifiaient la Scientologie comme étant une entreprise commerciale et refusaient de lui donner l'exemption fiscale accordée aux églises. Le refus avait été confirmé dans tous les tribunaux. Mais cette nuit-là la foule a appris un retournement étonnant. L'IRS a accordé des exonérations fiscales à chaque entité scientologue aux États-Unis.

"La guerre est finie" a déclaré David Miscavige, le chef de l'Eglise, sous les applaudissements tumultueux.

Le renversement historique des experts fiscaux permet à la scientologie de sauver des dizaines de millions de dollars en impôts. Plus important encore, la décision est un précieux outil de relations publiques pour sa campagne mondiale visant à l'acceptation de la Scientologie comme nouvelle religion. (mainstream)

Sur la base de la décision de l'IRS, le Département d'Etat a officiellement critiqué l'Allemagne pour discrimination contre les scientologues.

Le gouvernement allemand en ce qui considère l'organisation comme une entreprise, et non comme une religion exonérée d'impôt, la position qui était celle pendant 25 ans du gouvernement des États-Unis.

L'histoire complète de ce volte-face de l'IRS est resté caché 4 ans selon les lois de confidentialité qui concerne les taxations fiscales. Mais un examen par le New York Times a révélé que cette exemption a suivi une série d'actions inhabituelles de l'IRS survenues à la suite d'une extraordinaire campagne orchestrée par la scientologie contre l'agence et les gens qui y travaillent.

Parmi les conclusions de l'enquête du New York Times, basé sur plus de 30 entrevues et des milliers de pages de registres paroissiaux publiques et internes, on trouve les points suivants:

  • avocats de la Scientologie embauché des détectives privés pour fouiller dans la vie privée des représentants de l'IRS et de mener des opérations de surveillance pour déceler les vulnérabilités potentielles , selon les entrevues et les documents . Un enquêteur a déclaré qu'il avait interrogé les locataires dans des immeubles appartenant à des fonctionnaires IRS trois, à la recherche d' infractions au code du logement. Il a également déclaré qu'il avait pris des documents d'une conférence de l'IRS et les a envoyés à des fonctionnaires église et a créé un bureau de nouvelles fausses à Washington pour recueillir des informations sur les critiques église. L'église a également financé une organisation de l'IRS dénonciateurs qui ont attaqué l'agence au public.
  • La décision de négocier avec l'Église sont venus après Fred T. Goldberg Jr., le commissaire de l'Internal Revenue Service à l'époque, avait une rencontre inhabituelle avec Miscavige en 1991. propre version de la scientologie de ce qui s'est produit offre un remarquable la manière dont le dirigeant de l'église est entré dans le siège du SRI sans rendez-vous mais j'ai pour voir Goldberg , officielle de la nation d'imposition supérieures. Miscavige offert de mettre un terme à des poursuites de la Scientologie contre l'IRS en échange d' exonérations fiscales.
  • Après cette réunion, Goldberg a créé un comité spécial chargé de négocier un règlement avec la scientologie en dehors des procédures normales de l'agence . Lorsque le comité a déterminé que toutes les entités scientologie devraient être exemptés de taxes , les analystes d'impôt IRS ont été condamnés à ignorer les questions de fond dans l'examen de la décision , selon des protocoles IRS et les dossiers judiciaires.
  • L'IRS a refusé de divulguer les termes de l'accord , y compris si l'église a été tenu de payer les arriérés d'impôts , en faisant valoir qu'il s'agissait de renseignements confidentiels sur les contribuables . L'agence a maintenu cette position dans une lutte de longues procédures judiciaires , et en rejetant une demande d'accès par le New York Times dans le cadre du Freedom of Information Act . Mais la situation est en contraste frappant avec la manipulation de l'agence de quelques autres organisations religieuses . Les deux ministères Jimmy Swaggart et une filiale de l' révérend Jerry Falwell a été requis par l'IRS à révéler qu'il avait payé les arriérés d'impôts pour régler les différends ces dernières années.

Dans les interviews, les hauts fonctionnaires de l'IRS et la Scientologie a nié que des tactiques agressives de l'église avait un effet quelconque sur la décision de l' agence.

Ils ont dit que la décision était fondée sur une enquête de deux ans et les documents volumineux qui a montré l'église était qualifié pour les exonérations.

Goldberg , qui a quitté en tant que commissaire IRS en Janvier 1992 à devenir un secrétaire adjoint au Département du Trésor, ces lois de confidentialité lui interdisant de discuter de la Scientologie ou de sa rencontre impromptue avec Miscavige.

La réunion n'a pas été inscrite sur le calendrier de nomination Goldberg , qui a été obtenu par le New York Times par l'intermédiaire du Freedom of Information Act .

Le renversement IRS sur la scientologie, était presque aussi sans précédent que la guerre longue et acharnée entre les organisations . Au fil des ans , l'IRS avait toujours refusé les exemptions à la plupart des entités de Scientologie , et ses agents avaient pris pour cible l'église pour de nombreuses enquêtes et des audits.

Tout au long de la bataille, vue de l'agence a été soutenue par les tribunaux. En effet , tout juste un an avant le renversement de l'Agence, les revendications des États-Unis Cour a confirmé le refus du SRI d'une exemption à l'Église de Scientologie de spirituel de la technologie, qui avait été créé pour sauvegarder les écrits et les conférences de L. Ron Hubbard , l' écrivain de science-fiction fin dont les prédications forme Écriture de l'église.

Parmi les raisons énumérées par le tribunal de refuser l'exemption ont été " le caractère commercial d'une grande partie de la Scientologie », son« pratiquement incompréhensible procédures financières »et son« hostilité bibliquement fondée sur la fiscalité"

Il n'est pas étonnant que le monde des avocats fiscalistes et des experts a été surpris en Octobre 1993, quand l'IRS a annoncé qu'il était de délivrer des lettres d'exemption visant 30 150 églises de Scientologie , les missions et les sociétés . Parmi eux se trouvait l'Eglise de la technologie spirituelle .

«C'était une décision très surprenante», a déclaré Lawrence B. Gibbs, le commissaire IRS de 1986 à 1989 et prédécesseur de Goldberg. "Quand vous avez comme beaucoup de litiges sur autant de temps , avec l'uniformité générale des résultats que le service a eu avec la Scientologie , il est surprenant d'avoir la décision finale sera favorable. Il est encore plus surprenant que le service a pris la décision, sans avoir, à la lumière de l' arrière-plan avant."

Tandis que les fonctionnaires IRS a insisté pour que les tactiques de la Scientologie n'a pas d'incidence sur la décision , certains responsables ont reconnu que la décision contre l'Église aurait prolongé un combat qui a consommé les ressources du gouvernement vaste et exposés à des poursuites individuelles des fonctionnaires personnels . À une certaine époque, l'église et ses membres ont plus de 50 costumes en cours contre l'IRS et de ses fonctionnaires .

"En définitive, la décision a été prise sur une base juridique", a déclaré un haut fonctionnaire de l'IRS qui a été impliqué dans l'affaire et a parlé à la condition qu'il ne soit pas identifié. "Je ne dis pas la scientologie n'est pas prendre beaucoup de ressources , mais la décision a été prise sur une base légale."

La tactique de l'Eglise semble violer aucune loi , et de ses fonctionnaires et les avocats ont soutenu avec vigueur dans un entretien de trois heures dans les bureaux de l'église à Los Angeles le mois dernier que les exonérations ont été prises uniquement sur le fond . Ils ont dit que l'église avait été victime d'une campagne de harcèlement et de discrimination par des «agents voyous » au sein de l' IRS . Une fois que l'Agence a accepté d'examiner le dossier assez, disent-ils , il était inévitable que l'église serait accordé à ses exemptions.

"Les faits parlent d'eux-mêmes", a déclaré Monique E. Yingling , un avocat de Washington qui a représenté l'église dans le cas d'impôt. "La décision a été prise sur la base des informations que l'église fournis en réponse à l'enquête menée par l'Internal Revenue Service."

Les responsables de l'Eglise et les avocats ont reconnu que la Scientologie avait utilisé des détectives privés pour se pencher sur leurs adversaires , y compris les représentants de l'IRS, mais ils ont dit la pratique n'avait rien à voir avec la décision IRS.

«Il s'agit d' une organisation religieuse qui a été soumis à plus de harcèlement et d' attaques plus sûrement que n'importe quelle religion dans ce siècle et probablement de toute religion jamais, et qu'ils ont dû peut-être prendre des mesures extraordinaires pour survivre", a déclaré Mme Yingling.

LES ORIGINES: UNE ÉGLISE expansion sur une trajectoire de collision

Depuis sa fondation en 1950 , la Scientologie est devenue un mouvement mondial qui possède 8 millions de membres , bien que des transfuges dire le nombre réel est beaucoup plus petit . L'église , qui possède une vaste patrimoine immobilier à travers le monde et exploite un yacht dans les Caraïbes , se décrit comme la seule religion nouvelle principaux ont émergé au 20ème siècle.

Son fondateur, Ron Hubbard, a affirmé que les gens sont des esprits immortels qui ont vécu de nombreuses vies . Dans les enseignements de la Scientologie , Ron Hubbard décrit l'homme comme des grappes de spiritueux qui ont été emprisonnées dans la glace et banni de la Terre 75 millions d'années par Xenu , le dirigeant de la Confédération Galactique 26- planète .

Scientologie décrit son objectif comme «une civilisation sans folie , sans criminels et sans guerre, où les gens capables puissent prospérer et les gens honnêtes puissent avoir des droits, et où l'homme est libre de s'élever vers des sommets plus élevés . " Pour atteindre ces hauteurs , les scientologues croient , chaque individu doit être «nettoyé» des problèmes et des souffrances à travers une série de séances de counseling connu sous le nom « d'audit ». Les sessions sont réalisées par un vérificateur qualifié assisté par un dispositif similaire à un détecteur de mensonge , connu sous le nom E- mètre.

Bien que les finances compliquée Scientologie faire une estimation totale difficile, les dossiers dans les dossiers de l'IRS indiquent que dans le début des années 1990 l'église gagnait environ $ 300 millions par an de frais d'audit, de la vente de la littérature scientologue et des enregistrements , des services de gestion et de la franchise de ses philosophie. responsables de l'Eglise dit que ces chiffres étaient plus élevés que les gains réels .

L'église mère originelle, l'Eglise de scientologie de Californie, a été créé par Hubbard à Los Angeles en 1954. Trois ans plus tard , il a été reconnu comme exonérés d'impôt par l'IRS . Mais en 1967, l'agence dépouillé l'église de son exemption, et une lutte acharnée a éclaté entre l'agence et l'église.

Dans sa lettre de révocation , l'agence a déclaré que les activités de la Scientologie ont été commercial et qu'il a été mis en œuvre pour le bénéfice de Hubbard , un point de vue soutenu par les tribunaux à plusieurs reprises au cours des 25 années suivantes . L'église ignoré l'action , qu'il juge illégale , et retenu l'impôt.

L'IRS mis Scientologie sur ses liste de résultats . Procès-verbal des réunions IRS indiquent que certains agents engagés dans une campagne de fermer la scientologie , un effort que les responsables de l'église citer comme preuve de partialité . Certaines des tactiques conduit à réprimandes par les juges , y compris une décision de 1990 en Boston qui a critiqué l'IRS pour des pratiques abusives d'avoir accès à des registres paroissiaux.

Scientologie a riposté . En 1973, l'église a entrepris un code de programme nommé «blanc neige» . Dans un document portant la mention " secret ", Hubbard a défini une stratégie pour éradiquer tous les fichiers " faux et secret " détenus par les gouvernements du monde entier en ce qui concerne la scientologie.

"L'attaque est nécessaire pour une défense efficace", a écrit Hubbard

Blanche-Neige tourna bientôt sinistre. Sous la supervision de la troisième femme de Hubbard, Mary Sue , les scientologues infiltré le ministère de la Justice et de l'IRS pour découvrir des informations sur Hubbard . Ils ont fait irruption dans les bureaux la nuit et les montagnes de documents copiés . À un moment donné , un dispositif écoute électronique a été caché à l'intérieur d'une salle de conférence de l'IRS , la veille d'une réunion sur la scientologie .

Les critiques disent que ces actions relèvent d'un doctrine de l'Église que Hubbard avait appelé la politique Fair Game . Hubbard a écrit que les ennemis de l'Eglise peuvent "être privé de ses biens ou blessés par quelque moyen que par tout scientologue sans aucune discipline de la scientologie. Peut-être trompé , de poursuites ou a menti ou détruits."

Le complot a été découvert en 1977, et Mme Hubbard et 10 autres ont finalement été condamnés à la prison. Hubbard a été nommée co-conspirateur non accusé parce que les enquêteurs ne pouvaient le lier à des crimes

L'église a promis de changer ses méthodes . Scientologues dit que les membres qui enfreignent la loi ont été éliminés, y compris Mme Hubbard , et l'église a été restructuré pour se protéger contre une récidive . La politique de Fair Game , disaient-ils, a été mal interprété par les tribunaux et les critiques.

"Il n'y a rien de tel", a déclaré Elliot J. Abelson , conseiller général de l'église. "Il ne se produit pas."

LA guerre secrète: les dénonciateurs et «VULNERABILITES»

Mais des entrevues et un examen des dossiers judiciaires de pays montrent que, après la conspiration criminelle a été interrompue , la bataille de l'église contre l'IRS a continué sur d'autres fronts . Quand Hubbard est mort en Janvier 1986, son opposition aux taxes sur le vécu parmi la nouvelle génération de dirigeants , y compris Miscavige , un scientologue de seconde génération .

Une partie de la bataille a été public. Un rôle de premier plan a été joué par la Coalition nationale des IRS dénonciateurs, qui Scientologie a créé et financé pour près d'une décennie .

Sur la surface, la coalition a été comme de nombreux groupes indépendants qui fournissent du soutien pour les initiés qui veulent aller public avec des histoires de corruption. Mais Stacy B. Young, un membre du personnel senior de Scientologie, jusqu'à ce qu'elle a fait défection en 1989, dit-elle aidé à planifier la coalition dans le cadre de la bataille de la Scientologie contre l'IRS à la fin de 1984, alors qu'elle était rédactrice en chef de la liberté de l'Eglise Magazine.

"L'IRS ne donnait pas la scientologie son exonération d'impôt, alors qu'ils étaient considérés comme un ennemi assez importante", a déclaré Mme Young." Qu'est-ce que vous faites avec un ennemi, c'est vous aller après eux et à les harceler et de les intimider et essayer d'exposer leurs crimes jusqu'à ce qu'ils décident de jouer au ballon avec vous . L'idée était de créer une coalition qui a un lien de dépendance de la scientologie alors que il a plus de crédibilité."

Mme Young a déclaré qu'elle avait recruté Paul J. Desfossés, un ancien agent de l'IRS , qui s'était prononcé contre l'agence , au poste de Président du groupe. Desfossés a reconnu que la Scientologie a fourni un financement substantiel, mais il a nié que l'église s'est créé ou de la coalition.

"Nous avons obtenu le soutien de beaucoup de groupes religieux , y compris l'Eglise de Scientologie ", a déclaré Desfossés dans une récente interview.

Le plus grand succès de la coalition est venue en 1989 quand il a contribué à déclencher des audiences du Congrès sur des accusations d'actes répréhensibles par des fonctionnaires IRS . Utilisation de documents publics et divulgation de documents IRS , la coalition a montré que le superviseur à Los Angeles et certains collègues avaient acheté la propriété d'une société en cours de vérification par l'organisme . Peu de temps après l'achat , la vérification a été abandonné et le cabinet a versé plus d'argent.

Kendrick Moxon L., un avocat église de longue date, a reconnu que la coalition a été fondée par la liberté Magazine. Il a dit que son travail était bien connu et fait partie d'une campagne par la Scientologie et d'autres à la réforme de l'IRS.

la guerre de l'église avait un côté secret , aussi, et ses soldats étaient des enquêteurs privés . S'il ya eu des articles précédents sur l'utilisation de l'église des enquêteurs privés , dans toute la mesure de ses efforts contre l'IRS n'est que maintenant à venir à la lumière au moyen d'entrevues et de documents fournis au New York Times .

Octavio Pena , un détective privé à Fort Lee , NJ , atteint une certaine notoriété dans les années 1980 quand il a aidé à exposer les problèmes au sein de l' Internal Revenue Service tout en travaillant sur une affaire pour les entreprises Jordache , le fabricant de jeans .

À l'été 1989, Pena divulgué dans une interview, un homme qui s'est identifié comme Ben Shaw est venu à son bureau . Shaw, qui a dit qu'il était scientologue, a expliqué que l'église était préoccupé par la corruption et IRS paierait 1 million de dollars pour enquêter sur les fonctionnaires Pena IRS, a déclaré Pena.

«J'avais eu une première expérience avec les scientologues, et je lui ai dit que je n'avais pas à l'aise avec lui , même s'il était prêt à me payer 1 million de dollars", a déclaré Pena.

Les officiels scientologues ont reconnu que Shaw a travaillé pour l'église à l'époque, mais ils se moquaient de la notion qu'il avait essayé d'embaucher Pena. «Les Martiens ont offert 2 millions de dollars; c'est notre réponse», a déclaré Moxon, dont la firme a souvent engagé des détectives privés pour l'église.

Michael L. Shomers , un autre détective privé , a indiqué qu'il partageait aucun scrupule Pena, du moins au début .

Décrivant son travail au nom de la scientologie dans une série d'entretiens , Shomers dit que lui et son patron , Thomas J. Krywucki, a travaillé pour l'église pendant au moins 18 mois en 1990 et 1991.

De travail de son bureau du Maryland , at-il dit , il a mis en place une opération factice , le Washington Nouvelles Bureau , à poser en tant que journaliste et recueillir des informations sur les critiques église. Il a également dit qu'il avait infiltré conférences IRS à recueillir des informations sur les fonctionnaires qui pourraient être à sauter réunions , trop boire ou avoir des affaires.

«J'ai été la recherche de vulnérabilités», a déclaré Shomers.

Shomers a déclaré qu'il avait remis des informations à son contact de la Scientologie sur les fonctionnaires qui semblait trop boire . Il a également dit il a passé plusieurs heures courtiser une fonctionnaire IRS dans un bar lors d'une conférence , puis a donné son nom et les renseignements personnels à son sujet à la scientologie .

Dans un cas, l'information qui Shomers a dit qu'il avait recueillies lors d'une conférence IRS dans les montagnes Pocono a été confiée à un associé de Jack Anderson , le chroniqueur , et est apparue dans l'une des colonnes Anderson critiquant top gestionnaires IRS de vie élevé aux frais du contribuable .

Shomers a dit qu'il avait reçu ses instructions à des réunions avec un homme qui s'est identifié comme Jake Thorn et a dit qu'il était lié à l'église . Shomers a déclaré qu'il croyait que le nom est un pseudonyme.

Shomers a dit qu'il avait regardé dans plusieurs immeubles d'habitation en Pennsylvanie appartenant à des fonctionnaires IRS trois. Il a obtenu des dossiers publics afin de déterminer si les bâtiments avaient violé les codes de logement , at-il dit , et interrogé des résidents à la recherche d' plaintes , mais n'en trouve pas.

En Juillet 1991, Shomers dit, il a posé en tant que membre de la coalition IRS dénonciateurs et a travaillé avec un producteur et cameraman de NBC -TV pour obtenir des informations sur une conférence de représentants de l'IRS supérieurs à Walnut Creek , Californie Le producteur a déclaré que Elle a rappelé que Shomers un représentant de la dénonciateurs , mais ne savait rien de son lien avec la Scientologie . Le segment jamais couru .

À un moment donné , Shomers dit, il se glissa dans une salle de réunion à l'hôtel Embassy Suites , où se tenait la conférence , et a pris une pile de documents internes IRS . Il a dit qu'il postée le matériel à une adresse fournie par son contact église.

Krywucki a reconnu qu'il avait travaillé pour les avocats de la Scientologie en 1990 et 1991 , mais il a refusé de discuter de ce qu'il a fait . Il a dit qu'il demanderait aux avocats l'autorisation de parler de l'enquête , mais il n'a pas retourné les appels téléphoniques après cette conversation .

Il est impossible de vérifier toutes les déclarations de Shomers »ou déterminer si ses actions étaient fondées sur des instructions spécifiques de représentants de l'Eglise. Il a dit qu'il avait souvent été payé en espèces et parfois par des contrôles de Bowles et Moxon, une firme de Los Angeles la loi qui a servi de conseiller juridique principal de l'église. Il a dit qu'il n'avait pas retenu l'un des chèques de paie.

Shomers a fourni à The New York Times avec des copies des documents qu'il a dit qu'il avait obtenu de l'église ainsi que des copies des reçus d'hôtel indiquant qu'il avait séjourné dans un hôtel où l'IRS a tenu trois conférences , en Pennsylvanie , la Virginie-Occidentale et la Californie. Il a également fourni des copies de cartes d'affaires , avec de faux noms , ce qu'il a dit a été créé pour le bureau de nouvelles fausses , à Washington et des copies des photos prises dans le cadre de son travail de surveillance.

L'un des représentants de l'IRS enquête Shomers a rappelé que d'un enquêteur privé avait été fureter dans les propriétés il a réussi , au nom de lui-même et deux autres fonctionnaires de l'Agence de niveau intermédiaire .

Le fonctionnaire , Arthur C. Scholz, qui a depuis quitté l'IRS, a déclaré qu'il a été alerté par les locataires d'un homme qui s'est identifié comme un détective privé avait interrogé les locataires sur lui et les autres propriétaires . Il a dit que les locataires n'avaient pas rappelé le nom de l' homme, mais a noté qu'il était au volant d'une voiture avec des plaques d'immatriculation dans le Maryland.

«Il est allé au palais de justice et a constaté les propriétés, puis sortit frapper aux portes de ces locataires et fait un certain nombre d'allégations portant sur des choses qui étaient totalement Bull ", a déclaré Scholz , qui n'a pas participé à l'examen de la scientologie et IRS était à une perte d'expliquer pourquoi l'église aurait été intéressé à lui." Je l'ai signalé à la police locale à ce sujet."

Shomers , qui a depuis quitté le secteur privé - enquête, a déclaré qu'il était prêt à décrire son travail pour l'église, car il était venu à se méfier de la Scientologie et en raison d'un différend financier avec Krywucki .

Moxon , l'avocat de Scientologie, a déclaré l'IRS était bien conscient de l'utilisation de l'église des enquêteurs privés pour dénoncer les violations de l'Agence quand il a accordé des exemptions. Moxon ne nie pas Shomers embauche, mais il a dit les activités décrites par Shomers pour le New York Times étaient légales et appropriées.

Moxon et des avocats autre église dit que l'église nécessaires à l'utilisation des détectives privés pour contrer mensonges répandus par les agents du gouvernement voyou.

" L'IRS se sert des chercheurs, trop ", a déclaré un avocat église, Gerald A. Feffer , un ancien sous- procureur général adjoint maintenant avec Williams & Connolly , l'un des cabinets de Washington d'avocats les plus influents . " On les appelle des agents CID " - pour la Division des enquêtes criminelles - et les agents de police judiciaire mis cette église sous la loupe pendant des années avec une mission de détruire l'église."

Une évaluation directe de la stratégie victorieuse de la Scientologie contre l'IRS était contenue dans un long article de 1994 dans les marchés internationaux Scientologie Nouvelles, un magazine interne distribué. L'article dit:

"Cette exposition publique des criminels au sein de l' IRS a eu l' effet désiré . L'Église de Scientologie est devenu connu dans tout le pays comme le seul groupe prêt à prendre sur les IRS.

"Et l'IRS le savais, poursuit l'article . «Il est devenu évident pour eux que nous n'étions pas sur le point de plier ou disparaître. Notre attaque a été empiéter sur leurs ressources de façon importante, et notre expose de leurs crimes ont commencé à avoir de graves répercussions politiques. Il était devenu un coûteux guerre d'usure , sans vainqueur claire en vue."

LA PAIX inhabituelle: après une réunion, un virage à 180 degrés

Scientologie a fait le geste initial vers un cessez le feu lorsque Miscavige, le dirigeant de l'église , a effectué une visite imprévue à l'IRS, Goldberg.

Le premier compte complet de cette réunion et les événements qui ont suivi l'intérieur de l' IRS a été assemblé à partir d'entrevues , de la scientologie propre compte internes , documents IRS et des enregistrements dans une affaire en instance devant apporté par les analystes de l'impôt , un éditeur de commerce à but non lucratif , qui demandent la libération des accords IRS Scientologie et autres organismes exonérés d'impôt .

Feffer , un avocat église depuis 1984 , dit-il abordé les fonctionnaires du ministère de la justice et l'IRS en 1991 avec une offre de s'asseoir et de négocier une fin au différend .

version de l'église de ce suivi est tout à fait remarquable. Miscavige et Marty Rathbun, un autre responsable de l'église , se promenaient devant le bâtiment de l'IRS à Washington avec quelques heures à perdre un après-midi à la fin Octobre 1991, quand ils ont décidé de parler à Goldberg.

Après la signature de log des visiteurs à l' imposant bâtiment sur la Constitution Avenue, les deux hommes ont demandé à voir le commissaire. Ils ont dit à l'agent de sécurité qu'ils n'ont pas eu un rendez-vous mais certains Goldberg aurait envie de les voir Et, selon le compte de l'église , qu'il a fait.

Goldberg a déclaré qu'il ne pouvait pas discuter de la réunion , même si un ancien haut responsable a confirmé que cela s'est produit . Un porte-parole du SRI a déclaré qu'il serait inhabituel pour quelqu'un de rencontrer le commissaire sans rendez-vous.

Miscavige ne pas accorder d'entrevues , les responsables d'église ont dit , mais Rathbun a déclaré la réunion Goldberg a été l'occasion pour l'Eglise d'offrir à mettre fin à son différend de longue date avec l'Agence , y compris les dizaines de procès intentés contre l'IRS , en échange de l' exemption que la Scientologie a estimé qu'il méritait.

"Let's tout résoudre", Rathbun a rappelé dire. "C'est fou. Il a atteint des niveaux fous."

réponse Goldberg était également hors de l'ordinaire. Il a créé un groupe spécial composé de cinq membres de travail pour régler le différend , sans passer par l'agence exonérés de la division des organisations , qui gère normalement ces questions. Howard M. Schoenfeld , le fonctionnaire IRS choisi comme président de la commission en 1991 , a déclaré plus tard dans une déposition à Tax Analysts le cas où il a rappelé qu'un comité semblable en 30 ans à l'agence .

Les négociateurs et les avocats fiscalistes IRS Scientologie tenu de nombreuses réunions pendant près de deux ans. Un fonctionnaire IRS qui ont participé , et qui a parlé des réunions, à condition que son nom ne sera pas utilisé , a décrit les sessions, à l'occasion de rancune, mais il a dit le ton général était loin plus conviviale que sur les années précédentes.

Il ya des indications que l'élan vers le début de résolution . Dans une lettre à Mme Yingling le 19 janvier 1992, John E. Burke , la commissaire adjointe pour les organisations exonérées, écarté ce qui pourrait avoir été une pierre d'achoppement. Mme Yingling avait apparemment opposé à la divulgation publique d'information sur le potentiel que l'église était fournissant à l'IRS .

Burke a dit qu'il ne voulait pas le différend à retarder les négociations , et il a commis l' IRS de permettre à une partie seulement de l'information à devenir public. Il a dit que l'attelage ne viendrait" dans le cas où nos discussions en panne, une éventualité que je n'ai aucune raison de croire qu'ils se produisent."

Un fonctionnaire IRS impliqués dans les pourparlers a déclaré qu'il n'était pas inhabituel pour l'agence de négocier avec le contribuable sur ce qui est rendu public dans un accord . En acceptant d'emblée que l'information peut être refusé , cependant , l'IRS a semblé renoncer à une grande monnaie d'échange .

Paul Streckfus , un ancien fonctionnaire de la division IRS organisation exonérée , d'abord révélé l'existence du comité de négociation dans une revue professionnelle après l'accord a été annoncé . Il a dit dans une interview que la création du groupe destiné à un règlement était presque prédestiné.

"Une fois que l'IRS a décidé de créer ce groupe assez extraordinaire , les roues étaient en mouvement pour un accord", a déclaré Streckfus.

Pas même une décision de justice picotements en faveur de l' IRS pourrait faire dérailler les pourparlers . A mi-parcours des négociations , en Juin 1992, les revendications des États-Unis Cour a rendu sa décision confirmant le refus IRS d'une exonération fiscale pour l'Eglise de Scientologie de la technologie spirituelle . La décision a souligné les préoccupations de longue date de l'agence sur la nature commerciale de la Scientologie et d'autres questions.

Mme Yingling , avocat fiscaliste de l'église , dit l'arrêt Cour des petites créances ignoré les faits et a été rempli avec des affirmations gratuites. Elle a dit que les négociateurs IRS ont été plus équitable dans l'examen de la preuve.

Une partie de la correspondance entre l'agence et l'église des deux années de négociations a été libéré lorsque les exemptions ont été accordées trois ans et demi. Il remplit le cadre d'une grande bibliothèque dans la salle de lecture IRS à Washington.

Les questions centrales sont abordées dans une série de longues réponses par des avocats de la scientologie aux questions de l'IRS . L'église a fourni des informations complètes sur ses finances et sa structure opérationnelle .

Le haut fonctionnaire IRS impliqués dans les négociations , qui ont demandé de ne pas être identifié , a déclaré satisfait de l'église de l'Agence dans les trois domaines critiques . Il a dit que le comité était convaincu que ceux qui sont impliqués dans les crimes de Blanche-Neige avait été purgé , que l'argent église a été consacrée à des fins exonérées d'impôt et que , avec la mort de Hubbard, personne n'a été s'enrichir de la scientologie .

Mme Yingling a soutenu que rien n'avait changé quant au fond . Elle dit que l'église avait été admissible à l'exemption d'impôt des années, mais biaisée des éléments au sein de l' IRS avait tenu à sa manière.

"Il ya eu aucun changement dans les opérations ou les activités de l'église, dit-elle. " Ce qui est arrivé au sujet a été finalement qu'ils ont examiné tous les renseignements et j'ai vu que l'église bénéficier d'une exemption , et ils étaient satisfaits."

En août 1993, les deux parties sont parvenues à un accord. L'église recevrait ses exemptions convoité pour chaque entité scientologue dans le pays et mettre fin à son agression juridique sur les IRS et de son personnel .

Il n'y avait qu'un pas de plus . Scientologie entités sont tenues de soumettre de nouvelles demandes de dérogation , qui devaient être évaluées par l'agence exonérés de la division des organisations. Mais quelque chose d'inhabituel s'est produit , là aussi .

Schoenfeld , le président des négociations , a ordonné aux deux analystes d'impôt affecté à l'examen de ne pas examiner les questions de fond , selon des protocoles IRS et les registres en Tax Analysts le cas . Ces questions , les a informés Schoenfeld , a été résolu .

Les deux analystes, Donna Moore et M. Terrell Berkovsky, écrit protocoles précisant qu'ils avaient reçu pour instruction de ne pas aborder des questions telles que l'église a été engagé dans une activité commerciale trop ou si ses activités prévues excessive bénéfice privé à ses dirigeants.

Schoenfeld , qui a depuis quitté l'IRS , a déclaré qu'il ne pouvait pas discuter de l'affaire . Mais le haut fonctionnaire IRS impliqués dans les pourparlers a déclaré qu'il n'y avait rien de sinistre dans les instructions , car ces questions avaient été décidées par le comité de négociation . Il a reconnu , toutefois, que ce n'était pas la procédure typique.

L'accord a été annoncé le 13 octobre 1993. L'IRS a refusé de rendre public un de ses termes , y compris si l'Eglise de toutes les taxes payées de retour. L' IRS a également refusé de discuter le raisonnement juridique derrière l'un des plus grands revirements de l'histoire fiscale.

avocats fiscalistes dit l'IRS pourrait avoir besoin de l'église de divulguer les termes de l'accord, ce qu'elle a fait dans le passé . En 1991 , l'IRS a requis des ministères Jimmy Swaggart de divulguer que le groupe avait versé 171.000 dollars en arriérés d'impôts en cas de violation . En 1993 , quelques mois avant l'accord de la Scientologie , l'IRS a requis le Old Time Gospel Hour , un groupe affilié à l' révérend Jerry Falwell, pour faire connaître son paiement de 50.000 dollars en arriérés d'impôts .

"L'IRS effectivement déterminée, les médias nous ont été d'informer et approuvé le communiqué, " a déclaré Mark DeMoss, un porte-parole de Falwell. " Quand personne ne la ramasse, ils ont mis leur propre communiqué de presse."

William J. Lehrfeld , qui représente Tax Analysts dans son costume de rendre public le contrat de Scientologie , a dit: « Vous et moi, en tant que contribuables, subventionnent ces gens , et nous devrions voir cette information . "

Les suites: un ancien ennemi devient un allié

Cinq jours avant l'annonce officielle , Miscavige a précédé la rencontre de la scientologie à Los Angeles et a proclamé sa victoire . Dans un discours de deux heures , selon le récit de Scientologie Internationale Nouvelles, Miscavige décrit années d'attaques contre Hubbard et la Scientologie par le gouvernement.

"Aucun autre groupe dans l'histoire de ce pays n'a jamais été soumis à l'agression que je vous ai informé de ce soir", at-il dit , qualifiant de « la guerre pour mettre fin à toutes les guerres."

Dans le cadre du règlement , Miscavige dit, l'IRS avait accepté de distribuer une fiche d'information décrivant la Scientologie et Hubbard . " Il est très complet et très précis ", a déclaré David Miscavige. " Maintenant, comment puis-je savoir ? Nous l'avons écrit ! Et l'IRS sera de l'envoyer à tous les gouvernements dans le monde."

Feffer, Mme Yingling et Thomas C. Le printemps , un autre des avocats fiscalistes de l'église , est apparu en tenue de soirée sur scène ce soir-là et ont reçu des trophées en cristal Waterford , en reconnaissance de leurs efforts .

Miscavige a qualifié l'accord d'un traité de paix qui marque la plus importante expansion dans l'histoire de la Scientologie .

L'église a immédiatement commencé à citant la décision de l'IRS dans ses efforts pour susciter l'adhésion des autres gouvernements et faire taire les critiques . Mais le plus grand profit de relations publiques peut-être venu par le gouvernement américain lui-même.

Quatre mois après les exemptions ont été accordées, le Département d'État a publié son rapport influents droits de l'homme pour 1993 , une litanie des pays qui abusent de leur citoyens . Pour la première fois , le rapport contenait un paragraphe en notant que les scientologues se sont plaints de harcèlement et de discrimination en Allemagne . La question a été brièvement mentionné dans le rapports 1994 et 1995, aussi.

Tout au long de ces années , le conflit entre scientologues et le gouvernement allemand l'escalade . Dans une campagne publicitaire intensive qui comprend des annonces dans ce journal , l'église a déclaré que les entreprises possédées par des scientologues ont été boycottées et que ses membres ont été exclus de partis politiques et refuser l'accès aux écoles publiques. L'église a affirmé que les actions allemandes en parallèle la persécution nazie au début des Juifs.

Le gouvernement allemand a répondu que la scientologie n'était pas une église digne d' exonération de la taxe , mais une entreprise commerciale - la position de l'IRS très avait maintenu dans sa guerre de 25 ans contre l'église . fonctionnaires allemands dit assimilant le traitement des scientologues à celle des Juifs sous le régime nazi a été une distorsion et une insulte aux victimes de l'Holocauste , un point de vue partagé par certains responsables juifs en Allemagne.

Le différend portait sur un chahut diplomatique en Janvier lorsque le Département d'État a publié son rapport de 1996 droits de l'homme , avec une section détaillée sur la Scientologie a déclaré que le contrôle allemand de la religion a augmenté. Les artistes avaient été empêchés d'exercer en raison de leur appartenance à l'Eglise et de l'aile jeunesse de l' Union chrétienne-démocrate d'administration avait demandé un boycott du film « Mission: Impossible " parce que sa star , Tom Cruise, est un scientologue éminent , le Département d'Etat a dit .

fonctionnaires allemands ont été irrités par les critiques , et ministre des Affaires étrangères Klaus Kinkel a soulevé la question avec le secrétaire d' État Madeleine K. Albright , quand elle était à Bonn le 18 février. Mme Albright lui ai dit que la question a été l'objet de discussions bilatérales , mais elle dit qu'elle a trouvé revendications par des scientologues qu'ils sont les victimes des persécutions nazies de style " mauvais goût".

Nicholas Burns , le porte-parole du département d'Etat , a déclaré que, malgré la croyance que les scientologues étaient allés trop loin en établissant des comparaisons à la persécution des Juifs , le ministère s'est senti obligé de développer des troubles de l'Eglise avec les Allemands dans son dernier rapport sur les droits de l'homme .

"Les Allemands sont tout à fait catégorique, en fonction de leur propre histoire , que ce sont les sortes de groupes qui doivent être mis hors la loi», a déclaré M. Burns. «Toutefois, pour nos fins , nous classons la Scientologie comme une religion parce qu'ils ont obtenu le statut exonéré d'impôt par le gouvernement américain.»

Back to start

by Chris Owen (1997-1998)


Une utilisation ultra-agressive d'enquêteurs et des tribunaux

Par Frantz DOUGLAS

Traduction par google

Pendant des années, la Scientologie a donné beaucoup de mal à se défendre contre les critiques . Souvent, sa défense a impliqué des enquêteurs privés travaillant pour ses avocats . Bien que le recours à des enquêteurs privés sont très répandus dans la profession juridique , certains cas impliquant l'église ont été inhabituelle .

Les officiels scientologues dit que les enquêteurs exploité conformément à la loi et que les tactiques ont été nécessaires pour contre-attaques au cours des années par des agents de l'Internal Revenue Service et de la presse .

«Lorsque les gens arrêtent de répandre des mensonges à leur sujet et d'arrêter l'impression de fausses allégations à leur sujet dans les journaux, l'église va cesser d'utiliser des enquêteurs privés", a déclaré Monique E. Yingling , un avocat église.

En 1986, la Cour d'appel fédérale de Boston a déclaré la preuve dans une affaire d' extorsion de fonds ont indiqué que les enquêteurs de Scientologie avait incité les témoins à mentir. Il a identifié un enquêteur comme Eugene M. Ingram.

Huit ans plus tard, Ingram a été accusé de passer pour un agent de police dans la recherche d'informations sur un shérif, à Tampa, en Floride, alors qu'il travaillait comme enquêteur église. Lui et un employé de la scientologie flashé badges et dit à une femme qu'ils ont été les enquêteurs de police avant d'interroger ses liens sur d'éventuels entre un shérif du comté et de ce qui s'est dit à un réseau de prostitution, des dossiers de police dit.

fonctionnaires de la Cour a déclaré un mandat d'arrestation Ingram était toujours en suspens.

Ingram avait été révoqué de la police de Los Angeles en 1981, après les accusations selon lesquelles il était impliqué dans la gestion d'une réseau de prostitution et a fourni des informations à un trafiquant de drogue . Il a été acquitté d'accusations criminelles dans ce cas.

Elliot J. Abelson , conseiller général de l'Église , a dit qu'il avait utilisé Ingram souvent comme un enquêteur et avait le plus grand respect pour lui. Il a dit que l'affaire était bidon Tampa .

Richard Behar , journaliste d'investigation, encouru la colère de la scientologie quand il a écrit un article de couverture sur l'Eglise dans le magazine Time en 1991 . L'article appelle l'Eglise « une raquette extrêmement rentable mondiale qui survit en intimidant les membres et les critiques d'une manière mafieux . "

L'église et un membre poursuivi temps et Behar pour diffamation , et la compagnie a dépensé plus de 7 millions $ la défense des cas . fonction de l'église a été rejeté l'année dernière par un juge fédéral du tribunal de district , un recours en appel par la Scientologie . fonction de l'individu, a été réglée par un paragraphe correctives , mais pas d'argent.

Behar fait valoir, dans une contre que, même avant l'article couru , les enquêteurs ont interrogé l'église ses connaissances sur sa santé et si il avait eu des problèmes de drogue ou de l'impôt . Behar a déclaré que, après l'article courait, il avait été suivi par des agents de la Scientologie et avait été tellement préoccupé qu'il avait embauché des gardes du corps .

En 1992 , le juge Ronald Swearinger du comté de Los Angeles Cour supérieure a déclaré la revue The American Lawyer qu'il croyait que les scientologues avaient tailladé les pneus de voiture et noyé son Collie alors qu'il présidait un procès contre l'église. L'église a nié les accusations.

En 1993 , le juge James M. Ideman présidait un procès impliquant la scientologie dans le Federal District Court de Los Angeles quand il a pris l'initiative inhabituelle de se retirer de l'affaire. Dans une déclaration judiciaire, il a dit qu'il ne pouvait plus présider assez parce que l'Eglise " a récemment commencé à harceler mon clerc qui m'ont aidé sur ce cas."

Kendrick Moxon L., avocat de l'Eglise dans cette affaire, a dit qu'il avait essayé de questionner l'ancien greffier au sujet des accusations qu'il y avait une couverture de magazine Time encadrée sur la scientologie dans le cabinet du juge . Il a dit que l'ancien greffier avait refusé de lui parler et que son assignation à comparaître pour son témoignage avait été annulé .

tactiques de la Scientologie en justice ont également attiré l' reproches judiciaire. L'an dernier, la Cour d'appel de Californie accusé la Scientologie d'utiliser "la procédure judiciaire pour contraindre l'adversaire à se soumettre. "La Cour d'appel fédérale de San Francisco a déclaré l'année dernière que la scientologie avait joué " double jeu avec le système judiciaire" et perçu 2,9 millions de dollars à des sanctions contre l'église.

Par poursuit agressivement ses adversaires en cour , l'église semble tenir compte de la prédication de L. Ron Hubbard , son fondateur , qui a écrit: « Le but du procès est de harceler et décourager plutôt que gagner. La loi peut être utilisé très facilement pour harceler , et le harcèlement assez sur quelqu'un qui est simplement sur le bord mince de toute façon ... sera généralement suffisant pour causer sa baisse professionnel. Si possible , bien sûr , le perdre complètement . "

Un objet de poursuites intentées par des scientologues a été le Cult Awareness Network , un organisme sans but lucratif voué à la lutte contre les groupes religieux perçu comme dangereux.

La Scientologie a longtemps considéré le réseau , connu sous le nom CAN, comme un adversaire de la liberté religieuse et la haine d'un groupe . Le responsables de l'Eglise affirme que le réseau utilis des "déprogrammeurs" pour kidnapper des gens dans un effort de les convaincre de quitter de petits groupes religieux. Des déprogrammeurs affiliés au réseau ont été reconnus coupables de crimes dans le cadre des efforts visant à forcer les gens à quitter les organisations religieuses.

À partir de 1992, les scientologues déposé 40 à 50 poursuites contre le réseau et ses dirigeants , affirmant qu'ils discrimination en refusant d'autoriser les scientologues pour assister à des conventions ou inscris chapitres . Certains scientologues régnait dans la cour .

Moxon, qui a représenté de nombreux scientologues, a déclaré poursuites judiciaires avaient été destinés à lutter contre la discrimination réseau contre les gens qui voulaient le réformer .

Mais Daniel A. Leipold , qui a représenté le réseau, a déclaré lors de dépositions de certains des costumes que les actions avaient fait partie d'une campagne par la scientologie pour détruire le réseau .

L'année dernière, le réseau a déclaré faillite après une condamnation de de 1,8 M $ contre lui dans un procès intenté par un jeune homme qui avait été membre d'un groupe de pentecôtistes. Le jury a conclu que l'homme avait été séquestré par un déprogrammeur. Moxon, qui représentait l'homme, a déclaré qu'il avait pris l'affaire comme une question de liberté religieuse et que ses dépenses avaient été payés par le groupe de pentecôtistes.

Après le réseau a déposé son bilan, son nom, le logo et le téléphone ont été achetés par un groupe représenté par un avocat qui est un scientologue. Bien que l'église a dit qu'il n'avait aucun lien avec les acheteurs , une brochure par la poste par le nouveau réseau Cult Awareness en Janvier a été un ardent description de la scientologie comme un moyen "d'accroître le bonheur et améliorer les conditions pour soi et pour les autres."

Back to start

by Chris Owen (1997-1998)

 
Un scientologue américain, Hernandez, voulait déduire les sommes
qu'il versait à la scientologie des sommes déclarées au fisc

Argued November 28, 1988
Decided June 5, 1989

Original anglais: http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=490&invol=680

Résumé:

Le fisc américain a refusé, et le tribunal d'instance des impôts a refusé.Hernandez (avec l'appui de la secte) est allé en appel. La cour d'appel a refusé également. Hernandez a tenté la Cour Suprême des Etats-Unis: elle a confirmé la décision de la Cour d'appel et du Tribunal des Impôts.

(Nota: traduction que des partie les plus significatives, en marron)

Premiere décision: Purement scientologie, décision de la Cour suprême.

Deuxième décision: puisque le fisc américain IRS a violé la décision de la Cour Suprème et finalement accordé illégalement l'exemption d'impôts à la scientologie (ce qu'il n'avait évidemment pas le droit de faire puisque violant une décision inverse de la Cour Suprème des Etats-Unis), un père de confession juive (Michael Sklar) a demandé à son tour à ce qu'une partie des sommes qu'il verse pour ses enfants dans une écols juive soit déductible au titre de versements exempts d'impôts.

Cela lui a été refusé en instance et en appel. Nous avons traduit une toute petite partie de cette décision (qui se réfère d'ailleurs et confirme celle-ci) - démontrant l'illégalité de la décision de l'IRS d'accorder une exemption d'impôts aux scientologues et, en corollaire, à la secte.

Voir aussi la décision de la "Charity Commission" du Royaume Uni, parvenue à des conclusions très comparables à celles de la Cour Suprème de Etats-Unis, après des années d'une recherche poussée.

Enfin, malgré ces décisions à répétition des tribunaux, la secte continue d'emmagasiner de l'argent que paient les contribuaubles américains. Pire, elle a organisé soigneusement la fuite des capitaux extorqués à ses adeptes dans les pays où elle ne bénéficie pas d'exemption, comme la France. Le système est très simple: la secte américaine facture à prix d'or des "missions" et des "formations" voire des locations de bâtiments aux organisations scientologues de ces pays. Elle rapatrie donc ces fonds qui sont alors "exemptés d'impôts" aux USA. Elle a d'ailleurs obtenu un "droit" encore plus régalien et tout aussi illicite: celui de décider elle-même quelles entités scientologues sont exemptées d'impôts aux Etats-Unis. Cela découle de l'accord final entre la secte et l'IRS, en 1993.L'IRS a donc largement franchement le Rubicon en violant la décision claire et nette de la Cour Suprême ainsi que les évidences découlant de la Loi, lorsqu'il a accordé - dans ce deal secret qui pue le chantage et les pressions criminelles de la scientologie, l'exemption aux activités scientologues, pratiquement quelles qu'elles soient.


U.S. Supreme Court
HERNANDEZ v. COMMISSIONER, 490 U.S. 680 (1989)
490 U.S. 680
HERNANDEZ v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 87-963.

Discuté le 28 novembre, 1988
Décision du 5 juin, 1989 *

L'église de scientologie (église) fournit des séances "d'audition" destinées à améliorer la conscience spirituelle des membres, et des cours d'entraînement où les participants étudient les fondements de la croyance et essaient de parvenir aux qualifications nécessaires pour mener des séances d'audition. Selon un des fondements centraux de sa "doctrine d'échange", l'église a établi des tarifs obligatoires fixes pour les séances d'audition et d'entraînement, lesquels varient en fonction de la durée des séances et du niveau de sophistication; ces prix sont versés aux églises locales. Selon l'article 170 du code des impôts IRS de 1954, les demandeurs désirent déduire ces versements de leur déclaration au titre de "contribution charitable", ce qui se définit comme une "contribution ou un cadeau" transmis à des récipiendaires éligibles. Après que le Commissaire de l'IRS ait refusé ces déductions, expliquant qu'il ne s'agissait pas de "contributions charitables", les demandeurs sont allés devant un tribunal des Impôts pour obtenir révision de la décision. Ce tribunal a maintenu les décisions du Commissaire et rejeté les arguments constitutionnels basé sur le libre exercice des Clauses du Premier Amendement de la Constitution US. La Cour d'Appel a tenu les appels séparés.

Maintenu:

Les paiements effectués aux églises [de scientologie] locales pour les services d'audition et d'entraînement ne sont pas déductibles [au titre] des contributions charitables, selon l'article 170 [du code des impôts des Etats-Unis] pages 689-703.

(a) les paiements des demandeurs ne sont pas des "contributions" ou des "cadeaux" au sens de l'article 170. L'historique législatif des limites de "contribution ou cadeau" révèle que le Congrès avait l'intention d'établir une différence entre des paiements non exigés effectués à des destinataires qualifiés, qui sont déductibles, et des paiements effectués à des destinataires face à une contrepartie [un quid pro quo] en termes de biens ou services, paiements qui ne sont pas déductibles.

Pour s'assurer qu'un paiement donné se fait dans ces conditions de contrepartie, on doit examiner les particularités de la transaction effectuée. Ici, les particularités extérieures suggèrent largement un échange entre demandeurs [490 U.S. 680, 681], échange d'argent contre de l'audition et de l'entraînement, puisque l'église établit des prix fixes pour chaque église locale, qu'elle calibre ces prix en fonction de la durée de séances et du niveau de sophistication, qu'elle rend le trop-perçu si les services ne sont pas accomplis, qu'elle distribue des "relevés de compte" pour gérer ce qui a été payé par avance mais n'a pas encore été délivré, et qu'elle interdit catégoriquement les séances gratuites. L'argument du demandeur prétendant que l'analyse "quid pro quo" ne convient pas ici puisque les paiements effectués ne donnent, en cas de paiement effectués à une église, que des bénéfices religieux, cet argument ne convainct pas, puisque dans ses termes, l'article 170 ne donne pas d'indication de [traitement] préférentiel pour ce type de paiements, et que l'historique (1) législatif n'offre aucun indice qu'il puisse s'agir d'une négligence ou d'un oubli [du législateur]. En outre, la proposition de déductibilité des demandeurs étendrait la contribution charitable très au delà de ce qu'a fourni le Congrès et engloberait de nombreuses formes de paiements qui, autrement, ne seraient pas ou ne pourraient pas être déductibles. De plus, cette proposition pourrait soulever des problèmes d'implication entre Eglise et Etat, puisque l'IRS serait contraint d'établir des différenciations entre "bénéfices religieux" ou "services" d'organisations laïques. Pp. 689-694.

[la suite explique en quoi le refus d'autoriser cette déduction d'impôts aux demandeurs ne viole ni ce qu'on nomme la "Clause d'établissement" (Premier amendement de la Constitution américaine, qui interdit l'immixtion de l'état dans les affaires religieuses), ni la Clause de Libre exercice (autrement dit, la liberté de religion). Ensuite, la Cour explique en quoi les arguments des demandeurs n'expliquent pas de différenciations injustifiées entre les traitements du fisc face à la scientologie par rapport à d'autres "religions". Cette partie de la décision est assez formelle ; la cour d'appel de Californie ira plus loin, en recommandant, dans Sklar c. IRS, de faire un procès pour redresser l'anomalie de traitement commise par l'IRS dans les privilèges accordés à scientologie, mais pas à d'autres groupements]
 

Sklar contre IRS, extraits

Les Sklar sont un couple juif qui met ses enfants dans des écoles religieuses et voulait donc, conformé- ment aux avantages exorbitants accordés aux scientologues, déduire la formation religieuse de ses enfants des impôts qu'ils paient. Le fisc américain n'a cessé de refuser de leur appliquer les mêmes avantages que ceux accordés aux scientologues, lesquels déduisent au moins 80% de leurs versements à la secte de leurs propres impôts.

Dans le procès en appel de Michael Sklar et Marla Sklar, appelants, contre le Commissaire de l'IRS (fisc américain), voici ce qu'on peut lire. Rappelons brièvement les faits: les scientologues américains ayant obtenu une exemption illicté d'impôts pour ce qu'ils versent comme fonds à leur secte, une famille de religion juive de Los Angelès a demandé à bénéficier du même avantage pour les études religieuses de ses enfants. Elle n'a pas obtenu gain de cause, mais ici, on lit que la Cour d'Appel estime que l'avantage accordé aux scientologues par le fisc devrait leur être retiré (ou, en tout cas, l'affaire devrait faire l'objet d'un procès contre l'IRS et la secte)

"Nous [c'est le président de la Cour d'appel qui écrit] rejetons par conséquent l'argument selon lequel le compromis final entre l'église de scientologie et l'IRS [fisc américain], ou au moins, la partie du compromis qui établit les règles applicables aux membres de la scientologie en général, ne soit pas assujetti à l'obligation de publication auprès du public. L'IRS n'a simplement pas le droit d'établir des compromis finaux avec des organisations religieuses ou sans but lucratif, accords qui gouverneraient des déductions, puis de taire ces compromis auprès des tribunaux, du Congrès et du public.

.../...

Un compromis final de l'IRS ne peut supplanter le Congrès ni la Cour Suprême.

Si l'IRS donne en fait un traîtement préférentiel aux membres de l'église de scientologie, en leur donnant un droit spécial de prétendre à des déductions qui sont contraires à la loi, et que l'IRS refuse avec raison ce droit à tous les autres, l'action correcte à entreprendre alors est de porter plainte afin de mettre fin à cette politique. Le remède ne consiste pas à exiger que les autres obtiennent aussi cette déduction imméritée.


Le Tribunal auquel les Sklar se sont adressés pour la 3e fois dit ceci; en substance, le fisc américain prétend avoir voulu éviter un litige trop ennuyeux pour lui en signant un deal avec la secte criminelle. Mais le juge estime pour sa part que si on analyse cet argument, il suffirait à tous les groupes "religieux" de s'attaquer au fisc pour finir par obtenir une exemption imméritée. (Cf. Décision de la cour d'appel de février 2008 publiée le 12 décembre 2008)

(b) Disallowance of petitioners' 170 deductions does not violate the Establishment Clause. Petitioners' argument that 170 creates an unconstitutional denominational preference by according disproportionately harsh tax status to those religions that raise funds by imposing fixed costs for participation in certain religious practices is unpersuasive. Section 170 passes constitutional muster, since it does not facially differentiate among religious sects but applies to all religious entities, and since it satisfies the requisite three-pronged inquiry under the Clause. First, the section is neutral both in design and purpose, there being no allegation that it was born of animus to religion in general or to Scientology in particular. Second, its primary effect - encouraging gifts to charitable entities, including but not limited to religious organizations - does not advance religion, there being no allegation that it involves direct governmental action endorsing religion or a particular religious practice. Its primary secular effect is not rendered unconstitutional merely because it happens to harmonize with the tenets of religions that raise funds by soliciting unilateral donations.

Third, the section threatens no excessive entanglement between church and state. Although the IRS must ascertain the prices of a religious institution's services, the regularity with which such payments are waived, and other pertinent information about the transaction, this is merely routine regulatory interaction that does not involve the type of inquiries into religious doctrine, delegation of state power, or detailed monitoring and close administrative contact that would violate the nonentanglement command. Nor does the application of 170 require the Government to place a monetary [490 U.S. 680, 682] value on particular religious benefits.

Petitioners' claim to the contrary raises no need for valuation, since they have alleged only that their payments are fully exempt from a quid pro quo analysis - not that some portion of those payments is deductible because it exceeds the value of the acquired service. In any event, the need to ascertain what portion of a payment was a purchase and what portion was a contribution does not ineluctably create entanglement problems, since the IRS has eschewed benefit-focused valuation in cases where the economic value of a good or service is elusive, and has instead employed a valuation method which inquires into the cost (if any) to the donee of providing the good or service. This method involves merely administrative inquiries that, as a general matter, bear no resemblance to the kind of governmental surveillance that poses an intolerable risk of entanglement. Pp. 695-698.

(c) Disallowance of petitioners' 170 deductions does not violate the Free Exercise Clause. Although it is doubtful that, as petitioners allege, the disallowance imposes a substantial burden on the central practice of Scientology by deterring adherents from engaging in auditing and training sessions and by interfering with their observance of the doctrine of exchange, United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 , establishes that even a substantial burden is justified by the broad public interest in maintaining a sound tax system, free of myriad exceptions flowing from a wide variety of religious beliefs.

That this case involves federal income taxes, rather than the Social Security taxes considered in Lee, is of no consequence. Also of no consequence is the fact that the Code already contains some deductions and exemptions, since the guiding principle is that a tax must be uniformly applicable to all, except as Congress provides explicitly otherwise. Id., at 261. Indeed, the Government's interest in avoiding an exemption is more powerful here than in Lee, in the sense that the claimed exemption there stemmed from a specific doctrinal obligation not to pay taxes, whereas there is no limitation to petitioners' argument that they are entitled to an exemption because an incrementally larger tax burden interferes with their religious activities. Pp. 698-700.

(d) Petitioners' assertion that disallowing their claimed deductions conflicts with the IRS' longstanding practice of permitting taxpayers to deduct payments to other religious institutions in connection with certain religious practices must be rejected in the absence of any specific evidence about the nature or structure of such other transactions. In the absence of those facts, this Court cannot appraise accurately whether IRS revenue rulings allowing deductions for particular religious payments correctly applied a quid pro quo analysis to the practices in question and cannot discern whether those rulings contain any unifying [490 U.S. 680, 683] principle that would embrace auditing and training session payments. Pp. 700-703.

819 F.2d 1212 and 822 F.2d 844, affirmed.
MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. O'CONNOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SCALIA, J., joined, post, p. 704. BRENNAN and KENNEDY, JJ., took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases.


[ Footnote * ] Together with No. 87-1616, Graham et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Michael J. Graetz argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioners in both cases.

Deputy Solicitor General Merrill argued the cause for respondent in both cases. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Rose, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Alan I. Horowitz, and Robert S. Pomerance.Fn

Fn [490 U.S. 680, 683] Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Jewish Congress et al. by Walter J. Rockler, Julius Greisman, Paul S. Berger, and Marc D. Stern; and for the Council on Religious Freedom by Lee Boothby.

JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.

Section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (Code), 26 U.S.C. 170, permits a taxpayer to deduct from gross income the amount of a "charitable contribution." The Code defines that term as a "contribution or gift" to certain eligible donees, including entities organized and operated exclusively for religious purposes. 1 We granted certiorari to determine [490 U.S. 680, 684] whether taxpayers may deduct as charitable contributions payments made to branch churches of the Church of Scientology (Church) in order to receive services known as "auditing" and "training." We hold that such payments are not deductible.

I
Scientology was founded in the 1950's by L. Ron Hubbard. It is propagated today by a "mother church" in California and by numerous branch churches around the world. The mother Church instructs laity, trains and ordains ministers, and creates new congregations. Branch churches, known as "franchises" or "missions," provide Scientology services at the local level, under the supervision of the mother Church. Church of Scientology of California v. Commissioner, 823 F.2d 1310, 1313 (CA9 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1015 (1988).

Scientologists believe that an immortal spiritual being exists in every person. A person becomes aware of this spiritual dimension through a process known as "auditing." 2 Auditing involves a one-to-one encounter between a participant (known as a "preclear") and a Church official (known as [490 U.S. 680, 685] an "auditor"). An electronic device, the E-meter, helps the auditor identify the preclear's areas of spiritual difficulty by measuring skin responses during a question and answer session. Although auditing sessions are conducted one on one, the content of each session is not individually tailored. The preclear gains spiritual awareness by progressing through sequential levels of auditing, provided in short blocks of time known as "intensives." 83 T. C. 575, 577 (1984), aff'd, 822 F.2d 844 (CA9 1987).

The Church also offers members doctrinal courses known as "training." Participants in these sessions study the tenets of Scientology and seek to attain the qualifications necessary to serve as auditors. Training courses, like auditing sessions, are provided in sequential levels. Scientologists are taught that spiritual gains result from participation in such courses. 83 T. C., at 577.

The Church charges a "fixed donation," also known as a "price" or a "fixed contribution," for participants to gain access to auditing and training sessions. These charges are set forth in schedules, and prices vary with a session's length and level of sophistication. In 1972, for example, the general rates for auditing ranged from $625 for a 12 1/2-hour auditing intensive, the shortest available, to $4,250 for a 100-hour intensive, the longest available. Specialized types of auditing required higher fixed donations: a 12 1/2-hour "Integrity Processing" auditing intensive cost $750; a 12 1/2-hour "Expanded Dianetics" auditing intensive cost $950. This system of mandatory fixed charges is based on a central tenet of Scientology known as the "doctrine of exchange," according to which any time a person receives something he must pay something back. Id., at 577-578. In so doing, a Scientologist maintains "inflow" and "outflow" and avoids spiritual decline. 819 F.2d 1212, 1222 (CA1 1987).

The proceeds generated from auditing and training sessions are the Church's primary source of income. The Church promotes these sessions not only through newspaper, [490 U.S. 680, 686] magazine, and radio advertisements, but also through free lectures, free personality tests, and leaflets. The Church also encourages, and indeed rewards with a 5% discount, advance payment for these sessions. 822 F.2d, at 847. The Church often refunds unused portions of prepaid auditing or training fees, less an administrative charge.

Petitioners in these consolidated cases each made payments to a branch church for auditing or training sessions. They sought to deduct these payments on their federal income tax returns as charitable contributions under 170. Respondent Commissioner, the head of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), disallowed these deductions, finding that the payments were not charitable contributions within the meaning of 170. 3

Petitioners sought review of these determinations in the Tax Court. That court consolidated for trial the cases of the three petitioners in No. 87-1616: Katherine Jean Graham, Richard M. Hermann, and David Forbes Maynard. The petitioner in No. 87-963, Robert L. Hernandez, agreed to be bound by the findings in the consolidated Graham trial, reserving his right to a separate appeal. Before trial, the Commissioner stipulated that the branch churches of Scientology are religious organizations entitled to receive tax-deductible charitable contributions under the relevant sections of the Code. This stipulation isolated as the sole statutory issue whether payments for auditing or training sessions constitute "contribution[s] or gift[s]" under 170. 4 [490 U.S. 680, 687]

The Tax Court held a 3-day bench trial during which the taxpayers and others testified and submitted documentary exhibits describing the terms under which the Church promotes and provides auditing and training sessions. Based on this record, the court upheld the Commissioner's decision. 83 T. C. 575 (1984). It observed first that the term "charitable contribution" in 170 is synonymous with the word "gift," which case law had defined "as a voluntary transfer of property by the owner to another without consideration therefor." Id., at 580, quoting DeJong v. Commissioner, 36 T. C. 896, 899 (1961) (emphasis in original), aff'd, 309 F.2d 373 (CA9 1962). It then determined that petitioners had received consideration for their payments, namely, "the benefit of various religious services provided by the Church of Scientology." 83 T. C., at 580. The Tax Court also rejected the taxpayers' constitutional challenges based on the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment.

The Courts of Appeals for the First Circuit in petitioner Hernandez's case, and for the Ninth Circuit in Graham, Hermann, and Maynard's case, affirmed. The First Circuit rejected Hernandez's argument that under 170, the IRS' ordinary inquiry into whether the taxpayer received consideration for his payment should not apply to "the return of a commensurate religious benefit, as opposed to an economic or financial benefit." 819 F.2d, at 1217 (emphasis in original). [490 U.S. 680, 688] The court found "no indication that Congress intended to distinguish the religious benefits sought by Hernandez from the medical, educational, scientific, literary, or other benefits that could likewise provide the quid for the quo of a non-deductible payment to a charitable organization." Ibid. The court also rejected Hernandez's argument that it was impracticable to put a value on the services he had purchased, noting that the Church itself had "established and advertised monetary prices" for auditing and training sessions, and that Hernandez had not claimed that these prices misstated the cost of providing these sessions. Id., at 1218.

Hernandez's constitutional claims also failed. Because 170 created no denominational preference on its face, Hernandez had shown no Establishment Clause violation. Id., at 1218-1221. As for the Free Exercise Clause challenge, the court determined that denying the deduction did not prevent Hernandez from paying for auditing and training sessions and thereby observing Scientology's doctrine of exchange. Moreover, granting a tax exemption would compromise the integrity and fairness of the tax system. Id., at 1221-1225.

The Ninth Circuit also found that the taxpayers had received a "measurable, specific return . . . as a quid pro quo for the donation" they had made to the branch churches. 822 F.2d, at 848. The court reached this result by focusing on "the external features" of the auditing and training transactions, an analytic technique which "serves as an expedient for any more intrusive inquiry into the motives of the payor." Ibid. Whether a particular exchange generated secular or religious benefits to the taxpayer was irrelevant, for under 170 "[i]t is the structure of the transaction, and not the type of benefit received, that controls." Id., at 849.

The Ninth Circuit also rejected the taxpayers' constitutional arguments. The tax deduction provision did not violate the Establishment Clause because 170 is "neutral in its design" and reflects no intent "to visit a disability on a particular [490 U.S. 680, 689] religion." Id., at 853. Furthermore, that the taxpayers would "have less money to pay to the Church, or that the Church [would] receive less money, [did] not rise to the level of a burden on appellants' ability to exercise their religious beliefs." Id., at 851. Indeed, because the taxpayers could still make charitable donations to the branch church, they were "not put to the choice of abandoning the doctrine of exchange or losing the government benefit, for they may have both." Ibid. Finally, the court noted that the compelling governmental interest in "the maintenance of a sound and uniform tax system" counseled against granting a free exercise exemption. Id., at 852-853.

We granted certiorari, 485 U.S. 1005 (1988); 486 U.S. 1022 (1988), to resolve a Circuit conflict concerning the validity of charitable deductions for auditing and training payments. 5 We now affirm.


II
For over 70 years, federal taxpayers have been allowed to deduct the amount of contributions or gifts to charitable, religious, and other eleemosynary institutions. See 2 B. Bittker, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts 35.1.1 (1981) (tracing history of charitable deduction). Section 170, the present provision, was enacted in 1954; it requires a taxpayer claiming the deduction to satisfy a number of conditions. 6 The Commissioner's stipulation in this case, however, [490 U.S. 680, 690] has narrowed the statutory inquiry to one such condition: whether petitioners' payments for auditing and training sessions are "contribution[s] or gift[s]" within the meaning of 170.

The legislative history of the "contribution or gift" limitation, though sparse, reveals that Congress intended to differentiate between unrequited payments to qualified recipients and payments made to such recipients in return for goods or services. Only the former were deemed deductible. The House and Senate Reports on the 1954 tax bill, for example, both define "gifts" as payments "made with no expectation of a financial return commensurate with the amount of the gift." S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 196 (1954); H. R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., A44 (1954). Using payments to hospitals as an example, both Reports state that the gift characterization should not apply to "a payment by an individual to a hospital in consideration of a binding obligation to provide medical treatment for the individual's employees. It would apply only if there were no expectation of any quid pro quo from the hospital." S. Rep. No. 1622, supra, at 196 (emphasis added); H. Rep. No. 1337, supra, at A44 (emphasis added). 7

In ascertaining whether a given payment was made with "the expectation of any quid pro quo," S. Rep. No. 1622, supra, at 196; H. Rep. No. 1337, supra, at A44, the IRS has customarily examined the external features of the transaction in question. This practice has the advantage of obviating [490 U.S. 680, 691] the need for the IRS to conduct imprecise inquiries into the motivations of individual taxpayers. The lower courts have generally embraced this structural analysis. See, e. g., Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 413, 422-423 (Ct. Cl. 1971) (applying this approach and collecting cases), cited in United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 117 (1986); see also 2 B. Bittker, supra, at 35.1.3 (collecting cases). We likewise focused on external features in United States v. American Bar Endowment, supra, to resolve the taxpayers' claims that they were entitled to partial deductions for premiums paid to a charitable organization for insurance coverage; the taxpayers contended that they had paid unusually high premiums in an effort to make a contribution along with their purchase of insurance. We upheld the Commissioner's disallowance of the partial deductions because the taxpayers had failed to demonstrate, at a minimum, the existence of comparable insurance policies with prices lower than those of the policy they had each purchased. In so doing, we stressed that "[t]he sine qua non of a charitable contribution is a transfer of money or property without adequate consideration." Id., at 118 (emphasis added in part). 8

In light of this understanding of 170, it is readily apparent that petitioners' payments to the Church do not qualify as "contribution[s] or gift[s]." As the Tax Court found, these payments were part of a quintessential quid pro quo exchange: in return for their money, petitioners received an identifiable benefit, namely, auditing and training sessions. The Church established fixed price schedules for auditing and training sessions in each branch church; it calibrated particular prices to auditing or training sessions of particular lengths and levels of sophistication; it returned a refund if auditing and training services went unperformed; it distributed "account [490 U.S. 680, 692] cards" on which persons who had paid money to the Church could monitor what prepaid services they had not yet claimed; and it categorically barred provision of auditing or training sessions for free. 9 Each of these practices reveals the inherently reciprocal nature of the exchange.

Petitioners do not argue that such a structural analysis is inappropriate under 170, or that the external features of the auditing and training transactions do not strongly suggest a quid pro quo exchange. Indeed, the petitioners in the consolidated Graham case conceded at trial that they expected to receive specific amounts of auditing and training in return for their payments. 822 F.2d, at 850. Petitioners argue instead that they are entitled to deductions because a quid pro quo analysis is inappropriate under 170 when the benefit a taxpayer receives is purely religious in nature. Along the same lines, petitioners claim that payments made for the right to participate in a religious service should be automatically deductible under 170.

We cannot accept this statutory argument for several reasons. First, it finds no support in the language of 170. Whether or not Congress could, consistent with the Establishment Clause, provide for the automatic deductibility of a payment made to a church that either generates religious benefits or guarantees access to a religious service, that is a choice Congress has thus for declined to make. Instead, Congress has specified that a payment to an organization operated exclusively for religious (or other eleemosynary) purposes [490 U.S. 680, 693] is deductible only if such a payment is a "contribution or gift." 26 U.S.C. 170(c). The Code makes no special preference for payments made in the expectation of gaining religious benefits or access to a religious service. Foley v. Commissioner, 844 F.2d 94, 98 (CA2 1988) (Newman, J., dissenting), cert. pending, No. 88-102. The House and Senate Reports on 170, and the other legislative history of that provision, offer no indication that Congress' failure to enact such a preference was an oversight.

Second, petitioners' deductibility proposal would expand the charitable contribution deduction far beyond what Congress has provided. Numerous forms of payments to eligible donees plausibly could be categorized as providing a religious benefit or as securing access to a religious service. For example, some taxpayers might regard their tuition payments to parochial schools as generating a religious benefit or as securing access to a religious service; such payments, however, have long been held not to be charitable contributions under 170. Foley, supra, at 98, citing Winters v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 778 (CA2 1972); see id., at 781 (noting Congress' refusal to enact legislation permitting taxpayers to deduct parochial school tuition payments). Taxpayers might make similar claims about payments for church-sponsored counseling sessions or for medical care at church-affiliated hospitals that otherwise might not be deductible. Given that, under the First Amendment, the IRS can reject otherwise valid claims of religious benefit only on the ground that a taxpayers' alleged beliefs are not sincerely held, but not on the ground that such beliefs are inherently irreligious, see United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944), the resulting tax deductions would likely expand the charitable contribution provision far beyond its present size. We are loath to effect this result in the absence of supportive congressional intent. Cf. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259 -261 (1982). [490 U.S. 680, 694]

Finally, the deduction petitioners seek might raise problems of entanglement between church and state. If framed as a deduction for those payments generating benefits of a religious nature for the payor, petitioners' proposal would inexorably force the IRS and reviewing courts to differentiate "religious" benefits from "secular" ones. If framed as a deduction for those payments made in connection with a religious service, petitioners' proposal would force the IRS and the judiciary into differentiating "religious" services from "secular" ones. We need pass no judgment now on the constitutionality of such hypothetical inquiries, but we do note that "pervasive monitoring" for "the subtle or overt presence of religious matter" is a central danger against which we have held the Establishment Clause guards. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 413 (1985); see also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 272 , n. 11 (1981) ("[T]he University would risk greater `entanglement' by attempting to enforce its exclusion of `religious worship' and `religious speech'" than by opening its forum to religious as well as nonreligious speakers); cf. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981).

Accordingly, we conclude that petitioners' payments to the Church for auditing and training sessions are not "contribution[s] or gift[s]" within the meaning of that statutory expression. 10


III
We turn now to petitioners' constitutional claims based on the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. [490 U.S. 680, 695]


A
Petitioners argue that denying their requested deduction violates the Establishment Clause in two respects. First, 170 is said to create an unconstitutional denominational preference by according disproportionately harsh tax status to those religions that raise funds by imposing fixed costs for participation in certain religious practices. Second, 170 allegedly threatens governmental entanglement with religion because it requires the IRS to entangle itself with religion by engaging in "supervision of religious beliefs and practices" and "valuation of religious services." Brief for Petitioners 44.

Our decision in Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982), supplies the analytic framework for evaluating petitioners' contentions. Larson teaches that, when it is claimed that a denominational preference exists, the initial inquiry is whether the law facially differentiates among religions. If no such facial preference exists, we proceed to apply the customary three-pronged Establishment Clause inquiry derived from Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 11

Thus analyzed, 170 easily passes constitutional muster. The line which 170 draws between deductible and non-deductible payments to statutorily qualified organizations does not differentiate among sects. Unlike the Minnesota statute at issue in Larson, which facially exempted from state registration and reporting requirements only those religious organizations that derived more than half their funds from members, 170 makes no "explicit and deliberate distinctions between different religious organizations," 456 [490 U.S. 680, 696] U.S., at 246-247, n. 23, applying instead to all religious entities.

Section 170 also comports with the Lemon test. First, there is no allegation that 170 was born of animus to religion in general or Scientology in particular. Cf. Larson, supra, at 254-255 (history of Minnesota restriction reveals hostility to "Moonies" and intent to "get at . . . people that are running around airports"). The provision is neutral both in design and purpose.

Second, the primary effect of 170 - encouraging gifts to charitable entities, including but not limited to religious organizations - is neither to advance nor inhibit religion. It is not alleged here that 170 involves "[d]irect government action endorsing religion or a particular religious practice." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (1985) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment). It may be that a consequence of the quid pro quo orientation of the "contribution or gift" requirement is to impose a disparate burden on those charitable and religious groups that rely on sales of commodities or services as a means of fundraising, relative to those groups that raise funds primarily by soliciting unilateral donations. But a statute primarily having a secular effect does not violate the Establishment Clause merely because it "happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961); see also Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 , n. 30 (1983).

Third, 170 threatens no excessive entanglement between church and state. To be sure, ascertaining whether a payment to a religious institution is part of a quid pro quo transaction may require the IRS to ascertain from the institution the prices of its services and commodities, the regularity with which payments for such services and commodities are waived, and other pertinent information about the transaction. But routine regulatory interaction which involves no inquiries into religious doctrine, see Presbyterian Church in [490 U.S. 680, 697] U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 451 (1969), no delegation of state power to a religious body, see Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982), and no "detailed monitoring and close administrative contact" between secular and religious bodies, see Aguilar, 473 U.S., at 414 , does not of itself violate the nonentanglement command. See Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 305 -306 (1985) (stating that nonentanglement principle "does not exempt religious organizations from such secular governmental activity as fire inspections and building and zoning regulations" or the recordkeeping requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act) (citation omitted). As we have observed, supra, at 694, it is petitioners' interpretation of 170, requiring the Government to distinguish between "secular" and "religious" benefits or services, which may be "fraught with the sort of entanglement that the Constitution forbids." Lemon, supra, at 620.

Nor does the application of 170 to religious practices require the Government to place a monetary value on particular religious benefits. As an initial matter, petitioners' claim here raises no need for valuation, for they have alleged only that their payments are fully exempt from a quid pro quo analysis - not that some portion of these payments is deductible because it exceeds the value of the acquired service. Cf. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S., at 117 (describing "dual character" payments) (citing, inter alia, Rev. Rul. 68-432, 1968-2 Cum. Bull. 104, 105); see n. 10, supra. In any event, the need to ascertain what portion of a payment was a purchase and what portion was a contribution does not ineluctably create entanglement problems by forcing the Government to place a monetary value on a religious benefit. In cases where the economic value of a good or service is elusive - where, for example, no comparable good or service is sold in the marketplace - the IRS has eschewed benefit-focused valuation. Instead, it has often employed as an alternative [490 U.S. 680, 698] method of valuation an inquiry into the cost (if any) to the donee of providing the good or service. See, e. g., Oppewal v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 1000, 1002 (CA1 1972) (cost of providing a "religiously-oriented" education); Winters v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 778 (CA2 1972) (same); DeJong v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 373 (CA9 1962) (same). This valuation method, while requiring qualified religious institutions to disclose relevant information about church costs to the IRS, involves administrative inquiries that, as a general matter, "bear no resemblance to the kind of government surveillance the Court has previously held to pose an intolerable risk of government entanglement with religion." Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation, supra, at 305; cf. Lemon, 403 U.S., at 621 -622 (school-aid statute authorizing government inspection of parochial school records created impermissible "intimate and continuing relationship between church and state" because it required State "to determine which expenditures are religious and which are secular"). 12


B
Petitioners also contend that disallowance of their 170 deductions violates their right to the free exercise of religion by "plac[ing] a heavy burden on the central practice of Scientology." Brief for Petitioners 47. The precise nature of this claimed burden is unclear, but it appears to operate in two ways. First, the deduction disallowance is said to deter adherents from engaging in auditing and training sessions. Second, the deduction disallowance is said to interfere with observance of the doctrine of exchange, which mandates equality of an adherent's "outflow" and "inflow." [490 U.S. 680, 699]

The free exercise inquiry asks whether government has placed a substantial burden on the observation of a central religious belief or practice and, if so, whether a compelling governmental interest justifies the burden. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 141 -142 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.S., at 717 -719; Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 -221 (1972). It is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants' interpretations of those creeds. Thomas, supra, at 716. We do, however, have doubts whether the alleged burden imposed by the deduction disallowance on the Scientologists' practices is a substantial one. Neither the payment nor the receipt of taxes is forbidden by the Scientology faith generally, and Scientology does not proscribe the payment of taxes in connection with auditing or training sessions specifically. Cf. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S., at 257 . Any burden imposed on auditing or training therefore derives solely from the fact that, as a result of the deduction denial, adherents have less money available to gain access to such sessions. This burden is no different from that imposed by any public tax or fee; indeed, the burden imposed by the denial of the "contribution or gift" deduction would seem to pale by comparison to the overall federal income tax burden on an adherent. Likewise, it is unclear why the doctrine of exchange would be violated by a deduction disallowance so long as an adherent is free to equalize "outflow" with "inflow" by paying for as many auditing and training sessions as he wishes. See 822 F.2d, at 850-853 (questioning substantiality of burden on Scientologists); 819 F.2d, at 1222-1225 (same).

In any event, we need not decide whether the burden of disallowing the 170 deduction is a substantial one, for our decision in Lee establishes that even a substantial burden would be justified by the "broad public interest in maintaining a sound tax system," free of "myriad exceptions flowing [490 U.S. 680, 700] from a wide variety of religious beliefs." 455 U.S., at 260 . In Lee, we rejected an Amish taxpayer's claim that the Free Exercise Clause commanded his exemption from Social Security tax obligations, noting that "[t]he tax system could not function if denominations were allowed to challenge the tax system" on the ground that it operated "in a manner that violates their religious belief." Ibid. That these cases involve federal income taxes, not the Social Security system, is of no consequence. Ibid. The fact that Congress has already crafted some deductions and exemptions in the Code also is of no consequence, for the guiding principle is that a tax "must be uniformly applicable to all, except as Congress provides explicitly otherwise." Id., at 261 (emphasis added). Indeed, in one respect, the Government's interest in avoiding an exemption is more powerful here than in Lee; the claimed exemption in Lee stemmed from a specific doctrinal obligation not to pay taxes, whereas petitioners' claimed exemption stems from the contention that an incrementally larger tax burden interferes with their religious activities. This argument knows no limitation. We accordingly hold that petitioners' free exercise challenge is without merit.


IV
We turn, finally, to petitioners' assertion that disallowing their claimed deduction is at odds with the IRS' longstanding practice of permitting taxpayers to deduct payments made to other religious institutions in connection with certain religious practices. Through the appellate stages of this litigation, this claim was framed essentially as one of selective prosecution. The Courts of Appeals for the First and Ninth Circuits summarily rejected this claim, finding no evidence of the intentional governmental discrimination necessary to support such a claim. 822 F.2d, at 853 (no showing of "the type of hostility to a target of law enforcement that would support a claim of selective enforcement"); 819 F.2d, at 1223 (no "discriminatory intent" proved). [490 U.S. 680, 701]

In their arguments to this Court, petitioners have shifted emphasis. They now make two closely related claims. First, the IRS has accorded payments for auditing and training disparately harsh treatment compared to payments to other churches and synagogues for their religious services: Recognition of a comparable deduction for auditing and training payments is necessary to cure this administrative inconsistency. Second, Congress, in modifying 170 over the years, has impliedly acquiesced in the deductibility of payments to these other faiths; because payments for auditing and training are indistinguishable from these other payments, they fall within the principle acquiesced in by Congress that payments for religious services are deductible under 170.

Although the Commissioner demurred at oral argument as to whether the IRS, in fact, permits taxpayers to deduct payments made to purchase services from other churches and synagogues, Tr. of Oral Arg. 30-31, the Commissioner's periodic revenue rulings have stated the IRS' position rather clearly. A 1971 ruling, still in effect, states: "Pew rents, building fund assessments, and periodic dues paid to a church . . . are all methods of making contributions to the church, and such payments are deductible as charitable contributions within the limitations set out in section 170 of the Code." Rev. Rul. 70-47, 1970-1 Cum. Bull. 49 (superseding A.R.M. 2, Cum. Bull. 150 (1919)). We also assume for purposes of argument that the IRS also allows taxpayers to deduct "specified payments for attendance at High Holy Day services, for tithes, for torah readings and for memorial plaques." Foley v. Commissioner, 844 F.2d, at 94, 96.

The development of the present litigation, however, makes it impossible for us to resolve petitioners' claim that they have received unjustifiably harsh treatment compared to adherents of other religions. The relevant inquiry in determining whether a payment is a "contribution or gift" under 170 is, as we have noted, not whether the payment secures religious [490 U.S. 680, 702] benefits or access to religious services, but whether the transaction in which the payment is involved is structured as a quid pro quo exchange. To make such a determination in this case, the Tax Court heard testimony and received documentary proof as to the terms and structure of the auditing and training transactions; from this evidence it made factual findings upon which it based its conclusion of nondeductibility, a conclusion we have held consonant with 170 and with the First Amendment.

Perhaps because the theory of administrative inconsistency emerged only on appeal, petitioners did not endeavor at trial to adduce from the IRS or other sources any specific evidence about other religious faiths' transactions. The IRS' revenue rulings, which merely state the agency's conclusions as to deductibility and which have apparently never been reviewed by the Tax Court or any other judicial body, also provide no specific facts about the nature of these other faiths' transactions. In the absence of such facts, we simply have no way (other than the wholly illegitimate one of relying on our personal experiences and observations) to appraise accurately whether the IRS' revenue rulings have correctly applied a quid pro quo analysis with respect to any or all of the religious practices in question. We do not know, for example, whether payments for other faiths' services are truly obligatory or whether any or all of these services are generally provided whether or not the encouraged "mandatory" payment is made.

The IRS' application of the "contribution or gift" standard may be right or wrong with respect to these other faiths, or it may be right with respect to some religious practices and wrong with respect to others. It may also be that some of these payments are appropriately classified as partially deductible "dual payments." With respect to those religions where the structure of transactions involving religious services is established not centrally but by individual congregations, the proper point of reference for a quid pro quo analysis [490 U.S. 680, 703] might be the individual congregation, not the religion as a whole. Only upon a proper factual record could we make these determinations. Absent such a record, we must reject petitioners' administrative consistency argument. 13

Petitioners' congressional acquiescence claim fails for similar reasons. Even if one assumes that Congress has acquiesced in the IRS' ruling with respect to "[p]ew rents, building fund assessments, and periodic dues," Rev. Rul. 70-47, 1970-1 Cum. Bull. 49, the fact is that the IRS' 1971 ruling articulates no broad principle of deductibility, but instead merely identifies as deductible three discrete types of payments. Having before us no information about the nature or structure of these three payments, we have no way of discerning any possible unifying principle, let alone whether such a principle would embrace payments for auditing and training sessions.


V
For the reasons stated herein, the judgments of the Courts of Appeals are hereby


Affirmed.

JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE KENNEDY took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.


Footnotes
[ Footnote 1 ] Section 170 provides in pertinent part: "(a) Allowance of deduction "(1) General Rule "There shall be allowed as a deduction any charitable contribution (as defined in subsection (c)) payment of which is made within the taxable year. A charitable contribution shall be allowable as a deduction only if verified under regulations prescribed by the Secretary. . . . . . "(c) Charitable contribution defined "For purposes of this section, the term "charitable contribution" means a contribution or gift to or for the use of - . . . . . [490 U.S. 680, 684] "(2) A corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation - "(A) created or organized in the United States or in any possession thereof, or under the law of the United States, any State, the District of Columbia, or any possession of the United States; "(B) organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals; "(C) no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual; and "(D) which is not disqualified for tax exemption under section 501(c)(3) by reason of attempting to influence legislation, and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office. . . ."

[ Footnote 2 ] Auditing is also known as "processing," "counseling," and "pastoral counseling." 83 T. C. 575, 577 (1984), aff'd, 822 F.2d 844 (CA9 1987).


[ Footnote 3 ] The petitioner in No. 87-963, Robert L. Hernandez, was denied a deduction of $7,338 and was assessed a tax deficiency of $2,245 for 1981. 819 F.2d 1212, 1215 (CA1 1987). Of the petitioners in No. 87-1616, Katherine Jean Graham was denied a deduction of $1,682 and was assessed a tax deficiency of $316.24 for 1972; Richard M. Hermann was denied a tax deduction of $3,922 and was assessed a tax deficiency of $803 for 1975; and David Forbes Maynard was denied a deduction of $5,000 (including a carryover of $2,385 for contributions made in 1976) and was assessed a tax deficiency of $643 for 1977. 83 T. C., at 575-579.


[ Footnote 4 ] The stipulation allowed the Tax Court to avoid having to decide whether the particular branches to which payments were made in these [490 U.S. 680, 687] cases qualified under 170(c)(2) and 501(c)(3) of the Code as tax-exempt organizations entitled to receive charitable contributions. In a separate case decided during the pendency of this litigation, the Tax Court held that the mother Church in California did not qualify as a tax-exempt organization under 501(c)(3) for the years 1970 through 1972 because it had diverted profits to its founder and others, had conspired to impede collection of its taxes, and had conducted almost all activities for a commercial purpose. Church of Scientology of California v. Commissioner, 83 T. C. 381 (1984). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, basing its decision solely on the ground that the Church had diverted profits for the use of private individuals. It did not address the other bases of the Tax Court's decision. Church of Scientology of California v. Commissioner, 823 F.2d 1310 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1015 (1988).


[ Footnote 5 ] Compare Christiansen v. Commissioner, 843 F.2d 418 (CA10 1988) (holding payments not deductible), cert. pending, No. 87-2023; Miller v. IRS, 829 F.2d 500 (CA4 1987) (same), cert. pending, No. 87-1449, with Neher v. Commissioner, 852 F.2d 848 (CA6 1988) (holding payments deductible); Foley v. Commissioner, 844 F.2d 94 (CA2 1988) (same), cert. pending, No. 88-102; Staples v. Commissioner, 821 F.2d 1324 (CA8 1987) (same), cert. pending, No. 87-1382. The rulings for the taxpayer in the Neher, Foley, and Staples cases rested on statutory, not constitutional, grounds.


[ Footnote 6 ] The charitable transfer must be made to a qualified recipient, 170(c), within the taxable year, 170(a)(1), and consist of cash or qualified property, 26 U.S.C. 170(e)-(h) (1982 ed. and Supp. V), not exceeding [490 U.S. 680, 689] a specified percentage of the taxpayer's income in the year of payment or (where a carryover is permitted) in subsequent years. 26 U.S.C. 170(b), 170(d) (1982 ed. and Supp. V).


[ Footnote 7 ] The portions of these Reports explicating the term "gifts" actually address a closely related provision of the Code, 162(b), which refers specifically to 170. Section 162(b) provides, in pertinent part, that a taxpayer may not deduct as a trade or business expense a "contribution or gift" which would have been deductible under 170 were it not for the fact that the taxpayer had already met the maximum amount (measured as a percentage of income) which 170(b) permits to be deducted.


[ Footnote 8 ] The sole taxpayer in American Bar Endowment who had demonstrated the existence of a lower premium insurance program failed to show that he was aware of this less expensive option at the time he purchased his insurance. 477 U.S., at 118 .


[ Footnote 9 ] The Tax Court referred to a Church policy directive which stated: "Price cuts are forbidden under any guise. "1. PROCESSING MAY NEVER BE GIVEN AWAY BY AN ORG. Processing is too expensive to deliver. . . . . . "9. ONLY FULLY CONTRACTED STAFF IS AWARDED FREE SERVICE, AND THIS IS DONE BY INVOICE AND LEGAL NOTE WHICH BECOMES DUE AND PAYABLE IF THE CONTRACT IS BROKEN." 83 T. C., at 577-578, n. 5.


[ Footnote 10 ] Petitioners have not argued here that their payments qualify as "dual payments" under IRS regulations and that they are therefore entitled to a partial deduction to the extent their payments exceeded the value of the benefit received. See American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S., at 117 (citing Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 Cum. Bull. 104). We thus have no occasion to decide this issue.


[ Footnote 11 ] "`First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968); finally, the statute must not foster "an excessive governmental entanglement with religion." Walz [v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)].'" Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S., at 612 -613, quoted in Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S., at 252 .


[ Footnote 12 ] We do not rule out the possibility that, under the circumstances of a particular case, an IRS inquiry under 170 into a religious institution's expenses might raise entanglement problems. Because petitioners' claim necessitates no valuation inquiry, however, we need only decide here that such inquiries into cost under 170 generally pose no constitutional problem.


[ Footnote 13 ] Petitioners argue that an unofficial "question and answer guidance package" recently issued by an IRS official requires deductibility of payments for auditing and training sessions. Referring to the revenue ruling on pew rents, the brochure states that "fixed payments for similar religious services" are fully deductible. See IRS Official Explains New Examination-Education Program on Charitable Contributions to Tax-Exempt Organizations, BNA Daily Report for Executives, Special Report No. 186, J-1, J-3 (Sept. 26, 1988) (cited in Reply Brief for Petitioners 6). In ascertaining the IRS' justifications for its administrative practice, however, our practice is to rely on the agency's official rulings, not on the unofficial interpretations of particular IRS officials. In any event, the brochure on which petitioners rely was not included in the record before the Tax Court or the Courts of Appeals in these cases, and, in fact, was issued months after we granted certiorari. [490 U.S. 680, 704]

JUSTICE O'CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA joins, dissenting.

The Court today acquiesces in the decision of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to manufacture a singular exception to its 70-year practice of allowing fixed payments indistinguishable from those made by petitioners to be deducted as charitable contributions. Because the IRS cannot constitutionally be allowed to select which religions will receive the benefit of its past rulings, I respectfully dissent.

The cases before the Court have an air of artificiality about them that is due to the IRS' dual litigation strategy against the Church of Scientology (Church). As the Court notes, ante, at 686-687, n. 4, the IRS has successfully argued that the mother Church of Scientology was not a tax-exempt organization from 1970 to 1972 because it had diverted profits to the founder of Scientology and others, conspired to impede collection of its taxes, and conducted almost all of its activities for a commercial purpose. See Church of Scientology of California v. Commissioner, 83 T. C. 381 (1984), aff'd, 823 F.2d 1310 (CA9 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1015 (1988). In the cases before the Court today, however, the IRS decided to contest the payments made to Scientology under 26 U.S.C. 170 rather than challenge the tax-exempt status of the various branches of the Church to which the payments were made. According to the Deputy Solicitor General, the IRS challenged the payments themselves in order to expedite matters. Tr. of Oral Arg. 26-29. See also Neher v. Commissioner, 852 F.2d 848, 850-851 (CA6 1988). As part of its litigation strategy in these cases, the IRS agreed to several stipulations which, in my view, necessarily determine the proper approach to the questions presented by petitioners.

The stipulations, relegated to a single sentence by the Court, ante, at 686, established that Scientology was at all relevant times a religion; that each Scientology branch to which payments were made was at all relevant times a "church" within the meaning of 170(b)(1)(A)(i); and that [490 U.S. 680, 705] Scientology was at all times a "corporation" within the meaning of 170(c)(2) and exempt from general income taxation under 26 U.S.C. 501(a). See App. 38, 52-53; 83 T. C. 575, 576 (1984), aff'd, 822 F.2d 844 (CA9 1987). As the Solicitor General recognizes, it follows from these stipulations that Scientology operates for "`charitable purposes'" and puts the "public interest above the private interest." Brief for Respondent 30. See also Neher, supra, at 855. Moreover, the stipulations establish that the payments made by petitioners are fixed donations made by individuals to a tax-exempt religious organization in order to participate in religious services, and are not based on "market prices set to reap the profits of a commercial moneymaking venture." Staples v. Commissioner, 821 F.2d 1324, 1328 (CA8 1987), cert. pending, No. 87-1382. The Tax Court, however, appears to have ignored the stipulations. It concluded, perhaps relying on its previous opinion in Church of Scientology, that "Scientology operates in a commercial manner in providing [auditing and training]. In fact, one of its articulated goals is to make money." 83 T. C., at 578. The Solicitor General has duplicated the error here, referring on numerous occasions to the commercial nature of Scientology in an attempt to negate the effect of the stipulations. See Brief for Respondent 13-14, 23, 25, 44.

It must be emphasized that the IRS' position here is not based upon the contention that a portion of the knowledge received from auditing or training is of secular, commercial. nonreligious value. Thus, the denial of a deduction in these cases bears no resemblance to the denial of a deduction for religious-school tuition up to the market value of the secularly useful education received. See Oppewal v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 1000 (CA1 1972); Winters v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 778 (CA2 1972); DeJong v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 373 (CA9 1962). Here the IRS denies deductibility solely on the basis that the exchange is a quid pro quo, even though the quid is exclusively of spiritual or religious worth. Respondent [490 U.S. 680, 706] cites no instances in which this has been done before, and there are good reasons why.

When a taxpayer claims as a charitable deduction part of a fixed amount given to a charitable organization in exchange for benefits that have a commercial value, the allowable portion of that claim is computed by subtracting from the total amount paid the value of the physical benefit received. If at a charity sale one purchases for $1,000 a painting whose market value is demonstrably no more than $50, there has been a contribution of $950. The same would be true if one purchases a $1,000 seat at a charitable dinner where the food is worth $50. An identical calculation can be made where the quid received is not a painting or a meal, but an intangible such as entertainment, so long as that intangible has some market value established in a noncontributory context. Hence, one who purchases a ticket to a concert, at the going rate for concerts by the particular performers, makes a charitable contribution of zero even if it is announced in advance that all proceeds from the ticket sales will go to charity. The performers may have made a charitable contribution, but the audience has paid the going rate for a show.

It becomes impossible, however, to compute the "contribution" portion of a payment to a charity where what is received in return is not merely an intangible, but an intangible (or, for that matter a tangible) that is not bought and sold except in donative contexts so that the only "market" price against which it can be evaluated is a market price that always includes donations. Suppose, for example, that the charitable organization that traditionally solicits donations on Veterans Day, in exchange for which it gives the donor an imitation poppy bearing its name, were to establish a flat rule that no one gets a poppy without a donation of at least $10. One would have to say that the "market" rate for such poppies was $10, but it would assuredly not be true that everyone who "bought" a poppy for $10 made no contribution. Similarly, if one buys a $100 seat at a prayer breakfast [490 U.S. 680, 707] - receiving as the quid pro quo food for both body and soul - it would make no sense to say that no charitable contribution whatever has occurred simply because the "going rate" for all prayer breakfasts (with equivalent bodily food) is $100. The latter may well be true, but that "going rate" includes a contribution.

Confronted with this difficulty, and with the constitutional necessity of not making irrational distinctions among taxpayers, and with the even higher standard of equality of treatment among religions that the First Amendment imposes, the Government has only two practicable options with regard to distinctively religious quids pro quo: to disregard them all, or to tax them all. Over the years it has chosen the former course.

Congress enacted the first charitable contribution exception to income taxation in 1917. War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, 1201(2), 40 Stat. 330. A mere two years later, in A.R.M. 2, 1 Cum. Bull. 150 (1919), the IRS gave its first blessing to the deductions of fixed payments to religious organizations as charitable contributions:


"[T]he distinction of pew rents, assessments, church dues, and the like from basket collections is hardly warranted by the act. The act reads `contributions' and `gifts.' It is felt that all of these come within the two terms.

"In substance it is believed that these are simply methods of contributing although in form they may vary. Is a basket collection given involuntarily to be distinguished from an envelope system, the latter being regarded as `dues'? From a technical angle, the pew rents may be differentiated, but in practice the so-called `personal accommodation' they may afford is conjectural. It is believed that the real intent is to contribute and not to hire a seat or pew for personal accommodation. In fact, basket contributors sometimes receive the same accommodation informally." [490 U.S. 680, 708]

The IRS reaffirmed its position in 1970, ruling that "[p]ew rents, building fund assessments and periodic dues paid to a church . . . are all methods of making contributions to the church and such payments are deductible as charitable contributions." Rev. Rul. 70-47, 1970-1 Cum. Bull. 49. Similarly, notwithstanding the "form" of Mass stipends as fixed payments for specific religious services, see infra, at 709, the IRS has allowed charitable deductions of such payments. See Rev. Rul. 78-366, 1978-2 Cum. Bull. 241.
These rulings, which are "official interpretation[s] of [the tax laws] by the [IRS]," Rev. Proc. 78-24, 1978-2 Cum. Bull. 503, 504, flatly contradict the Solicitor General's claim that there "is no administrative practice recognizing that payments made in exchange for religious benefits are tax deductible." Brief for Respondent 16. Indeed, an Assistant Commissioner of the IRS recently explained in a "question and answer guidance package" to tax-exempt organizations that "[i]n contrast to tuition payments, religious observances generally are not regarded as yielding private benefits to the donor, who is viewed as receiving only incidental benefits when attending the observances. The primary beneficiaries are viewed as being the general public and members of the faith. Thus, payments for saying masses, pew rents, tithes, and other payments involving fixed donations for similar religious services, are fully deductible contributions." IRS Official Explains New Examination-Education Program on Charitable Contributions to Tax-Exempt Organizations, BNA Daily Report for Executives, Special Report No. 186, J-1, J-3 (Sept. 26, 1988). Although this guidance package may not be as authoritative as IRS rulings, see ante, at 703, n. 13, in the absence of any contrary indications it does reflect the continuing adherence of the IRS to its practice of allowing deductions for fixed payments for religious services.

There can be no doubt that at least some of the fixed payments which the IRS has treated as charitable deductions, or which the Court assumes the IRS would allow taxpayers to [490 U.S. 680, 709] deduct, ante, at 690-691, are as "inherently reciprocal," ante, at 692, as the payments for auditing at issue here. In exchange for their payment of pew rents, Christians receive particular seats during worship services. See Encyclopedic Dictionary of Religion 2760 (1979). Similarly, in some synagogues attendance at the worship services for Jewish High Holy Days is often predicated upon the purchase of a general admission ticket or a reserved seat ticket. See J. Feldman, H. Fruhauf, & M. Schoen, Temple Management Manual, ch. 4, p. 10 (1984). Religious honors such as publicly reading from Scripture are purchased or auctioned periodically in some synagogues of Jews from Morocco and Syria. See H. Dobrinsky, A Treasury of Sephardic Laws and Customs 164, 175-177 (1986). Mormons must tithe their income as a necessary but not sufficient condition to obtaining a "temple recommend," i. e., the right to be admitted into the temple. See The Book of Mormon, 3 Nephi 24:7-12 (1921); Reorganized Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Book of Doctrine and Covenants 106:1b (1978); Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 330 , n. 4 (1987). A Mass stipend - a fixed payment given to a Catholic priest, in consideration of which he is obliged to apply the fruits of the Mass for the intention of the donor - has similar overtones of exchange. According to some Catholic theologians, the nature of the pact between a priest and a donor who pays a Mass stipend is "a bilateral contract known as do ut facias. One person agrees to give while the other party agrees to do something in return." 13 New Catholic Encyclopedia, Mass Stipend, p. 715 (1967). A finer example of a quid pro quo exchange would be hard to formulate.

This is not a situation where the IRS has explicitly and affirmatively reevaluated its longstanding interpretation of 170 and decided to analyze all fixed religious contributions under a quid pro quo standard. There is no indication whatever that the IRS has abandoned its 70-year practice with respect [490 U.S. 680, 710] to payments made by those other than Scientologists. In 1978, when it ruled that payments for auditing and training were not charitable contributions under 170, the IRS did not cite - much less try to reconcile - its previous rulings concerning the deductibility of other forms of fixed payments for religious services or practices. See Rev. Rul. 78-189, 1978-1 Cum. Bull. 68 (equating payments for auditing with tuition paid to religious schools).

Nevertheless, respondent now attempts to reconcile his previous rulings with his decision in these cases by relying on a distinction between direct and incidental benefits in exchange for payments made to a charitable organization. This distinction, adumbrated as early as the IRS' 1919 ruling, recognizes that even a deductible charitable contribution may generate certain benefits for the donor. As long as the benefits remain "incidental" and do not indicate that the payment was actually made for the "personal accommodation" of the donor, the payment will be deductible. It is respondent's view that the payments made by petitioners should not be deductible under 170 because the "unusual facts in these cases . . . demonstrate that the payments were made primarily for `personal accommodation.'" Brief for Respondent 41. Specifically, the Solicitor General asserts that "the rigid connection between the provision of auditing and training services and payment of the fixed price" indicates a quid pro quo relationship and "reflect[s] the value that petitioners expected to receive for their money." Id., at 16.

There is no discernible reason why there is a more rigid connection between payment and services in the religious practices of Scientology than in the religious practices of the faiths described above. Neither has respondent explained why the benefit received by a Christian who obtains the pew of his or her choice by paying a rental fee, a Jew who gains entrance to High Holy Day services by purchasing a ticket, a Mormon who makes the fixed payment necessary for a temple recommend, or a Catholic who pays a Mass stipend, [490 U.S. 680, 711] is incidental to the real benefit conferred on the "general public and members of the faith," BNA Daily Report, at J-3, while the benefit received by a Scientologist from auditing is a personal accommodation. If the perceived difference lies in the fact that Christians and Jews worship in congregations, whereas Scientologists, in a manner reminiscent of Eastern religions, see App. 78-83 (testimony of Dr. Thomas Love), gain awareness of the "immortal spiritual being" within them in one-to-one sessions with auditors, ante, at 684-685, such a distinction would raise serious Establishment Clause problems. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 -70 (1985) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 -689 (1984) (concurring opinion). The distinction is no more legitimate if it is based on the fact that congregational worship services "would be said anyway," Brief for Respondent 43, without the payment of a pew rental or stipend or tithe by a particular adherent. The relevant comparison between Scientology and other religions must be between the Scientologist undergoing auditing or training on one hand and the congregation on the other. For some religions the central importance of the congregation achieves legal dimensions. In Orthodox Judaism, for example, certain worship services cannot be performed and Scripture cannot be read publicly without the presence of at least 10 men. 12 Encyclopaedia Judaica, Minyan, p. 68 (1972). If payments for participation occurred in such a setting, would the benefit to the 10th man be only incidental while for the personal accommodation of the 11th? In the same vein, will the deductibility of a Mass stipend turn on whether there are other congregants to hear the Mass? And conversely, does the fact that the payment of a tithe by a Mormon is an absolute prerequisite to admission to the temple make that payment for admission a personal accommodation regardless of the size of the congregation?

Given the IRS' stance in these cases, it is an understatement to say that with respect to fixed payments for religious [490 U.S. 680, 712] services "the line between the taxable and the immune has been drawn by an unsteady hand." United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174, 176 (1944) (Jackson, J.). This is not a situation in which a governmental regulation "happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions," McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961), but does not violate the Establishment Clause because it is founded on a neutral, secular basis. See Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 , n. 30 (1983). Rather, it involves the differential application of a standard based on constitutionally impermissible differences drawn by the Government among religions. As such, it is best characterized as a case of the Government "put[ting] an imprimatur on [all but] one religion." Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 450 (1971). That the Government may not do.

The Court attempts to downplay the constitutional difficulty created by the IRS' different treatment of other fixed payments for religious services by accepting the Solicitor General's invitation to let the IRS make case-specific quid pro quo determinations. See ante, at 702 ("The IRS' application of the `contribution or gift' standard may be right or wrong with respect to these other faiths, or it may be right with respect to some religious practices and wrong with respect to others"). See also Brief for Respondent 41-42. As a practical matter, I do not think that this unprincipled approach will prove helpful. The Solicitor General was confident enough in his brief to argue that, "even without making a detailed factual inquiry," Mormon tithing does not involve a quid pro quo arrangement. Id., at 43-44. At oral argument, however, the Deputy Solicitor General conceded that if it was mandatory, tithing would be distinguishable from the "ordinary case of church dues." Tr. of Oral Arg. 36-37. If the approach suggested by the Solicitor General is so malleable and indefinite, it is not a panacea and cannot be trusted to secure First Amendment rights against arbitrary incursions by the Government. [490 U.S. 680, 713]

On a more fundamental level, the Court cannot abjure its responsibility to address serious constitutional problems by converting a violation of the Establishment Clause into an "administrative consistency argument," ante, at 703, with an inadequate record. It has chosen to ignore both longstanding, clearly articulated IRS practice, and the failure of respondent to offer any cogent, neutral explanation for the IRS' refusal to apply this practice to the Church of Scientology. Instead, the Court has pretended that whatever errors in application the IRS has committed are hidden from its gaze and will, in any event, be rectified in due time.

In my view, the IRS has misapplied its longstanding practice of allowing charitable contributions under 170 in a way that violates the Establishment Clause. It has unconstitutionally refused to allow payments for the religious service of auditing to be deducted as charitable contributions in the same way it has allowed fixed payments to other religions to be deducted. Just as the Minnesota statute at issue in Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982), discriminated against the Unification Church, the IRS' application of the quid pro quo standard here - and only here - discriminates against the Church of Scientology. I would reverse the decisions below. [490 U.S. 680, 714]

 

Décision de la "Charity Commission" du Royaume Uni

CHARITY COMMISSION
DECISION OF THE CHARITY COMMISSONERS
FOR ENGLAND AND WALES
MADE ON 17 TH NOVEMBER 1999
APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION AS A CHARITY BY
THE CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY (ENGLAND AND WALES)

Texte complet au format html (au bas de cette page)

Nota: le traducteur a mis en caractères bleus ce qui lui paraissait le plus important dans cette décision

Extraits:

L'église de scientologie ("l'église") est une organisation internationale promouvant un système de croyance, doctrines et pratiques connues sous le nom de Scientologie. Les quartiers généraux sont situés aux Etats-Unis, mais les biens de l'église dans ce pays [Angleterre] sont en fait la propriété, et sont administrés par, une branche de l'église située en Australie. L'église a établi une société enregistrée au titre des Actes des Sociétés, a responsabilité limitée, dénommée Church of Scientology (England and Wales) (CoS), afin de pratiquer ses activités dans notre pays. En septembre 1996, la COS a demandé à la Commission a être enregistrée au titre de "Charity" [organisation charitable] selon la section 3 (2) de l'acte Charity de 1993. Depuis cette date, la CoS a dialogué avec la Commission de Charité quant à cette demande.

La demande de la CoS était supportée par une série de preuves légales, factuelles, et d'expertises. La CoS argue du fait qu'elle serait un corps établi pour des buts charitables de progression de sa religion, au titre de la section 3 de la loi Charity, ou, en alternative, si cela n'était pas établi, qu'elle serait établie dans le but charitable de pro- mouvoir la morale et le bien-être spirituel ou l'amélioration de la communauté, en vertu de la section 4 de la loi Charity. Que ce soit au titre 3 ou au titre 4, la CoS argue qu'elle serait établie pour le bien public.

Elément significatif dans la demande de la CoS: les Commissaires devraient se référer à la Convention Européen- ne sur les Droits de l'Homme, (CEDH), qui n'est pas directement applicable tant que l'Acte sur les Droits de l'Homme de 1998 (ADH) n'est pas complètement en vigueur. ceci devrait se produire en septembre 2000. Quand l'ADH sera en vigueur, il serait illégal pour les Commissaires, agissant en tant qu'autorité publique, d'agir de façon incompatible avec le CEDH. Cela incluerait les décisions des Commissaires quant à l'enregistrement au titre de Charity. Toute loi en cours devrait être interprétée de façon consistante avec la CEDH ainsi que l'interprètent la loi de la Cour Européenne des Droits de l'Homme et les opinions et décisions de la Commission Européenne. Jusqu'à la mise en vigueur de l'ADH, les Commissaires n'ont pas d'obligation légale clairement établie de tenir compte de la CEDH quant aux statut charitable et à l'enregistrement des Organisations Charitables ("Charities" au pluriel en anglais).

Les Commissaires ont cependant décidé qu'en vertu de bonne pratique, de prudence et d'obligation indirecte, ils considéreraient, pour la demande de Charity de la CoS, d'interpréter les autorités légales concernées, même si elles sont ambigües, de façon compatible avec la CEDH, et prendraient par ailleurs une approche souple et élargie des autorités légales concernées pour coller à leur politique et pratique à propos de la reconnaissance de nouveaux buts charitables tels qu'ils ont été établis dans le Rapport des Commissaires de Charity en 1985, paragraphes 24-27.

Les Commissaires ayant intégralement considéré le cas présenté par la CoS sur le plan légal et factuel, ayant revu la loi applicable, prenant en compte les principes contenus dans la CEDH quand ils s'appliquent, ont décidé que la CoS n'était pas établie pour des buts charitables et pour le bien public et qu'elle n'était par conséquent pas reconnue comme une Organisation Charitable au titre de la section 3 (2) de l'acte Charity de 1993.


page 2

En prenant cette décision, les commissaires ont en outre conclu que:

(1): Que la CoS n'est pas une organisation charitable établie pour un but charitable de promotion d'une religion, car, au vu de la loi et des preuves, la scientologie n'est pas une religion au regard de la loi anglaise sur la Charity.

(a) Les commissaires ont considéré que les autorités légales établissant la signification de religion dans la loi Charity, avaient été ambigües, mais, ayant rapproché ces autorités d'une façon compatible avec la CEDH, ils ont conclu que la définition de religion était caractérisée par la croyance en un être suprème et une expression de la foi en un être suprème, au travers d'actes d'adoration. cf: South Place Ethical Society [1980] 1 WLR 1565, Dillon J at p. 1572 D-E.

(b) Les Commissaires ont décidé que le concept d'un être suprème était élargi au delà du concept théïste d'un dieu créateur personnel, mais qu'il ne serait pas acceptable de spécifier précisément la nature de ce concept ou d'exiger qu'il soit analogue à la déïté ou à l'être suprême d'une religion particulière. Cependant les Commissaires ne se sont pas sentis contraints à rejeter le concept de théïsme ni d'accepter le concept abstrait de la notion de chose ou principe surnaturel.

Les Commissaires ont conclu que la scientologie croyait en un être suprême.

(c) Les Commissaires ont décidé que le critère d'adoration était rempli lorsqu'il y a croyance en un être suprême, croyance trouvant son expression en une conduite indiquant la révérence ou la vénération envers l'être suprême. cf: Registrar General ex parte Segerdal [1970] 2 QB, 697 Winn LJ at p. 709A . Il n'est pas possible d'adorer un ideal philosophique ou éthique avec révérence. cf. South Place Ethical Society, Dillon J at p. 1573A. L'adoration peut se manifester dans des activités particulières pouvant inclure des actes de soumission, de vénération, de louange, de reconnaissance, prière, ou intercession. cf. Registrar General ex parte Segerdal, Buckley LJ at p. 709 F-G. Les Commissaires ayant considéré les activités scientologiques d'audition et d'entraînement au regard de l'adoration, ont conclu que l'audition était plutôt un genre de thérapie ou de conseil, tandis que l'entrâinement tendait vers l'étude, et que ni l'audition ni l'entraînement n'étaient démonstratrices en essence, de révérence envers un être suprême, et qu'en tant que telles, les activités scientologiques ne sont pas adoration au regard de la loi Charity.

Les Commissaires ont décidé que l'audition et l'entraînement ne constituent pas une adoration au regard des autorités l'ayant définie et interprétée.

(2) que la CoS n'a pas été établie dans le but charitable de promouvoir la morale ou le bien-être spirituel et l'amélioration de la communauté.

(a) Les Commissaires ont considéré que la CoS n'était pas similaire aux autorités établies qui gouvernent cette zône de la loi. cf: Scowcroft [1898] 2 Ch 638, Re Hood [1931] 1 Ch 240, Re Price [1943] Ch 422, Re South Place Ethical Society. Ils ont conclu que la CoS n'était pas analogue aux cas précités, car elle promeut un système formel de croyances très structuré (qui est envisagé comme religieux), obligeant à un statut de membre et une adhésion à une organisation particulière pour pouvoir adhérer ou accéder à ses doctrines, pratiques et croyances, afin que celles-ci ne soient généralement pas accessibles au grand public. Les Commissaires ont cependant conclu qu'en outre, les autorités légales étaient ambigües.


3

(b) Les Commissaires ont considéré et interprété ces autorités de manière compatible avec la CEDH et conclu que les aspects clé du but charitable de promotion de la morale et du bien-être spirituel ou de l'amélioration de la communauté qui pourraient être discernés à partir de ces autorités, c'est que les doctrines et pratiques impliquées soient généralement accessibles au public et en mesure d'être appliquées ou adoptées par ce public, en fonction de son jugement individuel ou de son choix, de temps à autre, afin qu'il puisse en résulter un bien-être spirituel ou une amélioration de la communauté. cf: Price, Cohen J at p. 432. En raison de ce qui précède, les Commissaires ont conclu qu'il serait possible que des systèmes non religieux promus par une organisation d'adhérents soient établis afin dans ce but, si ces critères sont remplis.

(c) Les Commissaires ont considéré, en relation avec les doctrines et pratiques de la CoS, si celles-ci étaient accessibles et en mesure dêtre ainsi appliquées, mais ont conclu, du fait de la nature et de la pratique organisée des croyances de la scientologie, qu'elles étaient en déséquilibre et pas assez accessibles, et ne pouvaient être appliquées afin qu'il en résulte un bien-être ou une amélioration de la communauté.

(3) Que la CoS n'avait pas été établie pour le bien-être public.

En considérant le test légal appliqués aux organisations établies pour des causes classées sous les trois premiers titres de la loi Charity, en ceci qu'elles sont présumées destinées au profit public, et que les divers tests légaux appliqués au quatrième titre de la loi Charity aient été positifs, les Commissaires ont considéré qu'une telle distinction entre les tests légaux était consistante avec [les textes de] la CEDH. Il faut que le profit public soit établi dans tous les cas pour qu'il s'agisse d'organisation charitable. On en tient donc compte au cas par cas. Dans les trois premiers titres, il avait été établi que le profit public soit présumé, bien que dans certains cas individuels, on puisse en demander la preuve si des preuves inverses existent. Pour la quatrième titre, le profit public doit être établi bien qu'il soit évident dans certains cas, et n'ait alors pas à être prouvé.

Les Commissaires ont considéré que si la CoS avait été établie dans le but charitable de promouvoir une religion, elle était du coup établie pour le bien public. Ils ont examiné la présomption de bien public comme applicable aux organisations établies pour la promotion d'une religion. Ils ont conclu que, comme dans le cas d'organisations établies dans des buts charitables, il fallait que le profit public soit présent pour qu'une organisation établie pour la promotion d'une religion soit charitable. cf: Coats v Gilmour CA [1948] Ch 340, Lord Greene MR at p. 344. Ils ont en outre considéré que dans le cas de ces organisations, la présomption pouvait être refusée par des preuves indiquant que le profit public n'était pas présent, ces preuves ne se limitant pas à la preuve suggérant que l'organisation en jeu était contraire à la religion ou subversive de la moralité. cf: Coats v Gilmour, C.A., Lord Greene MR at p. 345, In re Hetherington, decd. [1990] Ch 1, Sir Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson V.C. at p. 12 D-G. Les Commissaires ont décidé que dans le cas de la CoS, sa relative nouveauté et les soucis judiciaires et publics qu'elle soulève quant à ses pratiques et croyances, les ont mené à conclure qu'elle ne devrait pas obtenir la présomption de profit public. Il reste dès lors à la CoS à démontrer qu'elle a été établie pour le bien public.


4

Les Commissaires ont considéré le test légal de bien public à appliquer aux organisations établies pour la promotion d'une religion. Ils ont conclu que lorsque la pratique d'une religion est essentiellement privée, ou limitée à une catégorie privée d'individus ne s'élargissant pas au public plus général, l'élement de profit public n'était pas établi. cf: re Hetherington, decd., Sir Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson V.C. at p. 12 D-G, Coats v Gilmour CA, Lord Evershed at p. 357. Les Commissaires ont considéré que ce test doit être appliqué aux pratiques centrales d'une telle organisation, et non point à des activités marginales ou à d'autres activités pouvant déjà être considérées comme charitables.

Après avoir passé en revue les pratiques d'audition et d'entraînement, considérées par la CoS comme au coeur de la pratioque scientologique, les Commissaires ont considéré qu'elles sont en réalité menées en privé et non pas en public, que leur nature véritable est privée plutôt que publique, si bien qu'aucun profit ne peut être, au sens légal, considéré comme étant conféré au public. On ne peut pas dire que les bénéfices de la scientologie s'étendent au delà de ses adeptes. En conséquence, le profit public n'a pas été établi.

Les Commissaires ont aussi considéré si, au cas où la scientologie avait été établie dans le but charitable de promouvoir la morale ou le bien-être spirituel ou l'amélioration de la communauté, elle serait établie pour le bien public. Les Commissaires ont considéré que c'était à la CoS d'établir le profit public, car cela tombait sous le Titre 4 de la loi Charity. Les Commissaires ont considéré le test légal applicable [en ce cas] à des organisations établies au titre du 4e titre de la loi Charity. Les Commissaires ont conclu que le test impliquait que l'ensemble de la tendance à la charité dans le sens légal du 4e titre de la loi soit en faveur d'un profit intangible, qu'il soit au moins nécessaire d'obtenir une approbation de la part de la "compréhension de l'opinion éclairée" - à l'époque considérée - avant qu'on puisse prendre en compte un profit intangible comme suffisant pour bénéficier à la communauté. Cf:National Anti Vivisection Society v IRC [1948] AC 31, Lord Wright at p. 49. Les Commissaires ont considéré que dans le cas du but de promotion de la morale ou du bien-être spirituel ou de l'amélioration de la communauté, et donc, de la CoS, le sujet tournait autour du bénéfice intangible, et qu'en relation à ce bénéfice intangible, les Commissaires ont considéré que le test légal se référait à une opinion de consensus commune parmi les gens sains d'esprit et libres de préjugés ou d'opinions partiales. Les Commissaires ont considéré les pratiques centrales de la scientologie, à savoir l'audition et l'entraînement, et conclu que la privauté de ces pratiques ainsi que leur absence générale d'accessibilité signifiaient que les profits étaient de nature plus personnelle que publique. En conséquence, en fonction du test légal ci-dessus, le profit public n'a pas été établi.

 
CHARITY COMMISSION
DECISION OF THE CHARITY COMMISSONERS
FOR ENGLAND AND WALES
 
MADE ON 17 TH NOVEMBER 1999
APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION AS A CHARITY BY
THE CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY (ENGLAND AND WALES)

PLEASE NOTE THAT THE MOST INTERESTING (from my viewpoint) PASSAGES HAVE BEEN HIGHLIGHTED IN BLUE COLOR

Some few comments: This text is particularly interesting, because here, the Commissioners of the English charity commission have mostly worked on the form rather than on the basics of scientology. But working to such details led them to conclude, inexorably, that scientology was not religious nor charitable, despite the many formal attempts of scientology to make believe that it is what it is'nt. Scientology has therefore been trapped here by its own formality.

1. The issue before the Commissioners

The Board of Commissioners considered an application by the Church of Scientology (England and Wales) (CoS) for registration as a charity pursuant to section 3(2) of the Charities Act 1993. In reaching their determination of the application the Commissioners considered whether CoS is charitable as being an organisation:

(i) established for the charitable purpose of the advancement of religion and/or

(ii) established for the charitable purpose of the promotion of the moral or spiritual welfare or improvement of the community, and if in the case of (i) or (ii) above CoS is so established for such a charitable purpose, whether it is established for the public benefit.

2. Conclusion

The Commissioners having considered the full legal and factual case and supporting documents (including expert evidence) which had been put to them by CoS and having considered and reviewed the relevant law, taking into account the principles embodied in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the Commissioners concluded that CoS is not established as a charity and accordingly is not registrable as such. In so determining the Commissioners concluded as follows -:

CoS is not charitable as an organisation established for the advancement of religion because having regard to the relevant law and evidence:

(a) Scientology is not a religion for the purposes of English charity law. That religion for the purposes of charity law constitutes belief in a supreme being and worship of that being (section 6, pages 12 to 25). That it is accepted that Scientology believes in a supreme being (section 6, page 25). However, the core practices of Scientology, being auditing and training, do not constitute worship as they do not display the essential characteristic of reverence or veneration for a supreme being (section 6, pages 25 to 26).

(b) That even were CoS otherwise established for the advancement of religion, public benefit should not be presumed given the relative newness of Scientology and public and judicial concern expressed – ie the presumption of public benefit available to religious organisations as charities was rebutted (section 8, pages 40 to 43); and that

(c) Public benefit arising from the practice of Scientology and/or the purposes of CoS had not been established (section 8, pages 43 to 44 and pages 47 to 48).

2

CoS is not charitable as an organisation established to promote the moral or spiritual welfare or improvement of the community because having regard to the relevant law and evidence:

(a) The practice of Scientology and the purposes of CoS are not analogous to the legal authorities establishing the moral or spiritual welfare or improvement of the community as a charitable purpose (section 7, pages 26 to 29), and in taking a broader view of the authorities, would not be likely to achieve such a purpose (section 7, pages 30 to 37).

(b) That even were CoS otherwise established for the promotion of the moral or spiritual welfare or improvement of the community, public benefit arising out of the practice of Scientology and/or the purposes of CoS had not been established (section 8, pages 45 to 47 and page 49).

3. The Application for Registration as a charity

The application In September 1996 a newly incorporated body 1 called the Church of Scientology (England and Wales) (CoS) applied to the Commission for registration as a charity for the advancement of religion accompanied by a full legal and factual case.

In 1997 the Commissioners indicated to CoS that they would consider whether CoS was a charity in law (not just the narrower question of whether CoS was charitable under a particular head of charity law, as advancing religion). If necessary, this might include other heads of charity such as the promotion of education or a purpose under the fourth head of charity such as the promotion of the moral or spiritual welfare or improvement of the community.

The promoters submitted further legal and factual argument that if and in so far as CoS is not a charity for the advancement of religion, it is charitable under the fourth head of charity as being established for the moral or spiritual welfare or improvement of the community. That argument also dealt with public benefit issues arising under that head.

The application was subsequently significantly augmented by CoS by the submission of international law argument which covered the Government’s then proposal to incorporate the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (and thus those provisions making it unlawful to discriminate against individuals on the grounds of their religion or other beliefs) into domestic law, and the effect of this upon the application. Since then the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) has been passed although it does not yet have legal effect. At present the Government proposes to bring the HRA into force in October 2000.

The Church of Scientology

The Commissioners noted the following background to the application for registration as a charity.

    1 A company limited by guarantee holding minimal property.

3

The Church of Scientology (the Church) is an international organisation which promotes a belief system, doctrines and practices known as Scientology. Its international headquarters are in the USA although it is organised world-wide. Assets owned by the Church in this country are currently held and administered by a branch of the Church incorporated in Australia. The Church has now established a company under the Companies Acts called the Church of Scientology (England and Wales) (CoS) to further its work in this country.

The activities of the Church of Scientology carried on in England and Wales are based principally at its properties at Saint Hill, East Grinstead in Sussex, although there are other Scientology centres eg at Poole and Plymouth. There are said to be about 200,000 adherents in this country. Scientology is based on the writings of the late L  Ron Hubbard.

Scientology claims to be a religion both in recognising the existence of a supreme being and in carrying out forms of worship through auditing and training.Scientology organisations have been recognised legally as religious in character in other countries for certain purposes. Most notably, by the Internal Revenue Service in the USA as an exclusively religious or charitable organisation under s501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code and thus exempt from Federal Income Tax and by the High Court of Australia (in Church of the New Faith v Commissioner of Payroll Tax (1983) 154 CLR 120 (HC of A)) as a religious, or public benefit, institution entitled to an exemption from paying payroll tax under the Payroll Taxes Act 1971.

The objects of CoS

The objects of CoS as set out in its Memorandum and Articles of Association are as follows:

The advancement of the Scientology religion and in particular but not so as to limit the generality of the foregoing:

(1) the espousal, presentation, propagation and practice of, and the ensuring and maintaining of the purity and integrity of, the religion of Scientology;

(2) the advancement of the religious and other charitable work of Scientology

Churches and Missions in England and Wales.

(3) the maintenance of the fabric and furnishings of Scientology Churches and Missions in England and Wales;

(4) the production, publication and dissemination of Scientology religious works;

(5) the advancement of religious education in accordance with the doctrines and practice of Scientology.

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Doctrines and Practices of Scientology

The Commissioners considered the comprehensive summary of the doctrine and core religious practice of Scientology put to them by CoS in their submission. In relation to

Scientology doctrine they noted that:

Scientology is based exclusively upon the research, writings and recorded lectures of the late L. Ron Hubbard - all of which constitute the scriptures of the ‘religion’.

These encompass more than 500,000 pages of writings, nearly 3,000 recorded lectures and more than 100 films. They include axioms that precisely define the fundamental laws and truths of life, including who one is, what one is capable of, and how one might realise one’s natural spiritual abilities. From these axioms come a great number of fundamental principles individuals can use to achieve spiritual infinity, as well as to improve their immediate lives and the lives of those close to them. A fundamental doctrine of Scientology is that spiritual freedom can be attained only if the path outlined in Hubbard’s works is followed without deviation. Hubbard is the only source of Scientology, and has no successor.

Scientology doctrine divides an individual’s existence into eight distinct divisions, called “dynamics”, each of which represents an area of life where every individual has an urge and determination to survive. Pursuit of survival along these dynamics is the common denominator of all life. The eight dynamics are best conceived as concentric circles ranging from the first dynamic in the centre, out to the eighth

dynamic in the outer parameter as follows:

(1) the first dynamic, self, is the effort to survive as an individual;

(2) the second dynamic is the urge to exist as a future generation, which encompasses the family unit;

(3) the third dynamic is the urge to survive as a member of a group, such as a company, a church or a social organisation;

(4) the fourth dynamic is the urge for survival of man as a species;

(5) the fifth dynamic is the urge to survive for all life forms, whether animal or vegetable;

(6) the sixth dynamic is the urge for survival of the physical universe and reflects the drive of the individual to enhance the survival of all matter, energy, space and time;

(7) the seventh dynamic is the urge to exist as a spiritual being; and

(8) the eighth dynamic is the urge to exist as infinity, which also may be identified as the supreme being or god.

The goal of Scientology is to help an individual survive to the greatest level across all dynamics from the self (the first dynamic) and ultimately to the supreme being (the eighth dynamic). Through the application of Scientology principles and practices an individual is able to increase his ability to improve survival across the dynamics. As he becomes more capable and more aware, he expands from the first.

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into the outer dynamics, and he becomes more able to control and influence all dynamics to better himself and all mankind.

CoS has no specific doctrine concerning god, although Scientology does affirm the existence of a supreme being. The practice of Scientology is to bring an individual to a new state where he can reach his own conclusions concerning the nature of the supreme being. As a person becomes more aware through the practice of Scientology, however, he attains his own certainty of every dynamic and, as he moves from the seventh (spiritual) dynamic to the eighth, he comes to his own awareness of infinity and god. He also understands his own relationship to eternal salvation as a spiritual being. Salvation in Scientology is attained through personal spiritual enlightenment.

In relation to Scientology practices the Commissioners noted that the core practices of Scientology were auditing and training and that:

Scientologists increase their spiritual awareness, and expand across the eight dynamics, by participating in auditing, which is one of the two central ‘religious’ practices of the Scientology faith. It is delivered by an auditor, from the Latin, ‘one who listens’. Auditing involves a series of gradient steps that Hubbard developed to address past painful experiences - both in this, and in prior, lifetimes -which, while below a person’s level of awareness, collectively cause all the fears and psychosomatic illnesses that he currently suffers. Through auditing one can uncover these unknown past experiences and erase their harmful effects, thereby increasing one’s awareness and capability across all dynamics. This also directly results in a spiritual transformation: the individual reaches a certainty that he is in fact a spiritual being that has lived and will live through countless lifetimes.

In auditing a ‘religious’ artefact called an E-meter is used to enable the auditor and the individual receiving the auditing to locate areas of the past which can then be addressed in auditing. It is not a lie detector and by itself it does nothing. It is only used by a trained minister and is essential to auditing; that is its only application.

The second central ‘religious’ practice consists of training - the intensive study of Scientology Scripture. Training derives its greatest significance from the fact that through training one learns to become an auditor.

The broad path the Scientologist follows through auditing and the study of Scientology materials is known as The Bridge. The Bridge embodies a route across a chasm between man’s present state and vastly higher levels of awareness.

It is comprised of gradient steps so that gains are incremental, predictable and apparent. There are two sides to this Bridge: on one side, by receiving auditing, one reaches the highest states of awareness as a spiritual being; on the other, one studies the axioms and principles of Scientology and learns to become an auditor, ultimately advancing to the highest levels of auditor skill. The freedom available through Scientology requires passage along both these paths. For while one becomes free through auditing, this must be augmented by knowledge of how to stay free.

The Commissioners noted that access to the core practices of auditing and training are normally prepaid by those members wishing to participate in them. These payments are referred to as requested donations and account for a substantial proportion of the revenues of the Church of Scientology. The extent of participation.

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in these practices is a matter which Church of Scientology fundraising staff discuss with members in personal consultation. Although requested donations are the normal method of obtaining access to participation in these practices, the Commissioners understood that auditing and training were available without a donation in certain circumstances. The Commissioners noted that organised donations are an established feature of some religions.

The Commissioners also noted:

the creeds and codes of Scientology:

§ The Creed of the Church of Scientology
§ The Auditor’s Code
§ The Code of Honor
§ The Code of a Scientologist
§ The Supervisor’s Code
§ The Credo of a True Group Member
§ The Credo of a Good and Skilled Manager

The ceremonies of Scientology:

Individual churches of Scientology conduct numerous ‘religious’ services, including naming ceremonies for the newborn, wedding and funeral services and weekly Sunday services. These services are open to those of any denomination.

The symbols and apparel of Scientology

Scientology ‘religious’ symbols and artefacts are protected by Religious Technology Centre, a California non-profit corporation which owns them and the rights to use them. Members of the Sea Organisation wear naval uniform.

Ministers officiate wearing apparel which resembles traditional Anglican vestments.

4. Relevance to the application of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)

The Commissioners noted that in support of their application for registration as a charity CoS relied upon international law arguments concerning the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion encompassed in Article 9 ECHR; and the right not to be discriminated against on account of thought, conscience and religion - Article 9 taken with Article 14 ECHR.

The Commissioners noted that the ECHR is to be incorporated into English law under the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA). That Act is likely to be fully implemented in the UK on 2 nd October 2000 2 . Under section 6 of the HRA it will be unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with ECHR rights.

The Commission will be a “public authority” for the purposes of the HRA s6(3). Once the HRA is implemented it will therefore be unlawful for the Commission to act in a way incompatible with ECHR rights. This would include its decisions with regard to the registration of charities where any common law authorities would need to be interpreted in a way compatible with such rights as interpreted by case law of the

    2 Latest government announcement.

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European Court of Human Rights and opinions and decisions of the European Commission.3

The Commissioners noted that while the ECHR is not part of English law at present there is no obligation on the courts and therefore the Commissioners to take ECHR into account in considering issues of charitable status. The Commissioners noted the general rule that in the absence of implementation in domestic law, international law in general and international agreements in particular are not binding within the UK legal system – Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd v Department of Trade [1990] 2 AC 418, and that no public authority is required as a matter of law to exercise its discretion in a way necessarily consistent with the ECHR – R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Brind [1991] 1 AC 696.4 This basic position has been confirmed in R v DPP ex parte Kebilene QBD [1999] 3 WLR 175 (CA), 972 (HL).

It is also clear, that while ECHR may be referred to, there is currently no strict legal obligation to have regard to the terms of ECHR when addressing issues of common law, even where these issues are uncertain, Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers Limited [1993] 2 WLR 449.

However, the courts are prepared to consider the international obligations of the United Kingdom where there is ambiguity in statutory language: Salomon v

Commissioners of Customs and Excise [1967] 2 QB 116. In R v Radio Authority ex parte Bull [1995] 4 All ER 481, this general principle was applied in the specific context of the ECHR.

Whilst it seemed clear to the Commissioners from the case law that where statutory provisions were ambiguous reference may be made to the ECHR so as to interpret the relevant statutes consistently with the ECHR, the extent to which there is any similar legal obligation in relation to the common law, and the extent to which a public authority may be obliged to act consistently with ECHR generally prior to implementation of the HRA was unclear 5

The Commissioners considered that it would be prudent to take account of the fact that where an application for registration is dealt with pre HRA and subsequently subject to an appeal under section 4(3) Charities Act 1993, the appeal would be likely to reach court after the HRA had been brought into effect, when the court would be obliged to deal with the matter consistently with ECHR, and to ensure that all case law is interpreted compatibly with ECHR principles. In addition, given the lack of clarity in English law about the extent to which a public authority may already be obliged to exercise its functions in a way taking account of the HRA being in force in the near future (R v DPP ex parte Kebilene), the Commissioners regarded it as prudent to seek to act consistently with ECHR in advance of implementation of the HRA where they were free to do so to the extent that ECHR may be relevant to the registration of charities.

The Commissioners considered that good administrative practice would suggest that applications for registration pre and post HRA should be dealt with consistently. It would not be good practice to consider applications received pre-implementation

    3 Section 2 HRA
    4 In that case the House of Lords unanimously held that the Home Secretary did not need to act consistently with ECHR in the exercise of a power he enjoyed under both statute and the BBC’s Charter to control the content of television and radio transmissions.
    5 R v DPP Ex parte Kebiline (QBD [1999] 3 WLR 175 (CA), 972 (HL).

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without any reference to ECHR considerations, but to apply such considerations to applications received post implementation. To do so could result in similar applications being deal with differently simply on the basis of the date on which they were received and considered.

Further it seemed to the Commissioners that they may already be under an indirect legal obligation to take account of ECHR principles, given that once the HRA is brought fully into force, there will be an element of retrospectivity which will benefit individuals who are able to demonstrate that they were victims of human rights violations before the HRA was in force. Essentially the combined effect of section 22(4) and section 7(1)(b) of the HRA seemed to the Commissioners to be that where a public authority brings or initiatives legal proceedings after implementation of the HRA, the persons who are the defendants in such proceedings would be able to rely upon their ECHR rights in the action which follows. The Commissioners were for example able to envisage a situation in which an association may seek to resist proceedings for recover of taxation on the basis that the refusal to register it as a charity had infringed its ECHR rights.

The Commissioners concluded that as a matter of prudence, good practice and indirect legal obligation any discretion which the Commissioners may have in applying the existing law should be exercised in accordance with and not contrary to the principles of the ECHR where those principles might be relevant to the registration of charities. Such discretion might arise for example where the provisions of the common law were ambiguous, or where English cases or other legal authorities (for example case law from other jurisdictions) were not binding on the Commission, but of persuasive value.

The Commissioners then proceeded to consider the potential relevance of ECHR to CoS’ s application for registration as a charity.

The relevant articles of ECHR

The Commissioners considered the relevant articles of ECHR to be

§ Article 9 taken on its own (right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion); and

§ Article 9 taken together with Article 14 (right to enjoyment of ECHR rights free from discrimination).

Article 9

Article 9(1) provides that:

“everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom either alone or in community with others and in public or private to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.”

9

Article 9 includes the right to manifest one’s belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance and therefore includes in principle the right to convince other people, for example through “teaching”6 .

The Commissioners considered that the protection offered by Article 9(1) extends to the whole range of individual beliefs including both religious and other belief systems. Both organisations which, in charity law terms, would appear to promote the moral or spiritual welfare or improvement of the community (a fourth head purpose), and those which promote religion (a third head purpose), would in the Commissioners view therefore fall within the protection of Article 9(1).

The Commissioners noted that Article 9(1) may be qualified in terms of the provision of Article 9(2). Any limitation of the freedom protected by Article 9(1) may be justified on the grounds set out in Article 9(2).

Article 9(2) provides that:

“Freedom to manifest one’ s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights or freedoms of others.”

Article 9 and Article 14 together

Article 14 provides that:

“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status”

The Commissioners noted that Article 14 is not an independent right to non-discrimination but may be used in conjunction with another article. The other article relied upon does not necessarily have to be breached by the alleged discriminatory act, rather the act has to fall within the ambit or scope of a right protected by the ECHR.

Therefore, it was in the Commissioners’ view arguable that the registration of charities which advance religion, and the exclusion of other beliefs for example, is potentially within the ambit of Article 9 (right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion).

Not all discrimination will be in breach of Article 14. An action or distinction will not be discriminatory if it has an objective and reasonable justification ie it is:

§ made in pursuant of a legitimate aim; or

§ there is a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aims sought to be realised.7

The Commissioners analysed the extent to which Article 9, and Articles 9 and 14 together may potentially apply to applications for registration of organisations

    6 Kokkinakis v Greece (1993) 17 EHRR 397
    7 Tsirlis and Kouloumpas v Greece (1997) 25 EHRR 198 at paragraph 116.

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established for the advancement of religion or to promote the moral or spiritual welfare or improvement of the community.

Article 9

The Commissioners noted that Article 9 is principally concerned with protecting the manifestation of a person’s religion or belief. To recognise or not recognise charitable status by registration did not in the Commissioners view appear to interfere with the manifestation of a person’s belief. Although in certain circumstances an organisation is declined registration and the benefits of charitable status 8 are not bestowed, the Article 9 freedoms did not in the Commissioners’ view seem to be restricted by this. In the cases which have come before the European Court the impairment of the Article 9 freedom has been much clearer 9 and it seemed to the Commissioners that it could be argued that Article 9 is not breached when for a particular belief system the State declines to confer a privilege.

Nevertheless, the Commissioners noted that it may be possible to argue that the decision to decline to register an institution as a charity amounts to a limitation of Article 9(1) freedoms. Article 9 protects the right to manifest one’s religion or belief “in worship , teaching, practice and observance”. The European Court has said that this includes the right to convince one’s neighbours through teaching, without which the “freedom to change religion or belief” protected by Article 9 would be redundant.10 The Commissioners considered that it is possible that both the European Court and the English courts would regard the fiscal benefits which flow from charity registration as relevant to an organisation’s ability to teach and pass on its beliefs. A court could conclude that to decline registration of a charity impairs Article 9 freedoms as it limits the organisation’s ability to manifest its beliefs through teaching and “evangelising” activities.

The Commissioners further noted that any limitation of an Article 9 freedom which might arise can be justified on the basis of Article 9(2).

In that context the Commissioners noted that the registration power of the Commission is “prescribed by law”11 and that the recognition of charitable purposes

8 These benefits are identified as common law, statutory and fiscal § The potential for being established in perpetuity; a lesser need for certainty than is required for private trusts; protection by the Crown; the ability to be the beneficiary of an existing charity with comparable objects. § Protection from failure of the charity’s purposes and administrative difficulties through the scheme making jurisdiction of the courts and the Charity Commission; protection from the effects of misconduct or maladministration by staff or trustees through Charity Commission’s investigative and remedial powers; to be advised on trustees’ duties, interpretation of governing document and guidance on charity law and good practice from the Charity Commission; protection of official sanction by the Charity Commission’s order for transactions expedient in the charity’s interest; protection of charity’s assets through a requirement that charity proceedings require consent of the Charity Commission or of the High Court; routine monitoring and review of registered charities by the Charity Commission.

§ Tax relief on voluntary and investment income and capital gains; tax relief on the profits of primary purpose trading; relief from non domestic rates for land and buildings used for charitable purposes; relief available to those who give to charity. 9 Manoussakis v Greece (1996) 23 EHRR 387; Kokkinakis v Greece supra and Christian Association of Jehovah’s Witnesses v Bulgaria (1997) 24 EHRR (C.D.) 52 10 Kokkinakis v Greece supra 11 It has a duty to keep a register of charities and power to do so provided by s.3 Charities Act 1993.

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has developed through the case law, by a reasonable predictable and incremental change.

The Commissioners noted that States are allowed a certain amount of scope for
deciding what limitations upon ECHR rights are necessary in a democratic society (the “margin of appreciation”) in their particular context, subject to certain guiding principles apparent from the European cases in particular:

§ the need to secure true religious pluralism as an inherent feature of the notion of a democratic society.12

§ that the measures taken at a national level must be justified in principle and be proportionate.13

§ that the state has no discretion to determine whether religious beliefs or the means used to express them are legitimate 14 .

In the light of the possibility of the potential for ECHR to apply and of these principles, the Commissioners considered that where they were free to do so (predominately where the English legal authorities were ambiguous) they would seek to interpret the relevant authorities consistently with ECHR.

Articles 9 and 14 together  

In relation to a charge of discrimination under Articles 9 and 14 together, the Commissioners noted the possibility of an argument that a religious or other belief system might be discriminated against if declined the charitable status afforded to others. They also noted that the law is clear that a distinction or difference in treatment within the ambit of an ECHR right will be discriminatory if it has “no objective and reasonable justification”.15

Given the potential application of Articles 9 and 14 taken together, the relevant

English case law concerning charitable status should in the Commissioners view, where ambiguous, be interpreted in a way compatible with ECHR.

The Commissioners went on to note the distinction between the tests of public benefit under the third and fourth heads of charity.16 It is presumed (although evidence may rebut the presumption) that a religious organisation is beneficial to the public. A belief system which seeks to be charitable under the fourth head must show that it is for the public benefit in a way recognised by charity law.17 The Commissioners noted that the different tests of public benefit were “prescribed by law” and that there did not seem to be any ambiguity in the cases concerning the test of public benefit in charity law, which the Commissioners considered was an entirely flexible rule applied to individual cases to establish the public benefit which is a requirement of all organisations which profess to be charitable.

12 Manoussakis v Greece supra paragraph 44
13 supra
14 supra
15 Tsirlis & Kouloumpas v Greece, supra; Belgian Linguistic Case (1968) (No 2) 1 EHRR 252 paras 9- 10
16 National Anti-Vivisection Society v IRC [1948] AC 31
17 Re Price [1943] Ch 42; Re Hood [1931] 1 Ch 240.
 
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Conclusion
 
In these circumstances and in the light of the potential impact of ECHR once the HRA is in force they decided to consider the application by applying the English legal authorities as they have traditionally been interpreted and understood unless these authorities were ambiguous. In those circumstances (ie of ambiguity in the decided cases) the Commissioners would exercise their discretion so as to construe those decided cases in a way complying with ECHR principles and otherwise in a generous and constructive manner consistent with the Commission’s approach to determining the charitability of novel purposes. Where it was concluded that such an approach should be adopted, CoS’s application and relevant legal authorities would be considered in that manner.
 
5. The Commissioners’ approach to determining CoS’s application
 
The Commissioners approached the question of CoS’s registration as a charity by considering first whether it is established for a charitable purpose recognised in English law, and secondly by addressing the question of whether CoS is established for the public benefit. In relation to the first issue, the charitable purpose, the Commissioners considered whether CoS is established for the advancement of religion or in the alternative whether it was established for the promotion of the moral or spiritual welfare or improvement of the community.
 
6. Whether CoS is established for the charitable purpose of advancing religion.
 
The legal framework
 
The Commissioners noted that English charity law has developed empirically, within the context of the traditional Western monotheistic religions, although it has long embraced monotheistic religions other than Christianity and Judaism 18 . Within that context, the following general principles are firmly established:
 
(i) Trusts for the advancement of religion take effect as charities without assessment by the court of the worth or value of the beliefs in question, unless the tenets of a particular sect inculcate doctrines adverse to the very foundations of all religion and/or subversive of all morality 19 .
 
(ii) The law does not prefer one religion to another 20 and as between religions the law stands neutral, but it assumes that any religion is at least likely to be better than none 21 .
 
(iii) In deciding whether a gift is for the advancement of religion, the court does not concern itself with the truth of the religion, a matter which is not susceptible of proof. This does not mean that the court will recognise as a religion everything that chooses to call itself a religion. But when once the religion is recognisedby the court as a religion, the  beneficial nature of a gift for its advancement will prima facie be assumed.22
 
18 Bowman v. Secular Society [1917] AC 406
19 Thornton v. Howe (1862) 31 Beav 14; Re Watson [1973] 1 WLR 1472
20 Thornton v. Howe, supra; Gilmour v. Coats [1949] AC 426
21 Neville Estates v. Madden [1962] Ch. 832
22 Re Coats’ Trusts, Coats v Gilmour [1948] Ch 340 (CA) @ 346 and 347 Lord Greene MR.
 
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(iv) In addition, in order to be charitable, the trust must not only be for the advancement of religion, it must also be of public benefit. This is a question of fact which must be answered by the court in the same manner as any other question of fact, ie by means of evidence cognizable by the court.23 In the absence of evidence to the contrary, public benefit is presumed.
 
Given these judicial principles, the Commissioners found it understandable that the English courts have resisted closely defining what it is that makes some belief systems religious and others not.
 
However, the Commissioners accepted that there are some characteristics of religion which can be discerned from the legal authorities:
 
-1. Belief in a god or a deity or supreme being – R v Registrar General ex parte Segerdal (Lord Denning).24
 
2. Reverence and recognition of the dominant power and control of any entity or being outside their own body and life (i.e. outside the body and life of the follower of that religion) - Segerdal (Winn L J).25
 
3. Two of the essential attributes of religion are faith and worship: faith in a god and worship of that god - South Place Ethical Society (Dillon J).26 The Commissioners noted that Hubert Picarda QC writes that religion involves not merely faith of a particular kind, but also worship, and states that the essential ingredient of worship is found in the definition of Webster’s New International dictionary which defines religion as “service and adoration of God or a god as expressed in a form of worship.”27
 
4. A trust for the purpose of any kind of monotheistic theism would be a good charitable trust - Bowman v Secular Society 28 (Lord Parker of Waddington)
 
5. Worship must have at least some of the following characteristics: submission to the object worshipped, veneration of that object, praise, thanksgiving, prayer or intercession - Segerdal (Buckley LJ).29
 
6. It would not seem to be possible to worship in this way (ie with reverence) a
mere ethical or philosophical ideal - South Place Ethical Society (Dillon J)30
 
7. Promotion of religion includes “the observances that serve to promote and manifest it.” - Keren Kayemeth Le Jisroel v IRC (Lord Hanworth MR).31
 
8. There must be a promotion of the religion, meaning “the promotion of spiritual teaching in a wide sense, and the maintenance of the doctrines on which it rests, and the observances that serve to promote and manifest it.” - Keren Kayemeth Le Jisroel v IRC (Lord Hanworth MR). This would include
 
23 Re Coats’ Trusts supra @ 347
24 R v Registrar General ex parte Segerdal [1970] 2 QB 697
25 R v Registrar General ex parte Segerdal supra
26 [1980] 1 WLR 1565 at 1572D-E
27 “The Law and Practice relating to Charities” by Hubert Picarda, 2 nd Ed. page 64 (3 rd Ed. page 74).
28 [1917] AC 406 at 448 - 450
29 supra page 709 F-G 30 supra page 1573A
31 [1931] 2 KB 465, 477 (affd. [1932] AC 650).
 
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observance of particular common standards, practices or codes of conduct as stipulated in particular scriptures or teachings.32
 
9. To advance religion means “to promote it, to spread the message ever wider among mankind; to take some positive steps to sustain and increase religious belief and these things are done in a variety of ways which may be comprehensively described as pastoral and missionary” - United Grand Lodge v Holborn BC 33 (Donovan J).
 
10. Promotion of religion includes a missionary element or other charitable work through which the beliefs of the religion are advanced - United Grand Lodge v Holborn BC (Donovan J).
 
11. Public benefit is a necessary element in religious trusts as it is in other charitable trusts - Coats v Gilmour 34 (Lord Greene MR).
 
Having considered these characteristics, the Commissioners concluded that the definition of a religion in English charity law was characterised by a belief in a supreme being and an expression of that belief through worship. The cases also make clear that there must be advancement or promotion of the religion.
 
CoS’ s argument that CoS is established to advance religion.
 
The Commissioners noted the arguments put forward by CoS that CoS is established for the advancement of religion, the religion in question being Scientology. In particular they considered that the relevant arguments could be summarised as follows:
 
(1) That neither Segerdal nor South Place Ethical Society is binding or persuasive authority as to the criteria of a “religion” in English charity law:
 
(2) That belief in a god or gods is not an essential characteristic of religion and a set of beliefs can constitute a religion if it affirms the existence of the spiritual or supernatural even though it does not recognise a supreme being or god, for the following reasons:
 
§ The views of theologians and leading scholars in comparative religion as to the meaning of “religion”: in particular sets of beliefs widely recognised as religions do not affirm the existence of a supreme being;
 
§ Decisions of courts abroad that non-theistic beliefs may constitute a religion;
 
§ The general principles of international law and the European Convention on Human Rights;
 
§ The adverse consequences of confining “religion” to theistic beliefs.
 
(3) Alternatively, if belief in a god and worship are essential characteristics of religion, that either:
 
§ Scientology possesses those characteristics, or
 
32 The Church of the New Faith v Commissioner for Payroll Tax, supra, which is a persuasive authority being an Australian case, also supported this notion.
33 [1957] 1 WLR 1080 34 Re Coats’s trusts, Coats v Gilmour [1948] Ch 340 at 344 (Court of Appeal).
 
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§ Scientology should be recognised as an exception
 
(4) That the Charity Commission has accepted that it must act constructively and imaginatively 35 when reviewing its own past decisions and those of the courts, and it is therefore appropriate in this case for the Commission to adopt “a generous as opposed to a restrictive view” 36
 
The Commissioners considered these arguments in the light of the English legal authorities.
 
The Commissioners noted that the Segerdal and South Place Ethical Society cases in particular, referring to the requirement of a god or deity have traditionally been regarded as decisive of the principle that theism (belief in a god) is a necessary criterion of religion for the purposes of charity law. Both cases suggest that religion in charity law is characterised by
 
§ faith in the personal, creator god of the traditional monotheistic religions, having existence outside the body and life of the votary, and
 
§ worship of that deity in the form of formalised expressions of supplication, veneration, praise and intercession, as traditionally practised in monotheistic religions.
 
Against those criteria, the Commissioners noted that Scientology claims to acknowledge a supreme being which may have created the world. This supreme being (“infinity”, the Eighth dynamic, the “allness of all”), is according to the expert opinion submitted by CoS in support of its application, a thoroughly impersonal abstract conception, more analogous to eastern enlightenment and realisation, which Scientologists recognise as the ultimate ground of being but of which they are reluctant to claim complete understanding.37
 
Whilst the Commissioners noted that CoS’s application stated that Scientology acknowledges a supreme being, the Commissioners concluded that the supreme being did not appear to be of the kind indicated by the decided cases.
 
The Commissioners also noted CoS’s submission that the activities of auditing and training constitute its worship, this argument being supported by the expert opinion submitted by CoS. However, the Commissioners were unable to accept that the practices of auditing and training were akin to or comparable with the acts of worship indicated by the English cases – praise, veneration, prayer, thanksgiving, intercession, submission to the object worshipped.
 
35 The Report of the Charity Commissioners 1985 paras. 24-25
36 The Report of the Charity Commissioners 1985 supra
37 for example the Opinion of Dr Wilson (Paras 8.07, 11.03(a) and 8.11); and of Dr Bryant (section IV.7.c-IV.7.d).
 
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Ambiguity in the English legal authorities
 
However, the Commissioners noted that the English legal authorities concerning the concept of religion in English charity law might not be entirely clear and unambiguous and may be of persuasive value rather than binding authority. Analysis of English legal authorities concerning the definition of ‘ religion’ in English charity law.
 
The Commissioners therefore considered the extent to which ambiguity existed in the
 
English legal authorities and reviewed these as follows.
 
(i) Segerdal (Court of Appeal)
 
The case of Segerdal was not concerned with charity law but it did concern a Church of Scientology chapel. The issue in Segerdal was not whether Scientology was a religion for the purposes of charity law. The question, rather, was whether a Church of Scientology chapel was a “place of meeting for religious worship” within the meaning of the Places of Worship Registration Act 1855. The court did not decide whether a non-theistic set of beliefs can constitute a religion for the purposes of charity law or whether Scientology is a religion for such purposes (Winn LJ expressly stated that he was not concerned to decide “whether Scientology is or is not a religion”); it merely interpreted “place of religious worship” for the purposes of the Act as meaning “a place where people come together to do reverence with prayer, humility and thanksgiving to a Supreme Being”, Lord Denning MR concluding: “I am sure that would be the meaning attached by those who framed this legislation of 1855”.
 
Accordingly, the Church of Scientology’s chapel did not (and still would not) qualify for registration as a place of worship under the Places of Worship Registration Act 1855.
 
The Commissioners considered that interpreted in a charity law context, the decision is not binding authority as to the criteria of a “religion” in charity law. The dicta of the judges are of persuasive value, and arguably strongly so, because the court did consider the question of the nature of religious worship, although it did not consider the nature of the Scientology practices of auditing and training (which CoS argues constitutes the worship of Scientologists), that not being a matter before the court.
 
(ii) Bowman v Secular Society (House of Lords)38
 
This concerned the validity of a gift to the Secular Society, one of whose objects was to promote the principle that “human conduct should be based upon natural knowledge and not upon supernatural belief, and that human welfare in this world is the proper end of all thought”. The issue was whether this object denied Christianity and, if so, thereby involved the criminal offence of blasphemy; if so, the gift to the Society would not be enforceable.
 
There was some consideration of a side issue of whether the gift, if given to the Society as trustee for the purposes set out in that object, would be charitable. Lord
 
38 [1917] AC 406.
 
17
 
Parker of Waddington said “It is not a religious trust, for it relegates religion to a region in which it is to have no influence on human conduct”.39
 
The Commissioners considered that the dicta here in relation to charity law were therefore neutral in relation to the characteristics or nature of religion.
 
(iii) South Place Ethical Society ( High Court)40
 
This case did concern charity law and religion. The issue before the court was whether the Society, which professed a belief in "“ethical principles"” that is, “the belief in the excellence of truth, love and beauty, but not belief in anything supernatural”, was a religion or otherwise charitable.
 
Dillon J began by referring to the Bowman case and the United Grand Lodge case in which the court had held, without defining the term religion to exclude non-theistic beliefs, that the organisations in question were not established for the advancement of religion, In relation to Bowman v Secular Society,41 Dillon J said: “That comment [in Bowman] seems to me to be equally applicable to the objects of the society in the present case… Lord Parker of Waddington has used the word [religion] ‘in its natural and accustomed sense’”.
 
In relation to the second case,42 in which Donovan J, after commenting that freemasonry held out certain characteristics including reverence, honesty, compassion, loyalty, temperance, benevolence and chastity, said – “Admirable though these objects are it seems to us impossible to say that they add up to the advancement of religion”.43 Dillon J considered that the society had not made out a case to be charitable on the grounds that its objects were for the advancement of religion.
 
The Commissioners considered that it may not have been necessary to the decision of the case to go on, as the judge did, to define “religion” with particularity, by reference to criteria of a god and worship of that god, nor necessarily to interpolate into charity law for that purpose, as he did, the decision in Segerdal.
 
However, given that this judgement was concerned with charitable status and religion, the Commissioners concluded that they would be able to give the statement due weight in considering the characteristics of a religion for the purposes of charity law.
 
39 Idem, at 445 40 [1980] 1 WLR 1565
41 Bowman v Secular Society [1917] AC 406
42 United Grand Lodge of Ancient Free and Accepted Masons of England v. Holborn Borough Council [1957] 1 WLR 1080
43 Idem, at 1090.
 
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(iv) Keren Kayemeth Le Jisroel v IRC (Court of Appeal)44
 
The Keren Kayemeth case was decided by the Court of Appeal in 1931. It was concerned with the charitable status of a company with objects to acquire land in Palestine, Syria and other countries for the purposes of settling Jews there. It had been argued that such a purpose might be religious because it is a religious purpose of the Jewish community to return to the Holy Land. The Court found that the company was not charitable and, in fact, there was very little discussion about the purported religious purpose. Lord Hanworth MR said:45 “Turning now to the problem whether either of the four characteristics [of charity] can be found in the Association, it is sufficient to say that as to “religion” I agree with the observations with Rowlatt J on that head. The promotion of religion means the promotion of spiritual teaching in a wide sense, and the maintenance of the doctrines on which it rests, and the observances that serve to promote and manifest it – not merely a foundation or cause to which it can be related. Religion as such finds no place in the Memorandum of the Association.”
 
It was apparent to the Commissioners from the full context of this paragraph in the judgement that Lord Hanworth did not mean to give a definition of religion but was concerned with what the promotion of religion means. In effect, all that Lord Hanworth was saying was that promoting an organisation which is related to a religion (in this case Judaism) is not the same as promoting a religion. It was not an issue at all whether Judaism was a religion. Lord Hanworth’s comments could not, in the Commissioners’ view, be taken as
providing a definition of religion which is binding. They could, though, be regarded as a proper indicator of the meaning of the promotion of religion.
 
(v) United Grand Lodge of Ancient Free and Accepted Masons of England v Holborn Borough Council (Court of Appeal) 46
 
In this case the United Grand Lodge claimed to be entitled to rating relief on the basis that the organisation’s objects were “charitable or otherwise concerned with the advancement of religion” within the meaning of section 8 (1)(a) of the Rating and Valuation (Misc. Provisions) Act 1955. Donovan J commented that the organisation urged freemasons to be reverent, honest, compassionate, loyal, temperate, benevolent and chaste; but he found that this did not amount to the advancement of religion.
 
The court went on per curiam 47 to identify what is meant by the advancement of religion (as opposed to defining religion itself) - to promote it by spreading its message ever wider by pastoral and missionary means.
 
The Commissioners agreed that they would be able to rely on this case as identifying the ways in which a religion may be advanced.
 
44 [1931] 2KB 465
45 supra page 477
46 [1957] 1 WLR 1080
47 statements given per curiam indicate that they have been decided on by the court and have authority as such.
 
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(vi) Coats v Gilmour (Court of Appeal and House of Lords)48
 
This case directly concerned religious charitable trusts and public benefit in relation to a closed order of nuns. The Court of Appeal judgements contain a more detailed analysis of the nature of public benefit enuring from a religious trust. Although the case was appealed to the House of Lords, the Lords did not disturb the findings of the Court of Appeal.
 
The judgements here are therefore binding on the Commissioners in considering public benefit and religious charities.
 
Conclusion
 
The Commissioners concluded that the English legal authorities are neither clear nor unambiguous as to the definition of religion in English charity law, and at best the cases are of persuasive value with the result that a positive and constructive approach and one which conforms to ECHR principles, to identifying what is a religion in charity law could and should be adopted.
 
In order to interpret the decided English cases in a manner which is both constructive and consistent with ECHR principles, the Commissioners considered that they could properly take account of how the question of what is “a religion” has been addressed elsewhere. In particular the Commissioners considered that they may take account of:
 
§ Court decisions in other jurisdictions, principally Australia, the USA and India although it was noted that these cases were of persuasive value only for the Commission, and to a lesser degree than the English cases.
 
§ Expert Opinion– submitted by CoS from scholars expert in the study of religion (principally from Dr Wilson, Dr Bryant and Dr Kliever).
 
§ Indications of whether the public at large would view a belief system as a religion including decisions of other ‘public bodies’, and the common English meanings of religion and worship, as found, for example, in the English dictionaries.49
 
48 [1948] Ch 340 & [1949] AC 426
49 CoS has yet to be accepted by the Home Office Immigration and Nationality Directorate of the religion for the purposes of the immigration rules. CoS has been recognised as an acceptable religious advertiser on British television by the ITC (R v ITC ex parte New Era Publications Aps and Church of Scientology Religious Education College [1996] (unreported) CO/227/96). This case did not reach court (except for the determination of costs). There is no formal “ruling” available; the ITC’s decision is reflected in the form of a press release dated 24 April 1996. The ITC advertising rules on “religious advertising” apply to advertising bodies with objects of a religious nature or which is directed towards a religious end and are also applicable to “advertising having a similar connection to systems of belief or philosophies of life which do not involve the recognition of a deity but can reasonably be regarded as equivalent or alternative to those which do”. It is not known whether CoS was regarded as a religion or belief system in this connection. The Ministry of Defence has confirmed by letter to CoS that Scientology is “an officially recognised religion in the Royal Navy”. The Commissioners noted that having regard to the way in which other English bodies had determined whether or not a belief system is religious would not provide them with indicators as to how to determine whether a belief system is religious for the purposes of charity law. However, the decisions of other bodies may provide evidence as to whether the public at large would view the belief.
 
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Belief in a supreme being
 
The Commissioners considered how the question of a belief in a supreme being was addressed both in the opinions of experts, by the foreign legal authorities and in common definitions of religion
 
Expert opinion
 
All three of the major experts relied upon by CoS conclude that Scientology believes in a supreme being, although the place and nature of that being is not the same as that of God in Christianity or Judaism for example. The place of the supreme being in Scientology is dealt with at section 8.11 and 11.03a of the Opinion of Dr Wilson. Dr Wilson writes that “Scientology does acknowledge a Supreme Being, but conceives of that entity as something which cannot be easily apprehended and with which communication, at this stage of human enlightenment, is a rare thing”. Section IV.7C-IV. 7D of the Opinion of Dr Bryant 50 and section 13 and 33 of the Opinion of Dr Kliever 51 in particular, also concern Scientology’s belief in a Supreme Being.
 
Foreign Legal Authorities
 
The Commissioners noted that foreign courts have taken a broad approach to the question of a supreme being. In The Church of the New Faith v the Commissioner for Payroll Tax supra, a case on appeal to the High Court of Australia two of the five Judges indicated that religion had two essential criteria - belief in a “supernatural being or thing or principle” and conduct giving effect to that belief. Two other judges concluded that a single formula could not determine whether a set of beliefs constituted a religion. However, they identified various indicia for answering that question as follows: - that the ideas in question reflect the ultimate concerns of human existence; an element of comprehensiveness; forms and ceremonies.
 
The one remaining judge in that case appears to have taken the view that “any body which claims to be religious and offers a way to find meaning and purpose in life, is religious”. It seems that only two of the judges there adopted what could broadly be described as a ‘theistic’ approach, referring to the criterion of a ‘supernatural being, thing or principle’.
 
The Indian Courts have concluded that religion is not necessarily theistic 52 , but undoubtedly has as its basis a system of beliefs or doctrines which are regarded by those who profess that religion as conducive to their spiritual well-being.
 
In Fellowship of Humanity v County of Alameda the California State Court of Appeal holding that facilities used by humanist groups for weekly meetings qualified as system as a religion. Further, reference to the dictionary definitions may further provide an indication of what is commonly understood by the terms ‘religion’ and ‘worship’ in the English language.
 
50 “The Eighth Dynamic is “the urge toward existence as Infinity”, or what others call “a Supreme Being or Creator”
51 “Scientology’s Eighth Dynamic affirms a spiritual context of life that radically transcends the empirical self and the physical universe. Scientologists are reluctant to claim complete technological control and philosophical understanding of this highest level of spirituality” and @ section33 “though the Church of Scientology resolutely affirms the existence of God, it has no dogma concerning the nature of God. For the most part… they think of God less as a personal Being who commands personal devotion and obedience than as a spiritual force that invites individual exploration and discovery…”
52 The Commissioner Hindu Religious Endowment Madras v Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar Of Sri Shirur Mutt (1954) – Indian Supreme Court [1954] SCR 1005.
 
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a place of worship for property tax exemption purposes identified four characteristics of religion, the first being “a belief not necessarily referring to supernatural power”.53
 
Common definitions
 
The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary indicates that religion means “belief in or sensing of some superhuman controlling power or powers entitled to obedience, reverence and worship, or in a system defining a code of living, especially as a means to achieve spiritual or material improvement; acceptance of such belief (especially if represented by an organised church) as the standard of spiritual and practical life; the expression of this in worship.”
 
Conclusion
 
In taking account of, and looking at the English cases in the light of, these sources, the Commissioners concluded that belief in a supreme being remains a necessary characteristic of religion for the purposes of English charity law. It would not, however, in their view, be proper to specify the nature of that supreme being or to require it to be analogous to the deity or supreme being of a particular religion.
 
However, the Commissioners did not find it necessary to conclude that the requirement of a supreme being is no longer necessary at all to the concept of religion in English charity law – the Commissioners did not find themselves compelled to reject “theism” altogether (as in the Indian case), nor to dilute the concept to the extent of the Australian case 54 (so as to refer to belief in a ‘supernatural… principle’; for example).
 
Worship
 
In relation to the question of worship it was apparent to the Commissioners from the
papers submitted to them by CoS that auditing and training are regarded as worship in Scientology.
 
The Commissioners noted the nature of these “core religious services”, a detailed description of which were found in the text book “What is Scientology?” supplied by CoS.55 It was clear that these activities (auditing and training) form the essential religious activities of Scientology – for example the “Enrolment Form for religious services of Scientology at Saint Hill in Sussex” [the Enrolment Form] states that “the core religious services of the Scientology religion are auditing and training”.
 
Auditing is described as a very unique form of personal counselling 56 which helps an individual look at his own existence and improves his ability to confront what andwhere he is, and is conducted at auditing sessions during which an auditor 57 audits a individual. Auditing uses exact sets of questions asked or directions given by an auditor to help an individual find out things about himself and improve his condition and locate areas of spiritual distress and travail. Auditing is assisted by use of an E-
 
53 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 315 P.2d 394 (1957) The other three characteristics were - a cult involving a gregarious association openly expressing the belief; a system of moral practice resulting from adherence to the belief; an organisation within the cult designed to observe the tenets of the belief
54 Church of the New Faith supra
55 At pages 80ff and 88ff.
56 The Commissioners noted that it is described as such by Scientologists on the Video Presentation to the Charity Commission, and also item 3 Enrolment Form.
57 person trained and qualified in applying auditing to individuals for their betterment. Pg. 80
“What is Scientology ?”.
 
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meter. As a result of auditing an individual discovers things about himself and his life, a realisation which results in a higher degree of awareness and a greater ability to succeed. Auditing sessions are conducted “in a quiet comfortable place where it will not be disturbed”. Those present are the auditor and person being audited with an E-meter set up for the auditor’s use.
 
Training in Scientology involves the study of the works of L Ron Hubbard, listening to his recorded lectures and drilling of the principles of application. Training sessions are supervised by a course supervisor who moves from student to student monitoring progress, and a course administrator who provides any needed materials. There is no formal teaching. Training is based solely upon study of the course materials and works of Mr Hubbard. Check sheets set out the sequence of study and the practical application drills to be followed. The materials of a Scientology course consist of books, other publications, films and recorded lectures by L Ron Hubbard.
 
The Scientology course is said to be solely for the benefit of the student, whose own advancement in knowledge determines progress. Completion of a course is marked by the award of a certificate signifying attainment of a particular level of knowledge or skill.
 
The Commissioners noted that participation in both auditing and training is generally, although not exclusively, dependant upon payment of what was described to the Commissioners by CoS as “a requested donation”. In this respect it was also noted that the Enrolment Form refers to “requested donations with respect to… participation in auditing and religious services”, and that it set out a procedure for seeking a refund if dissatisfied with the results of the service, provided the individual relinquishes membership of CoS. Thereafter it appears that the individual is no longer qualified to receive further auditing and training.58
 
However, the Commissioners noted that impecuniosity is not according to CoS, a bar to an individual’s progress in Scientology, there being other ways in which an individual can participate in auditing and training without making monetary contributions. They also noted that payment in respect of participation in auditing and training is said by CoS to be necessary because these are labour intensive activities from CoS’s point of view requiring a large number
of trained auditors and supervisors.
 
The Commissioners then turned to the question of how the concept of worship had been addressed elsewhere particularly in expert opinion, foreign legal authorities and in common definitions, as follows:
 
Expert opinions
 
The central practices of Scientology – auditing and training – constitute religious worship in the three main expert opinions relied upon by CoS, in particular the Opinion of Dr Kliever p.19 section 34-42; the Opinion of Dr Byrant, Section V pages 22-27; the Opinion of Dr Wilson Ch8 p59-70.
 
Dr Wilson, for example states that the definition of worship should not be confined to the assumptions of one specific tradition and that the forms traditional to Christianity do not exhaust all the various modes in which worship can occur. He argues that the universal aim of worship is to establish a rapport between the individual and the supernatural ultimate (being, object, law, principle, dimension, ground of being, or concern) in whatever way that ultimate is conceived by the religious body to which the
 
58 Item 5 Enrolment Form.
 
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individual belongs, with a view to his ultimate attainment of salvation or enlightenment – section 8.06 of Dr Wilson’s Opinion. He writes that the essence of Scientology is understanding through communication which is through auditing - private communication by the individual with his past; and training - communication with the fundamental truths and grounds of existence. In Scientology communication with
spiritual reality is sought and ultimately achieved through auditing and training which thus constitute worship.
 
Foreign legal authorities
 
In Fellowship of Humanity v County of Alameda 59 the California State Court of Appeal (in holding that facilities used by Humanist groups at their weekly meetings qualified as a place of worship for property tax redemption purposes) indicated that any lawful means of formally observing the tenets of the cult (defined as a gregarious association openly expressing the beliefs in question) constituted “worship”.
 
In Church of the New Faith v Commissioner for Payroll Tax the High Court of Australia in adopting a two-fold test to religion chose not to identify ‘worship’ as one of the two characteristics of religion. Rather, the second limb of the Court’s test refers to “the acceptance of canons of conduct in order to give effect to that belief [in a supernatural being, thing or principle – the first limb of the test] provided that the canons of conduct do not offend against the ordinary laws.” However the
Commissioners noted that the decision itself in that case seemed to turn upon whether the group of Scientologists involved were genuine in their belief, rather than upon any objective criteria identifying an organisation as “religious”.
 
Common Definitions:
 
The Commissioners agreed that dictionary definition of “worship” may provide an indication of how the public generally would understand that term, and noted that the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines worship as “acknowledgement of worth, homage; respectful recognition or honour shown to a person or thing; religious reverence, adoration or homage paid to a being of higher regard or treated as supernatural or divine; the expression of this in acts, ritual, ceremony or prayer, especially of a public or formal nature; veneration or devotion similar to religious homage shown to a person or principle.”
 
Reverence is defined there as “deep respect or veneration especially on account of the object’s sacred or exalted character” and veneration as “a feeling of deep respect or reverence for a person or thing. The action or act of showing this.”60
 
The Commissioners indicated that it is perhaps significant that Hubert Picarda QC 61 refers to the requirement of “worship as the manifestation of faith”. He states that there must be an expression of faith and refers to the definition of religion in Webster’s New International Dictionary – “Service and adoration of God or a god as expressed in the form of worship”.
 
59 153 Cal.App.2d673,315P.2d394(1957)
60 Other definitions are:- “reverence: to regard or treat with reverence, respect, honour or veneration: honour or respect felt or manifested, deference paid or expressed” and “veneration: a feeling of respect mingled with awe excited by the dignity, wisdom, superiority of a person, by sacredness of character, their consecrated state; the act of admiring humbly and respectfully” – Webster’s 3 rd New International Dictionary.
61 ‘The Law and Practice Relating to Charities’ H Picarda 2 nd Ed. p. 64 (3 rd Ed. p. 74).
 
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Conclusion
 
In approaching the question of worship the Commissioners recognised that the advancement of religion is regarded as a distinct (third) head of charity law accepted (on the basis of experience) as conferring public benefit subject to evidence to the contrary. There was therefore a need to maintain clear criteria to differentiate those purposes falling within the third head and those which did not. The Commissioners considered that the concept of worship had the potential to provide such clear and objective criteria. The Commissioners considered it proper that the distinction in English charity law between religious and non-religious belief systems be maintained. At the same time the Commissioners noted the need to avoid discrimination between religions.
 
Approaching the concept of worship in the light of these considerations the Commissioners identified in the English legal authorities a concept of worship which exhibited defining characteristics of reverence and recognition of a supreme being outside the body and life of the follower of the religion- ex parte Segerdal. Further in South Place Ethical Society, the court indicated that it did not seem possible to worship an ethical or philosophical ideal “with reverence”. The identifying feature of worship in English charity law appeared therefore to be that of reverence for or veneration of a supreme being.
 
The Commissioners further noted that the dictionary definitions indicate that worship is characterised by reverence and veneration.
 
The Commissioners thus concluded that the English legal authorities indicated that the criterion of worship would be met where belief in a supreme being found its expression in conduct indicative of reverence or veneration for that supreme being.
 
The Commissioners noted and welcomed the fact that the concept of worship so understood, distilled from the decided English cases was reflected in the common English definition of the word “worship”.
 
The Commissioners also noted that the concept of worship so understood provided objective criteria by which worship can be identified for the purposes of recognising an organisation to be charitable as advancing religion and so falling within a distinct third head of English charity, at the same time as being sufficiently broad to allow recognition of a range of belief systems commonly recognised as religions.
 
In reaching this conclusion the Commissioners did not feel themselves constrained to adopt either an understanding of “worship” as put forward in the expert opinions submitted by CoS, nor to adopt the approach taken in the foreign legal authorities. To adopt the approach of the expert Dr Wilson for example would in the Commissioners’ view effectively mean redefining worship as “the means by which communication with spiritual reality is sought and ultimately achieved”. Alternatively following the foreign legal authorities “worship” could be redefined as for example “any lawful means of formally observing the tenets of the religion” - Fellowship of Humanity v County of Alameda; or as “canons of conduct giving effect to the belief in question” - Church of the New Faith v Commissioner for Payroll Tax. The Commissioners concluded that it was not appropriate to adopt either of these approaches since to do so would mean redefining the concept of “worship” as a criterion of religion in English charity law, so as to give to the term “worship” a meaning different from that suggested by the English legal authorities, and one which the word does not, in ordinary English, naturally bear.
 
The Commissioners approach applied to Scientology.
 
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Belief in a Supreme Being
 
The Commissioners concluded that it could be accepted that Scientology claims to profess belief in a supreme being. The nature of this being is not fully developed but it is not similar to the god of the Judeo Christian tradition, for example. The Commissioners noted that different religions have different understandings of what is meant by the term “supreme being”, further, the nature of that being, and the extent to which differing religions exhibit a developed theology also varies. However, since it is clear that English law does not enquire into the nature, worth or value of religious beliefs 62 , nor concern itself with the truth of the religious beliefs in question 63 , the Commissioners concluded it to be sufficient for the purposes of English charity law that Scientology professes a belief in a supreme being.
 
Worship
 
The Commissioners concluded that auditing appears in essence very much akin to counselling, conducted on a one to one basis, in private, and addressed to the needs of the individual receiving auditing. Scientologists themselves describe auditing as counselling (for example in the video presentation to the Charity Commissioners for England and Wales). On the whole they do not appear to describe auditing in terms of worship.
 
The Commissioners further concluded that training in Scientology, involving the detailed study of the works of L Ron Hubbard, according to particular set formulae or methods of study, similarly lacks the elements of reverence or veneration necessary if it is to constitute worship. Scientology training appears more like an educational activity (the acquisition of knowledge and practical skills in the application of Scientology theory and technology) than a religious activity or worship in the sense identified by the Commissioners.
 
The Commissioners noted that it was a feature of auditing and training that it is normal practice (although not exclusively so) to require payment in advance, these payments being referred to as “requested donations” by CoS, as a prerequisite for participation in these activities. This practice was noted but the Commissioners did not consider it to have an impact upon whether the activities of auditing and training themselves constituted worship in English charity law.
 
Having considered the core religious services of Scientology, namely auditing and training which CoS submits constitutes worship, the Commissioners concluded that they could not find, in auditing and training whether taken separately or together, the reverence and veneration for a supreme being which they considered is necessary to constitute worship in English charity law.
 
The Commissioners therefore concluded that Scientology is not a religion for the purposes of English charity law, and that CoS is not charitable as being established for the charitable purpose of the advancement of religion.
 
Whether CoS promotes and advances Scientology
 
62 Thornton v Howe supra
63 Gilmour v Coats supra.
 
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Turning to the question of whether CoS promotes and advances Scientology – it was noted that this question was now hypothetical, the Commissioners having concluded that Scientology was not a religion in English charity law. However, CoS had supplied argument and evidence that it did promote and advance Scientology and the Commissioners considered this, although it was not strictly necessary to do so in view of the conclusion that Scientology was not a religion.
 
The Commissioners accepted that on the basis of the evidence put to them by CoS, the organisation did promote and advance Scientology as its system of belief, seeking to spread its message ever wider and exhibiting a missionary element in a manner identified by the relevant legal authorities. The Commissioners noted that it was not necessary in reaching this conclusion to consider the extent to which CoS is engaged in activities which may in themselves be charitable in their own right whether pursued by CoS or some other body, for example activities which may be charitable as relieving poverty or other need, or advancing education.
 
7. Whether CoS is established for the purpose of promoting the moral or spiritual welfare or improvement of the community
 
The Commissioners considered whether CoS is established for the purpose of promoting the moral or spiritual welfare or improvement of the community under the fourth head of charity law.
 
CoS argue that if Scientology is not a religion, then the advancement of Scientology is nevertheless charitable under the fourth head of charity 64 by analogy with decided cases where the institutions concerned were established for the moral or spiritual welfare or improvement of the community. The Commissioners therefore considered whether CoS is in fact established under the fourth head as promoting the moral or spiritual welfare or improvement of the community, being a purpose which is beneficial to the community, and already recognised in charity law.
 
The Commissioners indicated that it would be necessary for them to consider firstly the legal basis upon which the promotion of the moral or spiritual welfare or improvement of the community is regarded as a charitable purpose as set out in the cases of Re Scowcroft, Re Hood, Re Price and Re South Place Ethical Society; secondly whether Scientology is analogous to those cases and if so thirdly whether the test of public benefit under the fourth head has been satisfied.
 
The Commissioners noted that it is clear from the case law 65 that it may be charitable under the fourth head of charity to promote the moral or spiritual welfare or improvement of the community.
 
The Commissioners noted that in order to decide whether a novel purpose is charitable under the fourth head of charity, the courts and the Commission will consider whether the purpose is analogous to those found in the Preamble to the Statute of Elizabeth or to a purpose already found to be charitable by the courts or the Commission. The Commission has publicly stated its approach to determining such
 
64 under the classification of charities by Lord MacNaghten in Income Tax Special Purposes, Commissioners v Pemsel [1891] AC 531‘other purposes beneficial to the community not falling under any of the preceding heads’
65 Re Scowcroft [1898] 2 Ch 638, Re Hood [1931] 1 Ch 240, Re Price [1943] Ch 422, Re South Place Ethical Society supra.
 
27
 
cases in its Annual Report of 1985 66 and will act constructively and imaginatively in seeking an analogy, its general approach being to favour charity.67
 
In addition, public benefit must be shown to flow from the activities of the particular organisation in question. Tangible or objective benefits are generally required but intangible benefits are acceptable 68 . Those benefits must also be available to the public at large or to a sufficiently important section of the public.69 CoS’ s arguments that it is established for such a purpose
 
The Commissioners took note of CoS’s arguments in support of its application for registration as a charity under this head that Scientology regards itself as a religion whose principal concern is “to lead man to salvation”70 , but which is also concerned with human wellbeing. Scientology makes clear that its long term goal is the benefit of all mankind – by promoting its spiritual practices it seeks to eliminate destructive and hostile tendencies amongst men.71 The teachings of Scientology are translated into practical activity by its adherents (aimed at achieving Scientology’s stated aim 72 ), for example in the field of rehabilitation of drug addicts and criminals.
 
Dr Wilson (one of the experts in the study of religion relied upon by CoS) concludes that the teachings and intentions embraced in Scientology “do not materially differ from those in most other religious organisations, namely the moral and spiritual improvement of mankind and the creation of a safer and happier society”73 . In consequence CoS argues that there are clear parallels between the aims of the teachings of Scientology and the teachings of Rudolf Steiner considered in the case of Re Price. It is argued by CoS that Scientology’s teachings are all directed towards the promotion of moral or spiritual welfare or improvement of the community.
 
CoS argues that many of Mr Hubbard’s teachings are already recognised as charitable and applied by existing charities. For example Mr Hubbard’s teachings on drug abuse, how drugs and toxic residues impede spiritual improvement and about how to rid people of the adverse long term effect of drugs have general application in the field of drug rehabilitation, and are used particularly by the drug rehabilitation charity Narconon. Mr Hubbard’s methods developed to assist people in religious study are, it is argued, taught and used by educational charities both in this country and around the world. It is argued that other teachings based on the Scientology belief that moral and ethical living are necessary for true happiness and spiritual growth have been used in courses and to rehabilitate criminals by charities here and abroad. CoS therefore conclude that a large part of the teachings which promote moral, mental and spiritual improvement within Scientology are already recognised as charitable in purpose and taught and used by existing charities.
 
66 AR 1985 Pages 11 & 12 paras 24-27.
67 AR 1985 para 27
68 If such benefits would be regarded as valuable ‘by the common understanding of enlightened opinion’ -– National Anti-Vivisection Society v IRC [1948] AC 31.
69 Verge v Sommerville [1924] AC496
70 Opinion of Dr Bryan Wilson October 1997 “Scientology and the Public Benefit”
71 Opinion of Dr Bryan Wilson October 1997 supra
72 “A civilisation without insanity, without criminals and without war, where the able can prosper and honest beings can have rights, and where Man is free to rise to greater heights, are the aims of Scientology” L. Ron Hubbard – ‘The Aims of Scientology’
73 Opinion of Bryan Wilson October 1997 supra.
 
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Examination of the legal authorities
 
The Commissioners considered the relevant decided English cases and noted that the promotion of the moral or spiritual welfare or improvement of the community as a charitable purpose has developed over the course of several cases decided by the courts. The most recent case is Re South Place Ethical Society where the court considered that the Society in question was analogous to the three cases which had gone before - Re Scowcroft; Re Hood; Re Price.
 
It was clear to the Commissioners that the promotion of the moral or spiritual welfare or improvement of the community is a recognised category of charity falling within the fourth head of Lord MacNaghten’s classification 74 , and they considered whether CoS was established for a purpose analogous to those found in the case law. Re Scowcroft and Re Hood were both cases concerned with the promotion of temperance primarily as a means of advancing Christian principles, but also on its own account. On the facts, the Commissioners found little analogy between those cases and CoS.
 
The Commissioners considered that the cases of Re Price and Re South Place Ethical Society however, might provide a basis for an analogy. Re Price was concerned with advancing the teachings of Rudolf Steiner and these may have some similarity in their nature with the teachings of L Ron Hubbard promoted by CoS. Steiner taught, amongst a range of other things, a theory of knowledge and a method of mental and moral discipline and the application of this to a wide range of studies (eg to religion and education generally). L Ron Hubbard developed Scientology as the Science of Knowledge which, once learnt by a student of Scientology can be applied to many aspects of life.
 
However, there seemed to the Commissioners to be a fundamental difference between the case of Re Price and that of CoS.
 
The Steiner teachings were a broad range of teachings which included “a method of mental and moral discipline designed to train the imaginative, creative and devotional faculties of the mind…”. However, these did not constitute a formal system of doctrines, practices and beliefs and the Society in Re Price was not concerned with advancing a belief system whether religious or secular. Steiner’s principles were of general application to different aspects of life (“in other books and lectures Steiner taught and developed the application of [his theory of] knowledge to religion and education generally”.)75
 
It seemed to the Commissioners that CoS on the other hand is concerned with advancing a set of doctrines, practices and beliefs which constitute a highly structured and formal belief system, which its practitioners regard as a religion. Its adherents share beliefs which are unique to Scientology. Further it is necessary to receive Scientology services – principally auditing and training – in order to apply Scientology doctrines and practices to life. Progress across the Eight Dynamics is achieved through auditing with a trained Scientology auditor and participation in training. This necessitates membership of a particular organisation because of the need to engage in auditing and training - the Scientology services available through CoS. It was not
 
74 Income Tax Special Purposes Commissioners v Pemsel, supra
75 Re Price supra @ p. 431.

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therefore clear to the Commissioners that the doctrines, practices and beliefs of Scientology can be accepted and applied by the public at large as a broad philosophy for living their daily lives or as a way of achieving spiritual awareness. Nor was it clear that the public does so accept and apply those doctrines, practices and beliefs. For similar reasons CoS is distinguishable in the Commissioners’ view from the case of Re South Place Ethical Society. That Society was, as the Judge said, concerned with rational thought. A member of the public could share the views propounded by the Society and live by them (or not) from time to time as he might choose, because they were general views. An individual did not have to be a member of the South Place Ethical Society in order to understand or adopt the philosophy and principles that it advanced. Further the Society was not advancing a religion or other belief system.
 
In conclusion, the institutions found to be charitable in the Re Price and South Place Ethical Society cases were disseminating ideas which were broadly philosophical and which were generally accessible to and could be applied within the community and which could be adopted freely from time to time, according to individual choice or judgement, by members of the public at large.
 
In neither the Re Price nor the South Place Ethical Society cases was a belief system promulgated, nor was membership of the organisation concerned necessary for an individual to follow the principles of Steiner or those promulgated by the South Place Ethical Society.
 
CoS on the other hand was, in the Commissioners’ opinion distinct from these two cases because it regards itself as promoting a religion, and unarguably promotes a formal belief system (whether accepted as religious or not). Its doctrines, practices and beliefs are not such as to be available generally to the public at large as they may choose from time to time. Rather, the nature of Scientology’s doctrines, practices and beliefs is such that they constitute a highly structured system and such that membership of the organisation is necessary for participation.
 
The Commissioners did not find Scientology to be strictly analogous to the cases previously decided by the Court.
 
Ambiguity in the English legal authorities
 
However, the Commissioners noted that the English legal authorities concerning the moral or spiritual welfare or improvement of the community might not be entirely clear and unambiguous and may be of persuasive value rather than binding authority. Analysis of English legal authorities concerning the moral or spiritual welfare or improvement of the community.
 
The Commissioners therefore considered the extent to which ambiguity existed in the relevant legal authorities and reviewed these as follows:
 
(i) Re Scowcroft
In this case a vicar left by will a building used as a village hall and reading room “to be maintained for the furtherance of Conservative principles and religious and mental improvement and to be kept free of intoxicants and dancing”.
 
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The judge, Stirling J, found that the true reading was that it was either a gift for the furtherance of Conservative principles in such a way as to further religious and mental principles or it was a gift for the furtherance of religious and mental improvement in accordance with Conservative principles. In either case, the furtherance of religious and mental improvement was found to be an essential part of the gift. Stirling J held that therefore it was a gift for that purpose and a good charitable gift. He thought that the limitation of having to combine that gift with the advancement of Conservative principles did not defeat its charitable status.
 
The Commissioners noted that the judgement has been criticised for finding that the reference to Conservative principles did not prevent the gift from being charitable but there seems to have been little challenge to the proposition that furthering mental and religious improvement is a good charitable purpose. The judgement gives scant justification for this, though the judge said that this construction of the gift was aided by the direction that the building is to be kept free from intoxicants and dancing.
 
The Commissioners concluded that Re Scowcroft gives no reasons for the basis of mental or religious improvement as a charitable purpose. (ii) Re Hood
 
In this case, a testator expressed his belief that “the remedy for all the unrest and disorders of the body politic will be found in the application of Christian principles to all human relationships” and that drink was preventing the effective application of Christian principles. His gift was therefore to be used to spread Christian principles and to take steps to extinguish the drink traffic. It was being argued that these were two separate objects and that the second - concerning drink traffic - was not charitable. The court therefore had to consider whether promoting temperance was a charitable purpose.
 
Lord Hanworth MR concluded that this meant the advancement of Christian principles by the extinguishment of drink traffic. But after that, he went on to say obiter that “It will not be necessary for the present purposes, but I should have no hesitation in saying that ..... the object of reducing intemperance .. is also beneficial to society at large...” . Lawrence LJ thought that the second object could either be a means of furthering the first or could be an object in its own right. He said that the second object was charitable in any case: “temperance itself is undoubtedly a charitable object. It comes within the fourth class ... because many people regard temperance as contributing to the moral improvement of mankind.”
 
Romer LJ agreed that promoting temperance was charitable for the reasons given by the other judges and he referred to Re Scowcroft as providing a basis upon which to construe the gift.
 
None of the judges examined the reasoning behind the Re Scowcroft decision in any detail in relation to the moral or spiritual welfare or improvement of the community as a charitable purpose. Rather, it was used as a basis for construing the Re Hood gift as a charitable one.
 
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The Commissioners concluded that the Re Hood case is therefore of little value in understanding the principles behind mental and moral improvement as a charitable purpose.
(iii) Re Price  
 
This case concerned the trust of a fund which was left by will to the Anthroposophical Society of Great Britain. The Society was carrying on the teachings of Dr Rudolf Steiner, whose writings ranged from philosophy and religion through sociology, natural science, medicine, architecture, music and other arts. There was evidence to the effect that the teachings were: “directed to the extension of knowledge of the spiritual in man and in the universe generally and of the interaction of the spiritual and the physical. He sought to show both how this knowledge could be acquired and how it could be applied for the benefit of man in a wide range of activities .... He expounded a theory of knowledge....Steiner taught a method of mental and moral discipline designed to train the imaginative, creative and devotional faculties of the mind and so to develop the faculties of spiritual intuition and perception. This teaching is to be found in such a book as Steiner’s “Knowledge of Higher Worlds and its Attainment”. “In other books and lectures Steiner taught and developed the application of this knowledge to religion and education generally.”
 
The evidence before the Court was not challenged and the judge held that the gift to the Society was a valid one because the terms of the gift were not so uncertain that the Court could not take over the administration of the gift if that became necessary. The judge found that the gift did not tend to a perpetuity. Having decided this, he went on to say that it was not strictly necessary for him to decide whether it was charitable but he nevertheless went on to do so because the charitable nature of the gift had been argued before him. Nevertheless what the judge then had to say on the charitable status of the trust was obiter dicta.
 
Cohen J’s views on the charitability of the Steiner gift being directed towards the moral or spiritual welfare or improvement of the community were as follows: “I agree ... that (a) On the evidence the teachings of Rudolf Steiner are directed to the mental or moral improvement of man; (b) that provided this teaching is not contra bonos mores the court is not concerned to decide whether it will result in mental or moral improvement of anyone, but only whether on the evidence before the court it may have that result”. Cohen J then referred to what was said by Romilly MR in Thornton v Howe on the question of religious trusts to the effect that provided a sect did not have doctrines adverse to religion or subversive of morality the court would draw no distinction between one religion or another or enquire into the worth or value of religion.76 He
 
76 “In this respect, I am of the opinion that the court makes no distinction between one sort of reli- gion and another. They are equally bequests which are included in the general term of charitable bequests.Neither does the court, in this respect, make any distinction between one sect and another. It may be that the tenets of a particular sect inculcate doctrines adverse to the very foundations of all religion and subversive of all morality. In such a case, if it should arise, the court will not assist the execution of the bequest but will declare it void; but the character of the bequest would not be altered by this circumstance. The general immoral tendency would make it void whether it was to be paid out of purepersonality or out of real estate. But if the tendency were not immoral, and although the court might consider the opinions to be propagated foolish or even devoid of foundation, it would not on that account declare it void or take it out of the class of legacies which are included in the general terms charitable bequests.”
 
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then said: “What is said there of religion would apply also I think to philosophy” and he went on to say the Steiner gift would be charitable. However, it was not clear to the Commissioners why Cohen J thought it appropriate to apply the Thornton v Howe principles concerning religion to philosophy or promotion of moral or spiritual welfare or improvement; he gave no explanation.
 
The judgement of Cohen J is in the Commissioners’ view unclear on the following grounds:
 
a) What was said about the charitability of the gift was strictly obiter.77
b) The principles which the judge applied had previous judicial authority only in relation to religion and charity law. Applying the same principles to a different head of charity, where a different test of public benefit arises,78 may not be justified.
 
The Commissioners concluded that Re Price does not provide a comprehensive rationale underpinning the moral or spiritual welfare or improvement of the community as a charitable purpose. (iv) Re South Place Ethical Society The court decided that the Society concerned was not charitable by way of advancing religion but that it was charitable by way of advancing education or, alternatively, by analogy with Re Price, Re Hood, and Re Scowcroft, it was charitable under the fourth head as promoting the moral or spiritual welfare or improvement of the community.
 
The Society had as its object “the study and dissemination of ethical principles and the cultivation of a rational religious sentiment.” Dillon J noted that the members were sincere people of the highest integrity, who were not atheists but were agnostic about the existence of God. Dillon J said the following of the Society’s activities: “The objects refer to the dissemination as well as the study of ethical principles, and I should briefly mention the activities of the society.
 
It holds Sunday meetings, which are open to the public. At these meetings lectures are given, often by visiting lecturers, who may be persons of very considerable distinction, on subjects of serious and mainly intellectual interest, and the lectures are followed by discussions. There are other lectures on special occasions, such as the Conway Memorial Lectures, in memory of Moncure Conway. These are also open to the public. The society publishes a monthly magazine called the Ethical Record, which is available to the public,and others of its lectures are published and widely disseminated. In addition, in 77 Picarda, The Law and Practice of Charities 2 nd Ed. Pg 149 78 Under the advancement of religion head, public benefit is presumed although the presumption may be rebutted on the evidence. Under the fourth head, public benefit must be demonstrated.
 
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pursuit of the ideal of beauty and the appreciation of it, since the turn of the century, chamber music concerts have been given on Sunday nights in winter, first at the South Place chapel, and, since 1930, in the Conway Hall. These are open to the public. Performers of high repute and quality take part and the performances at these concerts are regarded by music experts as of a very high standard indeed. There are also, and not unexpectedly, social activities, which are broadly similar to the social activities of the congregation of a parish church, but these social activities are, in my judgement, ancillary to the other activities of the society. At the highest it can be said that they serve, as with the parish church, to further the esprit de corps of the congregation, and this in turn helps to further the cultivation of the rational religious sentiment.” Dillon J said of the objects:79 “I turn therefore to the objects of this society, as set out in its rules. The first part of the objects is the study and dissemination of ethical principles.
 
Dissemination, I think, includes dissemination of the fruits of the study, and I have no doubt that that part of the objects satisfies the criterion of charity as being for the advancement of education. The second part, the cultivation of a rational religious sentiment, is considerably more difficult. As I have already said, I do not think that the cultivation is limited to cultivation of the requisite sentiment in the members of the society and in no one else. In the context the society is outward looking, and the cultivation would extend to all members of the public whom the society’s teachings may reach. The sentiment or state of mind is to be rational, that is to say founded in reason. As I see it, a sentiment or attitude of mind founded in reason can only be cultivated or encouraged to grow by educational methods, including music, and the development of the appreciation of music by performance of high quality. The difficulty in this part of the society’s objects lies in expressing a very lofty and possibly unattainable ideal in a very few words, and the difficulty is compounded by the choice of the word ‘religious’, which, while giving the flavour of what is in mind, is not in my view used in its correct sense. Despite this, however, I do not see that the court would have any difficulty in controlling the administration of the society’s assets.”
 
On the evidence before him, therefore, Dillon J was satisfied that the Society’s activities - whether lectures, musical performances or otherwise - were of a very high calibre and he referred on several occasions to the “rationality” of the sentiment which the Society wished to advance. It seems to be for these reasons that he found the gift to the Society to be for charitable educational purposes, saying that the authorities show that the courts have construed the term “educational” widely.
 
Having so decided, there was no need for the judge to provide an alternative means by which the gift to the Society could be held to be charitable. Nevertheless, Dillon J did so, identifying the available analogies of Re Price, Re Hood, and Re Scowcroft, and concluding by reference to them that the gift to the Society would be charitable within the fourth head as well. Unfortunately, Dillon J did not examine the reasoning behind the previously decided cases or offer any explanation as to why the circumstances of the Society should be analogous to them.
 
79 [1980] 1 WLR Pg 1565.
 
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The Commissioners concluded that whilst the South Place Ethical Society case is cited by the text books 80 as laying to rest any doubt that promotion of the moral or spiritual welfare or improvement of the community is a charitable purpose, Dillon J’s comments may nevertheless be obiter dicta and, since the judge gave no reason for his alternative view of the objects, the decision is actually of limited value in determining the charitable status of institutions which may be established for that purpose.
 
The Commissioners noted that the development by court decisions of the promotion of the moral or spiritual welfare or improvement of the community as a charitable purpose seems to have come about with little judicial explanation as to the reasoning or principles involved. It seems to have arisen because the court has attempted to find a way to justify the cases before them as charitable. In fact, the only real reasoning for this purpose occurred in Re Price where the judge simply adopted the principles involved under another head of charity, although without explaining why he did so.
 
The Commissioners agreed that the cases about the charitability of this purpose are ambiguous. There are no cl